

# Integrating stress tests within the Basel III capital framework: a macroprudentially coherent approach

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*The views expressed in this presentation are my own and do not necessarily coincide with those of Banca d'Italia*

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- Post-crisis financial sector reforms introduced macroprudential tools aimed at enhancing the stability of the system & reducing the volatility of the cycle
- Banks' capital adequacy is established by the Basel III capital standards and by supervisory stress tests (STs)
- Basel III requires banks to build-up buffers during expansions, and allows for their use during downturns
- Supervisory STs assess in a forward-looking manner the resilience of both banks and the system as a whole to adverse macroeconomic shocks

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How to implement STs with cyclical severity?

- Constrained discretion approach to severity choice based on simple severity measure and rule

# How to integrate STs within Basel III?

- Basel III introduces buffers (CCyB & CCoB) to absorb losses during downturns
- STs can be used to assess if Basel III buffers are sufficient to withstand a macro shock


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
$$STB = \max \left\{ \frac{ST \text{ Losses}}{Risk \text{ weighted assets}} - (CCoB + CCyB), 0 \right\}$$

- Introduce the STB as a capital requirement additional to the other Basel III Pillar 1 requirements (minimum and buffers)
- The STB transforms ST results into the Basel “language” of buffers


# The Stress Test Buffer: illustration



# STB & G-SIIB: higher resilience for systemic banks



# Voluntary buffer, Stress Test Buffer and capital shortfall



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
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- The build-up of Basel III buffers during expansions to be used in downturns...
- defines a capital framework in which banks are allowed to operate with a lower level of resilience in downturns than in expansions
- Macroprudential coherence requires the level of resilience of STs to follow same cyclical path...
- meaning that **ST severity should be procyclical**: increase during expansions and decrease in downturns

# Stress Test severity along the cycle: illustration



# Implementation of STs with cyclical severity & main challenges

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  - Recession based measures preferable to probabilistic ones
- A “constrained discretion” approach to severity choice should be adopted
  - Need to define rules guiding severity for crucial parameters of the adverse scenario (e.g. unemployment rate, house prices, stock market indices,...)

# A bird's eye view on ST approaches in US, UK and EA

Supervisory STs	United States	United Kingdom	Euro area
<b>Capital implications</b>	Prohibition of dividends if capital shortfall	Transparent calibration of two required buffers	Capital guidance under SREP
<b>Procyclical severity</b>	Yes	Yes	No
<b>Severity measure</b>	No	No	No
<b>Severity rule</b>	Yes (for unemployment rate)	No	No

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- macroprudential coherence of a capital framework based on Basel III & STs requires **procyclical ST severity**

# Conclusion

- Policy makers' attention has to move to ensuring **coherent, transparent and predictable** use of new regulatory instruments

Implications for a bank capital framework based on Basel III & STs:

- macroprudential coherence of a capital framework based on Basel III & STs requires **procyclical ST severity**
- transparency is enhanced with the introduction of a **stress test buffer**

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Implications for a bank capital framework based on Basel III & STs:

- macroprudential coherence of a capital framework based on Basel III & STs requires **procyclical ST severity**
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Implications for a bank capital framework based on Basel III & STs:

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- transparency is enhanced with the introduction of a **stress test buffer**
- predictability benefits from a **constrained discretion** approach based on simple severity measure and rule
- The definition and implementation of such a framework **in the euro area is maybe more challenging** than in other jurisdictions **but equally necessary**
  - Severity choices of domestic components of scenarios should take into account heterogeneity in domestic financial and business cycles