

Golden Fetters and Paper Fetters

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Chief Economists' Workshop Conference on CBDC

Bank of England

July 2021

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Motivation

- CBDC is being **actively explored** by a large number of central banks around the world.
- These investigations are carefully considering a wide range of **design issues**, including the form of CBDC (accounts vs. tokens), privacy issues, and interactions with other types of payments.
- One key issue that warrants further consideration is whether CBDC should be interest bearing, and if so, whether this provides an opportunity to eliminate the **Effective Lower Bound (ELB)** on the level of the central bank's policy rate.

Our Analysis

- **Historical Perspective:** We examine the analogy between the ELB with the classical Gold Standard (GS).
- **Model Specification:** We identify the key ingredients of a DSGE model that are needed for assessing the rationale for eliminating the ELB.
- **Quantitative Analysis:** We conduct a variety of simulations of the DSGE model to gauge the impact of the ELB.

GS and ELB: Historical Coincidences

- Under the GS (1880-1914), monetary authorities fixed the nominal price of gold in terms of domestic currency and were required to maintain convertibility
- ELB is a technical constraint arising from the zero-interest rate on paper cash

GS: Constraint on Monetary Policy

- Gold Exchange Standard (1924-36) **collapsed** in the Great Depression: due to “*golden fetters*”, central banks, which no longer had credibility, **were unable to use expansionary monetary policy** as lenders of last resort to protect their banking systems for fear of triggering a speculative attack on their international reserves.
- Their only option **was departure from the gold standard**, devaluation and expansionary monetary policy.
- Countries which left the gold standard **ended the economic contraction and quickly recovered**; while those that did not, lingered in the slump.

ELB: Constraint on Monetary Policy

- The ELB has **limited the ability** of central banks to achieve their inflation targets (*“paper fetters”*)
- “Golden fetters” has considerable resonance for the ELB, because of the mentality of the gold standard: adherents were **loath to leave their pegs** even if it would aid recovery.

GS and ELB: Distributional Consequences

- In the short to medium run, price levels would rise or fall reflecting the shocks to the gold market
- The alternating waves of rising and falling price levels led to **political discontent and dissatisfaction** with the operation of the classical GS
- Periods of unanticipated deflation produced **redistribution of income** from debtors to creditors
- In the U.S., this was a key source of political turmoil (William Jennings Bryan presidential campaign speech in 1896: “...you shall not crucify mankind upon a cross of gold.”)


Model Specification

Key ingredients of the NK model to examine the ELB and its distributional effects

- Allow for **different types of consumers** in the economy: savers, and the hand-to-mouth
- Incorporate **realistic features of expectation formation** for the consumers (evidence from survey data suggests expectations are not rational)

First paper to combine these strands of the literature

Revisiting the Effects of Monetary Policy



Specification of Households

- **Heterogeneity**: Hand-to-mouth **HTM** (λ) and **Savers** ($1 - \lambda$) maximize lifetime utility
- HTM hold no assets and consume labor income
- Savers hold risk-free bonds, receive all firm profits, rent out physical capital
- All households exhibit **bounded rationality**: Cognitive discounting or **myopia** parameter measures attention to the future (Gabaix, 2020)

Other Model Features


- Capital: Level of capital is determined by past level and investment
- Labor market: Union pools labor inputs and sets wages on behalf of both households
- Firms: Monopolistically competitive firms face Calvo pricing
- Fiscal policy: Lump-sum taxes so that the steady state level of consumption for HTM and savers is the same
- Monetary policy: Taylor rule

Parameters

- Percentage of HTM consumers in the economy $\lambda : 50\%$
- Myopia parameter $m : 0.96$
- In the benchmark: $\lambda = 0, m = 1$

Model Dynamics: Contractionary MP shock


Do the model modifications matter for *aggregate* dynamics? **Very little**



Percentage deviations of Real GDP from steady state


Model Dynamics: Contractionary MP shock

Do the model modifications matter for *savers* vs. *HTM* consumers? **Yes**



Percentage deviations of Consumption from steady state

Model Dynamics: ELB Constraint



Percentage deviations of Consumption from steady state

How to eliminate the ELB with Digital Currency

- Individuals & businesses should **remain free to use paper cash or private payments.**
- Fees should be imposed on large transfers between digital cash and paper cash, thereby curtailing arbitrage and **eliminating the ELB.**
- Moderate amounts of digital cash balances should be **exempt** from negative interest rates.
- The central bank can **respond to severe adverse shocks by cutting interest rates below the ELB to maintain macroeconomic stability**

Synopsis of Findings

- Aggregate dynamics are **not substantially different** when bounded rationality and heterogeneity are introduced
- However, our quantitative analysis suggests that the **recovery for the HTM consumers is much more protracted** during ELB episodes
- The results imply a **strong rationale** for eliminating the ELB

Directions for Future Research

- Incorporate heterogeneity in the labor market
- Incorporate endogenous transitions between the savers and HTM consumers
- Re-think the central bank's objective function with heterogeneous consumers