# PRA RULEBOOK: CRR FIRMS: REMUNERATION AND CERTIFICATION INSTRUMENT 2021

## **Powers exercised**

- A. The Prudential Regulation Authority ("PRA") makes this instrument in the exercise of the following powers and related provisions in the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 ("the Act"):
  - (1) section 137G (The PRA's general rules);
  - (2) section 137H (General rules about remuneration);
  - (3) section 137T (General supplementary powers);
  - (4) section 192V (Rules imposing consolidated requirements); and
  - (5) section 192XA (Rules applying to holding companies)
- B. The rule-making powers referred to above are specified for the purpose of section 138G(2) (Rulemaking instrument) of the Act.

### **Pre-conditions to making**

- C. In accordance with section 138J of the Act (Consultation by the PRA), the PRA consulted the Financial Conduct Authority. After consulting, the PRA published a draft of proposed rules and had regard to representations made.
- D. In accordance with sections 144C(3) and 144E of the Act, the PRA consulted the Treasury about the likely effect of the rules on relevant equivalence decisions within the meaning of section 144C (4) of the Act.

### PRA Rulebook: CRR FIRMS: REMUNERATION AND CERTIFICATION INSTRUMENT 2021

E. The PRA makes the rules in the Annexes to this instrument.

### Commencement

- F. Annex A comes into force on 30 December 2021.
- G. Annex B comes into force on 1 March 2022.

## Citation

H. This instrument may be cited as the PRA Rulebook: CRR Firms: Remuneration and Certification Instrument 2021.

### By order of the Prudential Regulation Committee

14 December 2021

### Annex A

### Amendments to the Remuneration Part

In this Annex new text is underlined and deleted text is struck through.

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# 1 APPLICATION AND DEFINITIONS

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1.3 (1) In this Part, the following definitions shall apply:

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### business unit

means any separate organisational or legal entities, business lines, or geographical locations.

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control functions

has the meaning provided in Article 3 of the Material Risk Takers Regulationmeans a function that is independent from the business units it controls and that is responsible for providing an objective assessment of the firm's risks or to review or report on those and which includes (but is not limited to) the risk management function, the compliance function and the internal audit function.

### core business line

means business lines and associated services which represent material sources of revenue, profit or franchise value for a *firm* or for its *group*.

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managerial responsibility

has the meaning provided in Article 2 of the *Material Risk Takers Regulation*means a situation in which an *employee*:

- (1) heads a *business unit* or a *control function* and is directly accountable to the management body as a whole or to a member of the management body or to the senior management.
- (2) heads one of the functions set out in 3.2A(1); or
- (3) heads a subordinated *business unit* or a subordinated *control function* in a *large institution* and reports to an *employee* that has the responsibilities referred to in (1).

material business unit

has the meaning provided in Article 4 of the *Material Risk Takers Regulation*means a *business unit* that meets either of the following criteria:

- (a) it has allocated internal capital of at least 2% of the internal capital of the *firm* as set out in Internal Capital Adequacy Assessment 3.1(1) or is otherwise assessed by the *firm* as having a material impact on the *firm*'s internal capital; or
- (b) it is a core business line.

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#### Material Risk Takers Regulation

means the draft regulatory technical standards on criteria to define managerial responsibility and control functions, a material business unit and a significant impact on its risk profile, and categories of staff whose professional activities have a material impact on an institution's risk profile published by the *EBA* on 18 June 2020.

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significant impact on the relevant business unit's risk profile

has the meaning provided in Article 5 of the Material Risk Takers Regulation.

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# 3 MATERIAL RISK TAKERS

- 3.1 A *firm* must, save where otherwise stated, apply the requirements of this Part in relation to a *person* (a "material risk taker") who is:
  - (1) an *employee* of a *CRR firm* whose professional activities have a material impact on the *firm's* risk profile, including:

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(c) *employees* entitled to a significant total *remuneration* in the preceding financial year, where:

...

- (ii) the employee performs the professional activity within a material business units and the activity is a kind that has a significant impact on the relevant business unit's risk profile significant impact on the risk profile of a material business unit,
- (d) employees whose professional activities are deemed to have a material impact on the firm's risk profile under Articles 6 and 7 of the Material Risk Takers Regulation<u>3.2A</u> and 3.3A; or

...

[Note: Article 92 of the CRD and the Material Risk Takers Regulation]

- <u>3.1A</u> For the purposes of 3.1(1)(c) and (d), a *firm* must calculate all amounts of variable and fixed *remuneration* on a gross and full-time equivalent basis.
- 3.1B For the purposes of 3.1(1)(c)(i):
  - (1) a firm must calculate the average total remuneration of all members of the firm's management body and senior management by taking into account the total of the fixed and variable remuneration of all members of the firm's management body in its management function and supervisory function as well as all members of senior management; and
  - (2) a *firm* must value variable *remuneration* that has been awarded but has not yet been paid as at the date of the award without taking into account the application of the discount rate referred to in 15.13 or reductions in pay-outs through clawback, malus or otherwise.

- <u>3.1C</u> For the purposes of 3.1(1)(c)(ii), in determining whether the professional activity of an <u>employee has a significant impact on the risk profile of a material business unit a firm must</u> <u>apply all of the following criteria within its remuneration policies, practices and procedures:</u>
  - (1) the risk profile of the material business unit,
  - (2) the distribution of internal capital to cover the nature and level of the risks, as referred to in Internal Capital Adequacy Assessment 3.1(1);
  - (3) the risk limits of the material business unit,
  - (4) the risk and performance indicators used by the *firm* to identify, manage and monitor risks of the *material business unit* in accordance with General Organisational Requirements 2.1;
  - (5) the relevant performance criteria set by the firm in accordance with 15.4 and 15.6; and
  - (6) the duties and authorities of *employees* or categories of *employee* in the *material business* <u>unit concerned.</u>
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3.2A In addition to *employees* identified under the criteria set out in 3.1(1)(a) to (c), a *firm* must deem an *employee* to have a material impact on a *firm*'s risk profile where one or more of the following qualitative criteria are met:

- (1) the employee has managerial responsibility for any of the following:
  - (a) legal affairs;
  - (b) the soundness of accounting policies and procedures;
  - (c) finance, including taxation and budgeting;
  - (d) performing economic analysis;
  - (e) the prevention of money laundering and terrorist financing;
  - (f) human resources;
  - (g) the development or implementation of the remuneration policy;
  - (h) information technology;
  - (i) information security; or
  - (j) managing *outsourcing* arrangements of a function, where a defect or failure in the performance of that function would materially impair the continuing compliance of the *firm* with the conditions and obligations of its authorisation, financial performance, or the soundness or continuity of its services and activities:
- (2) the employee has managerial responsibility for any of the risk categories set out in Internal Capital Adequacy Assessment 3.1(2) (a) to (g), (i) and (j) or is a voting member of a committee responsible for the management of such a risk category;
- (3) with regard to credit risk exposures of a nominal amount per transaction, representing 0.5% of the *firm's* common equity tier 1 capital and which is at least £4.5 million, the *employee* member meets either of the following criteria:
  - (a) the employee has the authority to take, approve or veto decisions on such credit risk exposures; or
  - (b) the employee is a voting member of a committee which has the authority to take the decisions as referred to in (a);

- (4) in relation to a *firm* for which the derogation for *small trading book* businesses set out in Article 94 of the *CRR* does not apply, the *employee* meets either of the following criteria:
  - (a) the employee has the authority to take, approve or veto decisions on transactions on the trading book that in aggregate represent one of the following thresholds:
    - (i) where the standardised approach is used, an *own funds* requirement for *market risk* that represents 0.5% or more of the *firm's* common equity tier 1 capital;
    - (ii) where an internal model based approach is approved for regulatory purposes, 5% or more of the *firm*'s internal value-at-risk limit for trading book exposures at a 99th percentile (one-tailed confidence interval level); or
  - (b) the *employee* is a voting member of a committee that has the authority to take the decisions referred to in (a);
- (5) the employee heads a group of employees who have individual authorities to commit the *firm* to transactions and either of the following conditions is met:
  - (a) the sum of those authorities equals or exceeds the threshold referred to in 3.2A(3)(a) or 3.2A(4)(a)(i); or
  - (b) where an internal model based approach is approved for regulatory purposes, those authorities amount to 5% or more of the *firm*'s internal value-at-risk limit for trading book exposures at a 99th percentile (one-tailed confidence interval level): where the *firm* does not calculate a value-at-risk at the level of that *employee*, the value-at-risk limits of *employees* under the management of that *employee* must be aggregated; or
  - (6) the employee meets either of the following criteria with regard to decisions on approving or vetoing the introduction of new products:
    - (a) the employee has authority to take such decisions; or
    - (b) the employee is a voting member of a committee that has authority to take such decisions.

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- 3.3A In addition to *employees* identified under the criteria set out in 3.1(1)(a) and (b), a *firm* must deem an *employee* to have a material impact on a *firm*'s risk profile where either of the following quantitative criteria are met:
  - (1) the employee, including an employee referred to in 3.1(1)(c), has been awarded in or for the preceding performance year a total remuneration that is equal to or greater than £660,000; or
  - (2) where the *firm* has over 1,000 *employees*, the *employee* is within the 0.3% of *employees* within the *firm* (which is to be calculated on an individual entity basis only and rounded to the next higher integral figure) who have been awarded the highest total *remuneration* in or for the preceding performance year.

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### 6 **REMUNERATION POLICIES**

6.1 In this Chapter, 6.2-and, 6.5 and 6.6 apply to *firms* in relation to *firms' remuneration* policies, practices and procedures generally, not only in relation to *material risk takers*.

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6.6 A firm must ensure that its remuneration policy sets out the reference year for the variable remuneration that it takes into account when calculating total remuneration and that reference year must be either:

(1) the year preceding the financial year in which the variable remuneration is awarded; or

(2) the year preceding the financial year for which the variable remuneration is awarded.

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# 15 REMUNERATION STRUCTURES

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15.17 ...

- (2) A *firm* must not award, pay or provide a variable *remuneration* component to a *higher paid material risk taker* unless a substantial portion of it, which is at least 40%, is deferred over a period which is not less than:
  - (a) in the case of a *higher paid material risk taker* who does not perform a *PRA senior management function*, but:
    - (i) who meets the criteria in 3.1(1)(a) or (b); or
    - (ii) whose professional activities meet the qualitative criteria set out in Article 6(1), 6(2) or 6(5) of the *Material Risk Takers Regulation*3.2A(1), 3.2A(2) or 3.2A(5)

five years vesting no faster than on a pro-rata basis; or

### Annex B

### Amendments to the Certification Part

In this Annex new text is underlined and deleted text is struck through.

# 1 APPLICATION AND DEFINITIONS

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1.2 In this Part, the following definitions shall apply:

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#### Material Risk Takers Regulation

means Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 604/2014 of 4 March 2014 supplementing Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to regulatory technical standards with respect to qualitative and appropriate quantitative criteria to identify categories of staff whose professional activities have a material impact on an institution's risk profile.

significant risk taker

means

 an employee of a CRR firm whose professional activities have a material impact on the firm's risk profile, including any employee who is deemed to have a material impact on the firm's risk profile in accordance with criteria set out in Articles 3 to 5 of the Material Risk Takers Regulationfalls within Remuneration 3.1(1);

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(3) any *employee* of a *third country CRR firm* who would fall within (1) if it had applied in relation to him or her<del>, unless the *firm* has deemed the *employee* not to be a material risk taker under Remuneration 3.2.</del>

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