MONETARY POLICY AND INDIVIDUAL HETEROGENEITY: THE EXPERIENCE OF THE BANCO DE ESPAÑA

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This talk: Two issues

- Optimal monetary policy (MP) with heterogeneous agents: A theoretical perspective
 - How does individual heterogeneity shape the optimal response of MP in the short-run vs medium run?
- The investment channel in the aftermath of the Spanish financial crisis: The key role of firms' heterogeneity
 - Squaring strong investment with strong deleveraging forces at the aggregate
 - The transmission of the ECB's CSPP in a dual economy featuring many small firms and a few (very) large ones

Why should MP-makers care about agent heterogeneity and the distributional effects of their policies?

- In standard NK models intertemporal substitution effects are centerpiece for understanding MP transmission
- But there is growing evidence that this channel is not the full story (may not be even the main one...)
 - The intertemporal allocation effects of changes in interest rates (IR) on consumption and investment are typically low
 - Indirect (general equilibrium) effects of changes in IR are more relevant (Kaplan et al. 2016)
 - Redistributive channels (heterogeneous earnings and IR exposures, Fisherian effects, etc.) may amplify the effect of IR (Auclert, 2016)
 - Some key aspects of non-conventional MP –including Forward Guidance and QE-transmission- are better understood from a heterogenous-agent perspective (McKay et al. 2016)

Individual heterogeneity seems relevant for MP: How should the CB incorporate it into its optimal policy?

- Work in this area has been mainly positive, little progress on the normative side
- Recent research by Nuño and Thomas (BdE 2016) analyzes the fully optimal monetary policy in a heterogeneous-households (HHs) economy

Key ingredients:

- HHs face uninsurable idiosyncratic risk à la Huggett (1993)
- HHs hold nominal non-contingent assets *Fisherian channel*
- Utility costs of inflation (due to costly price adjustment)

Main results

- Discretionary MP features a redistribution-driven inflationary bias:

With incomplete markets (and concave preferences), low-wealth agents have higher marginal utility than high-wealth ones

- Under commitment, central bank promises to reduce inflation gradually over time (inflation front-loading):

- to avoid high inflation expectations being priced into new bond issuances: optimal long run inflation is zero (under general conditions)
- > **both** debtors and creditors gain relative to discretion

Discretion vs Commitment

- <u>Discretionary</u>: inflation starts and remains high, i.e. inflationary bias
- <u>Commitment</u>: inflation starts high (no pre-commitments), but falls gradually towards long-run target (≈ zero)



What do we learn in practical terms?

- Medium-long run: Anti-inflation commitment is optimal
- Short run: There is margin to optimally exploit the redistribution channel

> By how much? It depends on the initial wealth distribution...



➤hence, it is an empirical question.

Aggregate consequences of individual heterogeneity: An empirical view on the corporate sector

- The Nuño-Thomas (2016) theory offers a stylized framework to think about optimal MP with heterogeneous households / distributional issues.
- But the empirical and firm dimensions are relevant in practice too.
- Two specific questions on this (focused on the BdE's experience):
 - Squaring strong investment with strong deleveraging forces at the aggregate
 - The transmission of the ECB's CSPP in a dual economy featuring many small firms and a few (very) large ones

The recovery of the Spanish economy: Deleveraging-cum-investment



Source: Banco de España, Eurostat

Aggregate deleveraging has been compatible with a significant share of investing firms raising their indebtedness

Only a fraction of the firms distribution is relevant to understand aggregate investment dynamics during the current recovery

- see Ottonello and Winberry (2017) for related evidence on the US economy

ASSETS AND LIABILITIES OF NFCs WITH POSITIVE OR ZERO NET INVESTMENT. FLOWS



ASSETS AND LIABILITIES OF NFCs WITH NEGATIVE NET INVESTMENT. FLOWS

Source: INE, Banco de España

2009

% GVA

40

30

20

10

0

10

20

30

40

2008

Resources

Uses

NET CAPITAL INCREASE FINANCIAL DEBT FINANCIAL INVESTMENT OTHER NET FLOWS (ASSETS - LIABILITIES)

2011

2012

2013

2014

2010

INTERNAL FINANCE GROSS FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION NET TRADE CREDIT (ASSETS - LIABILITIES) FIRMS AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL (Right-hand scale)

10

But, which part of the distribution?

Following the burst of the crisis, credit has been allocated towards firms that on average are more productive...



PROBABILITY OF OBTAINING A CREDIT: TIME-

VARYING COEFFICIENT ON TFP

AVERAGE DIFFRENCE OF TFP BETWEEN FIRMS WITH NON-NEGATIVE CREDIT GROWTH AND WITH NEGATIVE CREDIT GROWTH (T-1)



Source: INE, Banco de España

Source: Banco de España

...and with sounder financial fundamentals

PROBABILITY OF GETTING A LOAN FROM ANY BANK



Source: Banco de España

The transmission of the Eurosystem's corporate sector purchase programme (CSPP) in a dual economy

CSPP has accelerated the trend towards less banking intermediation in Spanish corporates financing



Source: Banco de España

Beside substitution effects, the CSPP is unchaining positive spillovers to non CSPP-elegible firms through banks' credit reallocation

Heterogeneity in the distribution of firms across sizes allows for a stronger transmission of monetary instrument (Arce, Gimeno, Mayordomo 2017)



Changes in outstanding loans by corporation

Fuente: Arce, O., Gimeno, R., y Mayordomo, S. (2017). "Making room for the needy: The effects of the CSPP program". Work in progress.