



HM Treasury, 1 Horse Guards Road, London, SW1A 2HQ

29 October 2018

Mark Carney
Governor
Bank of England
Threadneedle Street
London
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Dear Mark,

REMIT AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE FINANCIAL POLICY COMMITTEE

The Bank of England Act 1998 (the Act), requires me, at least once a year, to specify what the economic policy of the government is and to make recommendations to the Financial Policy Committee (FPC) about matters that the Committee should regard as relevant to the Committee's understanding of the Bank's Financial Stability Objective and the Committee's responsibility in relation to the achievement of that objective. The Act also empowers me to make written recommendations to the Committee about its responsibilities in relation to support for the government's economic policy, as well as matters to which the Committee should have regard in exercising its functions.

This letter and the accompanying annex constitute the remit and recommendations for the FPC for the coming year. This covering letter sets out my perspective on the current economic context and the FPC's priorities for the year ahead.

Before doing so, I would like to acknowledge the achievements of the FPC over the first five years of its existence. As part of the government's fundamental reforms to the system of financial regulation in response to the crisis 10 years ago, the FPC was established in 2013 as the UK's macroprudential authority. Over that period, the FPC has identified and assessed risks to the UK's financial stability on an ongoing basis, setting out its assessment and the actions it has taken in an

accountable manner through its Financial Stability Reports and quarterly Statements and Records.

The FPC has acted to enhance the resilience of the financial system through the implementation of the Countercyclical Capital Buffer (CCyB), and acted to guard against the risk of a marked loosening of underwriting standards in the mortgage market and a significant increase in the number of highly indebted households. It introduced a leverage ratio for systemically important UK banks well ahead of international or EU action.

The FPC has also taken action to build greater cyber resilience in the financial system, including through the introduction of tests, known as CBEST tests, which subject firms to simulated cyber-attacks, and are used to identify weaknesses in resilience and take action against any issues.

Through its annual assessment of risks and regulation beyond the core banking sector, the FPC has also examined potential financial stability risks from non-bank financial institutions, markets and infrastructure, and where appropriate undertaken in-depth assessments of these potential risks.

Alongside the Prudential Regulation Committee (PRC), the FPC introduced an annual stress test of the largest UK banks and building societies in 2014. The 2017 stress tests showed that no bank needed to strengthen its capital position. This reflects the substantial progress that has been made in enhancing the resilience of the banking sector, with bank capital ratios now three times higher than in 2008.

I am grateful to you and the members of the Committee (past and present) for these substantial achievements, that mean the financial system as a whole is in a far more resilient position than pre-crisis.

Looking ahead to the coming year, in accordance with the Act, I confirm that the government's economic policy objective is to achieve strong, sustainable and balanced growth. Price and financial stability are essential pre-requisites for strong, sustainable and balanced growth in all regions and sectors of the economy. The specification of the government's economic strategy to deliver this objective, reflected in today's Budget, can be found in section A of the annex to this letter.

The government is also committed to UK financial services being effectively regulated; securing the right balance between a financial sector that is globally competitive and secure over the long-term.

The FPC's main contribution to these goals is protecting and enhancing financial stability in the UK, working in tandem with the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) and Financial Conduct Authority (FCA). The government believes that a strong and stable financial system supports economic growth, facilitates the


provision of finance to support the expansion of the economy's productive capacity and underpins the UK's position as an important global financial centre. The Committee should have regard to the impact of its policies on these elements of the government's economic strategy, and seek to support them where appropriate.

We are, of course, in unprecedented times as the UK undergoes the process of leaving the EU. During this process, the FPC's ongoing work to identify, monitor, and communicate financial stability risks associated with Brexit is critical so that preparations can be made and actions taken to mitigate them. The government remains confident of achieving the best possible deal for the UK on departure from the EU. But it is the job of a responsible government to prepare for all scenarios, including the unlikely event that we reach March 2019 without agreeing a deal. For financial services, this means having legislation in place to make sure that a fully functioning legal and regulatory framework is in place when we leave the EU.

To support these preparations, and in accordance with its duties, the FPC should continue to assess financial stability risks in all scenarios. I note that the FPC judges that the 2017 stress test encompassed an appropriately wide range of UK macroeconomic outcomes that could be associated with Brexit, and therefore that the UK banking system would be strong enough to service UK households and businesses through a disorderly Brexit. It is vital that government and regulators continue to work closely together in order that we can ensure a smooth transition, secure the continuity of provision of credit and finance to households and businesses, and maintain the UK's position as a world-leading financial centre operating to the highest international standards. The expertise of the regulators, and particularly the FPC's role within the UK regulatory framework on macroprudential oversight, will be critical and I look forward to continuing to work with the FPC over the coming years.

The FPC and the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) should continue to have regard to each other's actions, to enhance coordination between monetary and macroprudential policy. This coordination has enhanced the strength and resilience of the UK's macroeconomic framework. It has performed well through testing times, and is well-equipped to address future challenges.

I am grateful to you and all the members of the Committee for your continuing good work and dedication.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Philip Hammond', with a horizontal line underneath the name.

PHILIP HAMMOND

REMIT AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE FINANCIAL POLICY COMMITTEE

The Bank of England Act 1998 (“the Act”) sets out the objectives of the Financial Policy Committee (FPC). The Committee is to exercise its functions with a view to:

- a) contributing to the achievement by the Bank of the Financial Stability Objective; and
- b) subject to that, supporting the economic policy of Her Majesty’s Government, including its objectives for growth and employment.

The Bank’s Financial Stability Objective, under the Act, is to protect and enhance the stability of the financial system of the United Kingdom.

The responsibility of the Committee in relation to the achievement by the Bank of its Financial Stability Objective relates primarily to the identification of, monitoring of, and taking of action to remove or reduce systemic risks with a view to protecting and enhancing the resilience of the UK financial system.

Section 9C(4) of the Act makes clear that it does not require or authorise the Committee to exercise its functions in a way that would in its opinion be likely to have a significant adverse effect on the capacity of the financial sector to contribute to the growth of the UK economy in the medium or long term.

Section 9D(1) of the Act allows me to specify what the economic policy of Her Majesty’s Government is taken to be.

Section 9E(1) of the Act also allows me to make recommendations to the Committee about:

- matters that the Committee should regard as relevant to its understanding of the Bank’s Financial Stability Objective; or
- the responsibility of the Committee in relation to the achievement of that objective.

Section 9D(2) and 9E(2) of the Act require that I specify the economic policy of the government and make recommendations to the Committee at least once in every calendar year.

In addition, section 9E of the Act empowers me to make recommendations to the Committee about:

- the responsibility of the Committee in relation to support for the economic policy of Her Majesty’s Government, including its objectives for growth and employment; and
- matters to which the Committee should have regard in exercising its functions.

This document discharges the Treasury’s duties under both section 9D and section 9E of the Act.

A. The government's economic policy

The government's economic policy objective is to achieve strong, sustainable and balanced growth. Price and financial stability are essential pre-requisites for strong, sustainable and balanced growth in all regions and sectors of the UK economy.

To achieve this objective, the government's economic strategy consists of:

- operationally independent monetary policy, responsible for maintaining price stability and supporting the economy;
- a credible fiscal policy, returning the public finances to health, while providing the flexibility to support the economy;
- addressing long-term economic weaknesses in order to sustain high employment, raise productivity, and improve living standards for people across the UK; and
- continuing to strengthen the financial system, improving the regulatory framework to reduce risks to the taxpayer and building resilience, so that it can provide finance and financial services to the real economy and realise better outcomes for consumers, supporting sustainable economic growth and encouraging productive investment (see Section C Recommendation ii).

B. Matters that the Financial Policy Committee should regard as relevant to the Bank's Financial Stability Objective, and the responsibility of the Committee in relation to the achievement of that objective

The FPC is charged with contributing to the Bank's Financial Stability Objective primarily by identifying, monitoring and addressing risks to the resilience of the UK financial system as a whole. It should ensure that it considers all parts of the financial system, prioritising as appropriate. The purpose of preserving stability is to contribute to avoiding serious interruptions in the vital functions which the financial system as a whole performs in our economy: notably, the provision of payment and settlement services, intermediating between savers and borrowers, and insuring against risk (for individuals, businesses and financial market participants).

The Committee originally focused its energies on rebuilding the resilience of the banking sector. With the current programme of reform in this area now firmly in the implementation phase, the Committee has broadened its focus to include systemic risks to, or stemming from, other sectors such as financial markets, institutional investors, or insurance. It has also broadened the range of risks it considers: in addition to the risks stemming from financial institutions' balance sheets, the FPC has taken on responsibility for identifying, monitoring and addressing market issues and systemic non-financial risks, such as cyber risks, that could have material implications for the resilience of the financial system. The Committee should continue with this broader range of focus, and should continue

its work with the firm-level regulators and other bodies as appropriate to address the risks it identified in these areas.

The role of the Committee is a crucial complement to, but distinct from, those of the firm level regulators. The Act provides the Committee with the power to give directions and also recommendations, including on a 'comply or explain' basis, to both the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) and the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA). The Act makes clear that the Committee will not be responsible for making decisions in respect of individual firms. Where relevant to sustaining systemic stability, the Committee should use its recommendation powers to steer both the PRA and FCA's general policies towards types of firms or risks, including, for example, in the case of the PRA's strategic approach to large systemically important firms.

C. The responsibility of the Financial Policy Committee in relation to support for the government's economic policy

i. Recommendations as to the interaction between the FPC's objectives

The FPC's primary and secondary objectives should be complementary. There may, however, be circumstances where the Committee faces a trade-off in the short term between the secondary objective of supporting economic growth and the primary objective of addressing sources of systemic risk. The materiality of any such trade-offs may vary with the precise circumstances of the financial system at different points of the economic and credit cycles. The Committee is neither required nor authorised by the Act to exercise its functions in a way that would in its opinion have a significant adverse effect on the capacity of the financial sector to contribute to the growth of the UK economy in the medium or long term.

Any such trade-offs should be managed and communicated transparently and consistently with the Committee's assessment of the costs and benefits of its actions, in the light of the Act's provisions.

Specifically, the Act requires the Committee to explain the use of its powers, and also to prepare explanations of how decisions to exercise the following powers are compatible with the Committee's objectives and other general duties:

- its direction making powers;
- its powers to make recommendations within the Bank relating to the exercise of the Bank's functions in relation to payment systems, settlement systems and clearing houses;
- its powers to make recommendations to the Treasury; and
- its powers to make recommendations to the PRA and FCA.

In discharging this requirement the Committee should set out publicly how its actions are assessed to contribute to its objectives, including its judgement as to the balance of risks to those objectives, how those risks are judged to have evolved and how they are expected to evolve.

ii. Recommendations regarding facilitating finance for productive investment

The government's framework for raising productivity is built around:

- **encouraging long term investment** in economic capital, including infrastructure, skills and knowledge; and
- **promoting a dynamic economy** that encourages innovation and helps resources flow to their most productive use.

Subject to achievement of its primary objective, the FPC should support the government's economic objectives by acting in a way that, where possible, facilitates the supply of finance for productive investment provided by the UK's financial system. When explaining how its actions are consistent with its objectives, the FPC should consider the impact of its policy actions on the ability of the financial sector to provide finance for productive investment.

The Committee should consider the impact on finance for productive investment when making any judgements as to whether its actions would have a significant adverse effect on the capacity of the financial sector to contribute to the growth of the UK economy in the medium or long term for the purposes of compliance with section 9C (4) of the Act.

iii. Recommendations regarding support for the government's policy towards the financial services industry

The government is committed to UK financial services being effectively regulated; securing the right balance between a financial sector that is globally competitive and secure over the long-term. Ensuring financial stability, the Committee's primary objective, is an essential prerequisite for achieving that ambition. Subject to achieving that, the Committee should act in a way that supports the government's overall strategy for financial services, covering, in particular:

- **Competition and innovation.** The government is keen to see more competition and innovation in all sectors of the industry, particularly retail banking. This includes minimising barriers to entry and ensuring a diversity of business models within the industry.
- **Competitiveness.** The government wishes to ensure that the UK remains an attractive domicile for internationally active financial institutions, and that London retains its position as the leading international financial centre. In its assessment of the costs and benefits of its policy actions, the Committee

should, wherever practical and relevant, take these considerations into account.

D. Matters to which the Committee should have regard in exercising its functions

i. Recommendations as to the interactions between monetary policy and macroprudential policy

In general, the objectives of price stability and financial stability will be complementary over the longer term. As with both the Monetary Policy Committee's (MPC) and the FPC's primary and secondary objectives, there may, however, be occasions when there are short-term trade-offs to be made between these objectives.

In order to foster coordination of monetary and macroprudential policy, there is overlap between the membership of the MPC and the FPC. The Bank has implemented a programme of regular joint meetings of the MPC and FPC to further improve interaction between the two Committees. To enhance that coordination, where appropriate, the FPC should note in the records of its meetings, its policy statements and its Financial Stability Reports (FSR) how it has had regard to the policy settings and forecasts of the MPC. In the same way, the government has also asked the MPC to reflect in any statements on its decisions, the minutes of its meetings and its Inflation Reports how it has had regard to the policy actions of the FPC.

ii. Recommendation that the Financial Policy Committee have regard to risks to public funds

The government is implementing reforms to strengthen the resilience of the financial system, minimise risks to taxpayer funds and reduce the perceived implicit taxpayer guarantee. The Financial Services Act 2012 places obligations on the Bank, in pursuing its Financial Stability Objective, to notify the Treasury where there is a material risk of public funds being required and to notify the Treasury of any subsequent changes to such a risk.

The FPC should, in exercising its responsibilities and functions under the Act, have regard to whether there is a material risk of public funds being required, such that the Bank's obligation to notify the Treasury would be triggered. The Committee should seek where possible to minimise such risks whilst recognising that it will be for the Chancellor and the Treasury to determine whether any use of public funds would be in the public interest. Where it identifies such a risk, the Committee should take it into account in its assessment of the costs and benefits of its actions, and should reflect its assessment in its publications and wider communications (subject to deferred publication on public interest considerations).

Similarly, where the Bank makes a public funds notification that, in its judgment, is relevant to the exercise by the Committee of its responsibilities and functions under the Act, the Bank should alert the Committee to that notification.

The Chancellor and the Treasury have sole responsibility for any decisions on whether and how to use public funds in support of financial stability. The Treasury will need to satisfy itself that any use of public funds would offer good value for public money and to this end may, as appropriate, request further information from the Bank.

iii. Recommendations to the Treasury on legislative changes

The Act allows the FPC to make a number of written recommendations to the Treasury on the need for legislative changes; these include changes to the scope of activities regulated under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, to the scope of activities prudentially regulated by the PRA and the purposes for which the FCA may make product intervention rules. The Committee may also recommend that the Treasury gives it additional or revised powers of direction. In order to aid the Treasury's assessment of the case for making these legislative changes, the Committee should provide, along with its written recommendations, evidence that:

- there are potential risks which the Committee, the PRA or the FCA need to address in those areas that cannot be effectively mitigated within the current regulatory powers;
- the Committee's proposals would address effectively those risks; and
- changes to the potential actions by the Committee, the PRA or the FCA, and any resulting action by those bodies in those areas would not create material unintended consequences or costs in excess of the benefits.

iv. Recommendations regarding enhancing the accountability of the FPC

The FPC's performance and procedures are reviewed by the Court of the Bank of England on an ongoing basis. The Bank is accountable to Parliament through its publication of the twice annual FSR and evidence given to the Treasury Committee. Finally, through the publication of the record of its meetings, the FSR, policy statements for its direction-making powers, the explanations of its decisions and its wider communications, the FPC is accountable to the public at large. Therefore, the Committee should attach high priority, in so far as consistent with its statutory objectives and functions, to reducing uncertainty and boosting confidence in the financial system. This includes continuing to develop the set of published indicators that it uses to monitor and assess risks to financial stability. It should provide clear, focussed and consistent messages about the planned regulatory response to

identified financial stability risks and ensure that its policy actions are as predictable as possible.

Recognising the requirement imposed by paragraph 11 (4) of Schedule 2A of the Act to achieve consensus wherever possible, communication by individual members regarding FPC decisions needs to be coordinated and consistent where this is the case. The record of the FPC's policy meeting should continue to set out the deliberations considered in reaching the consensus. Where consensus cannot be reached and a vote is taken, as required by the Act, the balance of arguments should be reflected in the record of the meeting. In such circumstances, members should be free to explain their differences and will be publicly accountable accordingly.

v. Recommendations as to engagement with financial sector participants and other external experts

The FPC already operates to high standards of transparency and accountability, including frequent appearances before Parliament and an active programme of public speeches. An important element of this accountability is the FPC's dialogue with financial market participants and other external experts. The FPC should endeavour to fulfil its statutory responsibilities in an open and collaborative fashion, seeking the views of industry participants, academics, other regulators and the public, as appropriate, to supplement the Committee's own expertise. When seeking the views of external experts, the FPC should ensure that:

- any supporting documentation is sufficiently detailed so as to provide a comprehensive description of the FPC's views or proposed actions;
- respondents are given adequate time to consider the proposals and produce any response that they wish to provide; and
- wherever practicable, as set out in statute, a robust quantitative assessment of the impact of any proposed policy action is included in the documentation provided, including an estimate of the private costs to businesses.

In cases where the FPC consults publicly, the length of any consultation should be proportionate to the complexity and impact of the proposals, and the FPC's consultation periods should match best practice in the public sector.

These recommendations as to engagement with financial sector participants and other external experts should not prevent the FPC from making a Direction or Recommendation without, or with a more abbreviated, consultation where in line with its statutory duties, it considers it necessary to do so by reason of urgency, in order to protect and enhance the resilience of the UK financial system.

When deciding whether and how it would be appropriate to engage with external experts, the FPC should consider whether the publication of a contemplated future policy action may lead to actions aimed at avoiding future requirements, regulatory arbitrage, or financial sector participants taking other actions which could lead to risks to financial stability.

