DOES THE MODEL REMAIN FIT FOR PURPOSE? MONETARY POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

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Bank of England Independence 20 Years On
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PERFORMANCE: INFLATION STABLE

Inflation

Target

NOT ALWAYS SO

Inflation (and target)

Source: Greenwood et al (2014)
INDEPENDENCE IN PERSPECTIVE

**CPI inflation over decades (annual data)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Average</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1717-2016</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>6.6%</td>
<td>-22.8%</td>
<td>30.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1717-1913</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>6.4%</td>
<td>-22.8%</td>
<td>30.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1914-1945</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
<td>8.8%</td>
<td>-14.0%</td>
<td>25.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946-1973</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td>10.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974-1997</td>
<td>7.6%</td>
<td>5.7%</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>22.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998-2016</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998-2010</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011-2016</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
EXPECTATIONS ANCHORED IN SPITE OF SHOCKS

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**Figure 1.7: Inflation and policy interest rates (2007-2016)**

The solid grey line plots core inflation and the black dashed line the policy rate (overnight interbank rate when the policy rate is not available).

### Per cent

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>2000 (or start of series) to 2007 averages(1)</th>
<th>Averages since 2008</th>
<th>2016</th>
<th>Q1</th>
<th>Q2</th>
<th>Q3(c)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>One year ahead inflation expectations</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Households(4)</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bank/GfK/TNS(e)</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barclays Basix</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YouGov/Citigroup (Nov. 2005)</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Companies (2008 Q2)(9)</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| **Two to three year ahead expectations** | | | | | | |
| Households(4) | 2.7 | 2.7 | 2.3 | 2.2 | 2.4 | 2.7 | 2.8 | n.a. |
| Bank/GfK/TNS (2009 Q1)(e) | 3.2 | 3.0 | 2.6 | 1.9 | 2.2 | 2.4 | 2.8 | 2.9 | n.a. |
| Barclays Basix | 2.0 | 2.1 | 2.1 | 2.1 | 2.1 | 2.1 | 2.2 | 2.0 |
| Professional forecasters (2006 Q2)(9) | 2.8 | 3.0 | 3.1 | 3.0 | 2.8 | 3.2 | 3.5 | 3.3 | 3.2 |
| Financial markets (Oct. 2004)(d) | n.a. | 3.2 | 3.1 | 2.8 | 3.2 | 3.1 | 3.2 | 3.3 | n.a. |

### Five to ten year ahead expectations

| Bank/GfK/TNS (2009 Q1)(e) | n.a. | 3.2 | 3.1 | 2.8 | 3.2 | 3.1 | 3.2 | 3.3 | 3.3 |
| Barclays Basix | n.a. | 3.7 | 3.6 | 3.1 | 3.6 | 3.4 | 3.9 | 3.9 | n.a. |
| YouGov/Citigroup (Nov. 2005) | 3.5 | 3.2 | 2.9 | 2.7 | 2.7 | 2.7 | 3.1 | 3.0 | 3.1 |
| Financial markets (Oct. 2004)(d) | 3.0 | 3.4 | 3.4 | 3.3 | 3.1 | 3.3 | 3.5 | 3.4 | 3.3 |

Memo: CPI inflation

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**Source:** Miles et al (2017) and Inflation Report (August, 2017)
In 400 years, no 20-year period had such low and stable inflation.

In spite of bad shocks, kept trust in the value of pound stable. Central bank independence has been an astounding success!
THE CASE FOR INDEPENDENCE

Which policies, not mandates, should be delegated to technocrats?

1. Technically complex decisions.
2. Goal is clear and consensual.
3. Providing a stable framework is more important than quick reactions.
4. Redistribution issues are not first order.
5. Accountability and transparency can be enforced.

These arguments apply today as they did 20 years ago.

We do not vote on which side of the road to drive all the time; or on using metric versus imperial system. Standards are important. Central bank is the safe-keeper of a standard, the unit of account, what a pound is worth.
THE MANDATE

• Inflation:
  Since can control it, and it matters for welfare.

• Real activity
  1. *Gaps*: business cycle only, long-run monetary neutrality.
  3. *Feasible*: yes, as long as there is a Phillips curve.
  4. *Independent from other goal*: supply shocks.
  5. *Constrained activism*: transparent, accountable.
TIME TO ADOPT OTHERS?

Cyclical, mimics criticisms of GDP as measure of economic growth
• Twenty years ago: Human Development Index
• Ten years ago: Happiness measures
• Today: Inequality

Reasons for skepticism:
1. trend not gap,
2. quite imperfect measures,
3. unclear it is feasible,
4. unemployment already captures the major risk,
5-6. we disagree and vote on redistribution.
ON THE INFLATION TARGET

Bank of England, Federal Reserve, ECB, Bank of Japan: different central banks, different countries, different times, yet all 2% target on headline inflation.

Review process every 5-10 years, establish mandate. Sweden and Canada are examples. Establish a transparent political review process.

Choices for the nominal anchor, for the standard:

• Levels (averages) or growth rates, bygones or not?
• Include or focus on housing, commodities, nominal wealth, others?
• These are not just technical choices.
PRICE LEVEL OR INFLATION?
HOUSE PRICES, NOMINAL GDP

CPI  Target  Nominal GDP - 2%  House prices
ON THE TOOLS: MONETARY/FISCAL

Central bank is a fiscal agent. Always true, but so are the courts…

Three traditional fiscal considerations:

1. **Inflating the public debt.** Motivation for independence, universal evidence on how CBI allows government to borrow cheaper.

2. **Collecting seignorage from issuing banknotes.** Regular, small, in decline. Not so different from collecting ticket prices.

3. **Adapting to fiscal stance.** Since this affects inflation and real activity. The job may be hard, but that is the job.
THE LARGE BALANCE SHEET

Assets and liabilities

Size of balance sheet, historically

Source: Reis (2016) and Haldane (2012)
SIZE DOESN'T MATTER (MUCH)

1. **QE buys public liability by issuing another public liability.** Deposits by banks at the central bank (reserves). On net, zero effect on public debt. Like debt buybacks at the debt management office.

2. **Interest bill from paying interest on reserves is never an issue.** Because earn interest on government bonds that it at least as high as the interest it pays on the deposits.

3. **Makes implementation of monetary policy more focused:** interest on deposits controls inflation, balance sheet other tool.

4. **Cashless world is reserve-plentiful world.** Power is intact.
FISCAL SUPPORT AND RISK

Key is composition of balance sheet, or income it generates/requires.

Case i) Gilts-only.
    Have maturity risk. Can be controlled, managed.

Case ii) Other assets (foreign currency, private bonds, equities).
    Other risks, classic one is exchange rates. Key is to have effective risk management tools, value at risk, transparent portfolio. Discussion of controls is really about discretion and rules.

Case iii) Helicopter drops or QE to fund fiscal outlays.
    This yes, is clearly activist discretionary fiscal policy.
CONCLUSION

1. **Model has delivered**: low stable inflation, anchored expectations.

2. **Case for independence**: as strong as it was.

3. **Case for expanding mandate**: doubtful.

4. **Case for reviewing the nominal anchor**: periodically wise.

5. **Worries about size of b/s and gilts portfolio**: exaggerated.

6. **Transparent risk management, limits to asset holdings**: open for debate, should be discussed and clarified.