Understanding pay gaps

Speech given by

Andrew G Haldane
Chief Economist
Bank of England

Co-authors: Zahid Amadzarif, Marilena Angeli and Gabija Zemaityte

Joint Bank of England, Federal Reserve Bank and European Central Bank conference on Gender and Career Progression

Frankfurt
21 October 2019

The views expressed here are not necessarily those of the Bank of England or the Monetary Policy Committee. I would like to thank Will Abel, Shiv Chowla, Julia Giese, Brian Hallissey, Sam Juthani, Tomas Key, Clare Macallan, Jen Nemeth, Doug Rendle and Ratidzo Starkey for their comments and contributions.

This work contains statistical data from ONS which is Crown Copyright. The use of the ONS statistical data in this work does not imply the endorsement of the ONS in relation to the interpretation or analysis of the statistical data. This work uses research datasets which may not exactly reproduce National Statistics aggregates.

All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches
Section 1: Introduction

“Pay gaps” measure the difference in pay between people with different demographic characteristics doing identical jobs. They are considered to be a good approximation of inequality in workplace rewards (EHRC (2018)). Under the Equality Act 2010, it is against the law to discriminate on the basis of protected personal characteristics. When it comes to pay, this means people should earn the same wage for the same work, irrespective of their gender, race, religion, disability, or other protected characteristics. In other words, no “pay gap” should exist across any of these characteristics.

Since 2017, it has been compulsory for companies in Great Britain with over 250 employees to report gender pay gaps each financial year. Data for 2018 published earlier this year shows a gender pay gap of around 10% across reporting UK organisations.¹ The UK government has also begun a consultation on requiring companies to publish ethnicity pay gaps on an annual basis.² While 63% of employers monitor ethnicity pay gaps, only 31% of employers currently publish them.³ The Bank of England has published data on its gender pay gap since 2017 and on its ethnicity pay gap since 2018.

While it is widely recognised that these pay gap measures may be imperfect proxies for pay inequality, greater transparency about pay gaps can serve as an important incentive device. Publishing companies’ pay gaps encourages them to explain and, with time, close these gaps. The benefits of doing so, for individual companies and the economy at large, have been found to be large. For example, closing the gender pay gap has been estimated to add £600 billion (or 27% of GDP) to UK GDP by 2025 (McKinsey (2016)), while full representation of BAME individuals across the labour market, through improved participation and progression, could add an additional £24 billion (or over 1% of GDP) per year (BEIS (2017)).

Internationally, similar moves to improve pay gap reporting are underway. Iceland has since January 2018 required external auditors to assess pay inequalities among companies with more than 25 employees.⁴ The Danish Equal Pay Act 2014 requires companies with a minimum of 10 employees to make available gender-disaggregated pay statistics. A number of other EU member states have implemented new reporting standards, including recently in Germany and France. In the US, all employers with more than 100 workers must disclose pay information to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.

In this paper, we provide a detailed empirical examination of gender and ethnicity pay gaps in the UK using micro-level survey data. As well as describing the evolution of these pay gaps over time, we identify some of the key explanations and drivers of them over time. This decomposition is important when accurately

¹ Latest ONS LFS 2019Q1 release.
³ Business in the Community (2019).
⁴ Pay in Iceland is assessed using an Equal Pay Standard which highlights four main criteria: expertise, responsibility, effort, and work environment.
interpreting data on pay gaps and when deciding where action might best be taken – by companies and/or public policymakers – to close these gaps and harvest some of the benefits this would bring.

Section 2: Literature Review

Gender and ethnicity pay gaps have been studied fairly extensively using US data. In the US, the female/male earnings ratio has increased steadily since the 1980s (Blau and Kahn (2017)). This is typically attributed to improvements in women’s levels of education and experience (Stanley and Jarrell (1998), Jarrell and Stanley (2004), Weichselbaumer and Winter-Ebmer (2005)). Alkadry and Tower (2006) find human capital explains over 90% of the gender pay gap. Some studies have also found occupational representation and segregation has been a factor explaining gender pay gaps (Lewis and Soo Oh (2009)).

Goldin (2014) provides one of the most comprehensive studies of the gender pay gap in the US across different age groups. She finds that, while the gap has narrowed for most age groups, the aggregate gap has remained fairly stable. By looking across the life-cycle, she finds that as workers get older the size of the gender pay gap tends to rise. It also differs significantly by occupation, with business occupations having the largest gender pay gaps and technology and science-related occupations the lowest.

Like others, Goldin finds that the narrowing of the gap across age groups is largely due to a rise in the human capital of women relative to men, due to factors such as improved levels of education, experience, and labour force participation. The remaining pay difference can partly be explained by higher-paying occupations in the corporate, financial and legal worlds, especially at later career stages. This is disadvantageous for women who are more likely to work part-time or work fewer hours due to raising children.

The US literature on ethnic minority pay has tended to focus on wage differentials between white and black ethnic groups, the two largest ethnic groups in the US. Studies have tended to find a large wage differential between black and white men, although this does appear to have reduced over time with the black/white earnings ratio increasing from just under 60% in 1967 to around 80% by 2009 (Lang and Lehmann (2012)). This broadly mirrors trends in the gender pay gap. Studies looking at wage gaps over the life-cycle find that there is little evidence of an ethnicity pay gap during early working life, but that this grows to around 14% by age 40 (Tomaskovic-Devey et al (2005)).

Evidence on the role of education on the size of the ethnicity pay gap is mixed. Some studies find that, among young men, the black/white pay differential appears, in part, to be explained by education (O’Neill (1990), Rodgers and Spriggs (1996) and Carneiro, Heckman, and Masterov (2005)). For example, the pay differential decreases when controlling for performance on the Armed Forces Qualifying Test (Neal and Johnson (1996)). Studies also find that, among college-educated men, there is no difference in pay between black and white males (Black et al (2006)). This might suggest the ethnicity pay gap can largely be
explained by human capital differences in white-collar sectors, but not in blue-collar jobs (Bjerk (2007)). Other studies, however, have found that human capital differences increase the pay differential (Lang and Manove (2011)).

Wage differentials between black and white women have historically been considerably lower than between men (Lang (2007)) and at times have even reversed. However, Neal (2004) demonstrates that this finding partially reflects the differential selection of black and white women into the labour force. For example, black women face a lower household income than white women, which provides a stronger incentive for them to enter the workforce in the first place.

For the UK, although evidence is more partial, it suggests that both gender and ethnicity pay gaps have fallen over time (ONS (2018), ONS (2019)). For gender, the factors determining these gaps include age, educational background, sector, occupation and part time work (Olsen and Walby (2004), Manning and Swaffield (2005), Brynin (2017), ONS (2018)). For ethnicity, it includes occupation, being born in the UK and education (ONS (2019), Brynin and Guveli (2012)). As in the US, the UK ethnicity gap appears to be larger for males than females (Longhi and Brynin (2017)).

When it comes to explaining the sources of pay gaps, three main approaches have typically been used. Regression techniques estimate pay gaps controlling for various characteristics of the individual or job (Goldin (2014), Brynin and Guveli (2012)). Oaxaca-Blinder decompositions account for differences in pay between two groups using an independent set of factors. This is useful for capturing the effects of compositional differences in the characteristics of groups (O’Donnell et al (2008)). Finally, a rich literature uses experiments to assess bias in hiring, promotion and bargaining between groups (Neumark (2018)).

In this paper, we use the first two approaches – regression-based techniques and decompositions – to analyse gender and ethnicity pay gaps in the UK. In the next section, we describe the dataset, summarise key trends in the UK labour market over the past 25 years and discuss unconditional pay gaps by gender and ethnicity. In the following section, we provide an explanation of these pay gaps using factor-decomposition and regression-based methods. Section 5 summarises our key findings and policy recommendations.

Section 3: Trends in the UK Labour Market

This paper uses quarterly returns from the UK Labour Force Survey (LFS) from 1994 Q1 to 2019 Q1. This gives us a sample of 1,154,759 observations of employed individuals, reduced to 563,353 observations when incorporating pay variables, as there are fewer observations for respondents on pay. 6 There are two

---

6 Throughout our analysis we only use wave 1 respondents in order to ensure that we are not counting multiple responses from the same individual. In addition to this, we only include workers aged 25 and over in order to remove noise from the data. Most workers under 25 are earning in the minimum wage range which is subject to regulation, and may also particularly represent part-time employment.
main advantages to using the LFS relative to other surveys, such as the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) and the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE). 7

First, the LFS has the longest time-series of pay and other work characteristics at a quarterly frequency in the UK. Using it allows us to track the evolution of pay gaps over time. Second, the LFS dataset offers a rich set of information on the characteristics of both workers and their jobs. These controls improve the robustness of the analysis, statistically, and the ability to explain movements in pay gaps behaviourally, using various individual and work-related characteristics.

There have been a number of important changes in the employed LFS survey population over time. First, the share of ethnic minorities in the workforce has more than doubled, from 4% in 1994 to 10% in 2019. Second, the share of the population in higher education or with a degree has also increased significantly, from 22% to 43%. Third, the share of the population not born in the UK has almost tripled, from 6% in 1994 to 17% in 2019. These trends are representative of the composition of the UK population, as reported in the 2011 Census.

(a) Participation Trends

Female participation in the workforce has been on a broadly upward trend in the UK. Elsewhere across the G7, trends have been more disparate (Chart 1). Based on OECD Labour Force Statistics, UK rates of female participation are second only to Canada across the G7, having recently overtaken the US.

Chart 1: G7 female participation rates


7 This paper does not aim to produce better estimates of the gender and ethnicity pay gaps than the official ones published by the ONS. ASHE data is the best source for estimating the overall gaps, but the LFS has a rich set of individual and job characteristics allowing the type of analysis showcased here.
The increase in female participation has been accompanied by an opposite trend among the male population, which has fallen from 70% to 65% over the sample. In other words, the gender “participation gap” between males and females in the UK has fallen by around 10 percentage points over the past 25 years, though it remains positive at around 8 percentage points.

The participation of ethnic minorities in the UK labour force has also been on an upward trend since the 1990s, reaching around 64% in 2019. Labour participation by the white population was, by contrast, on a slightly downward trend prior to the GFC, after which it has flattened off. That leaves participation rates for ethnic minorities today slightly above the levels of the white population.

There have been some striking gender-related shifts in the pattern of work. The share of part-time employment among females has been declining, with a corresponding larger share of females working full-time. The opposite is true among males, with the share of men working part-time increasing by 5 percentage points over the sample. For ethnic minorities, part-time employment has steadily increased, with a pronounced pick up following the crisis.

Next, we look at three variables which are often used to capture aspects of “human capital”: the highest qualification achieved, the occupation of a person, and the sector in which they are employed. For illustrative purposes, we split the sample into four sub-groups – white men, white women, ethnic minority men, and ethnic minority women – though we also consider more granular sub-sets of these groups.

Chart 2 compares the highest qualification attained among the four sub-samples in 1994 and 2019. The main trend is the same across the board: the share of people with degrees or higher education has almost doubled since 1994. The increases are, however, most pronounced among women and ethnic minorities. For example, ethnic minority females have seen a 31 percentage point increase between 1994 and 2019. In 2019, around 60% had a degree or a higher education qualification.

Conversely, the shares of people without a qualification have decreased significantly across the four groups, with the trend for UK-born ethnic minority women reducing at a faster pace than for non-UK born ethnic minorities. Both UK-born and non-UK born workers entering the labour force market in the UK are materially more qualified than in the past.
Chart 2: Highest qualification attained


Chart 3 shows the composition of the labour force by occupation across the four sub-groups. Occupational participation differs strikingly by gender, less so by ethnicity. There is a higher share of managers, professional, and associate occupations among men than women. Compared to men, women have a larger representation in administrative, and personal, sales and customer service occupations, while men have a larger representation in skilled trades and process and plant occupations. This holds true across ethnicities.

Chart 3: Occupational representation

Chart 4 shows the composition of the UK labour market by sector. The vast majority of men across both ethnic sub-samples work in the ‘industry’ sector (including manufacturing, utilities and mining) and trade and transport sectors. The latter is particularly important for ethnic minority males, where close to 40% of this sub-group works. On the other hand, the public sector is dominated by females of both ethnicity backgrounds. The share of people working in professional services and finance is similar across the board.

Chart 4: Sectoral representation


(b) Pay Trends

Table 1 shows summary statistics of the distribution of earnings across gender and ethnicity. It shows that white men have the highest mean and median hourly earnings, as well as higher earnings across every percentile of the pay distribution. Males also have higher earnings than females across the pay distribution for both ethnic groups. Ethnic minority females have higher earnings than white females across the distribution. All distributions have a strong positive skew, though white males have the longest upper tail.
Table 1: Summary statistics for hourly earnings (£) across gender and ethnicity groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statistic</th>
<th>White male</th>
<th>White female</th>
<th>Ethnic minority male</th>
<th>Ethnic minority female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25th percentile</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>8.35</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75th percentile</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>13.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard deviation</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skewness</td>
<td>46.3</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Charts 5 plots the distribution of hourly pay in £ for males, females and ethnic minorities separately on two dates: 1997 and 2018. It shows that there is a higher peak of low-paid females in 1997 and, to a lesser extent, in 2018. Put differently, more of the distribution of pay among males is skewed towards the upper tail of higher pay rates. Pay distributions between whites and ethnic minorities show fewer differences.

Chart 5: Distribution of hourly pay by gender and ethnicity

Chart 6 plots the mean hourly pay by decile for different ethnicity and gender groups. In 1997, white males earned more than all other groups, on average, across the entire distribution. The same is broadly true in 2018, except that ethnic minority males now earn more in the top decile. Females continue to earn less than males right across the distribution. The difference between white females and ethnic minority females is relatively small across the distribution.

Chart 6: Mean hourly pay by decile for ethnicity and gender interaction groups

![Chart 6](chart.png)


(c) Unconditional gender and ethnicity pay gaps

Unconditional gender and ethnicity pay gaps are calculated as the difference between median male (white) gross hourly earnings and median female (non-white) earnings, divided by median male (white) earnings.\(^8\) As with published pay gaps for companies, these measures make no attempt, at this stage, to control for factors driving or explaining these gaps; they are unconditional pay gaps.

The unconditional gender pay gap is large over the sample, averaging just over 22% (Chart 7). This gap has shrunk over the past 25 years, from around 30% in the mid-1990s to around 20% in 2018. This downward trend is particularly pronounced in the first part of the sample, when the pay gap was falling by, on average, around half a percentage point per year. Since the GFC, however, the gender pay gap has flattened-off and has been essentially unchanged since 2007.

At the same time gender pay gaps have been falling, female participation in the workforce has been steadily rising (Chart 7). Increased female participation may have contributed to the shrinking of the gender pay gap.

---

\(^8\) Unconditional gaps are calculated using raw pay data from the LFS and will not attempt to account for individual or job characteristics.
during the 1990s and early 2000s, as female representation in certain sectors and occupations expanded. But there is little evidence of these effects over the past decade, during which female participation in the workplace has, if anything, picked up pace but the gender pay gap has been sticky.

Chart 7: Female participation rate and unconditional gender pay gap

If we assess by qualification, the largest gender pay gaps are observed for people with GCSE or no qualifications, while the lowest gaps are for workers with a degree or equivalent (Chart 8). Generally speaking, the higher the qualifications, the lower the gender pay gap.

Location also appears to play an important role. The gender pay gap outside London is consistently higher than in London, across all levels of qualification. The largest gap between London and the rest of the UK is among workers who have no or “other” qualifications. This might be explained by the fact that “other” qualifications includes degrees from outside the UK which may get less recognition.

---

9 Olivetti, C and Petrongolo, B (2016) show that structural change of the economy becoming more service based, can explain at least half of the overall variation in female hours, both over time and across countries.
By occupation, consistent with qualifications, the gender pay gap is smaller for professional and administrative occupations than for skilled trades, customer service and plant operatives (Chart 9). For almost all occupations, the gender pay gap is higher outside London. In 2018, the gender pay gap outside London remained higher for managers, skilled trades and elementary occupations. For the rest of the occupations, the pay gap in London overtook the respective gap outside London.

Broadly speaking, occupations with median hourly pay of more than £10 (managers, professional, and associate occupations) have lower gender pay gaps than occupations where the median hourly pay is less than £6.50 (sales and customer services, and elementary occupations). Relatedly, there is a clear inverse relationship between the gender pay gap and female-dominated professions. Occupations with a lower share of females tend to be characterised by higher gender pay gaps and vice versa, consistent with increased female representation shrinking gender pay gaps cross-sectionally, if not always over time.
Finally, if we look at unconditional gender pay gaps by sector (Chart 10), these gaps are broadly-based across sectors. The largest gaps are in the finance sector, both in London and the rest of the UK. These average close to 40%. This is materially larger than the next-worst sector, ICT, which averages around 30%. The evolution of the gender pay gap in finance suggests it has fallen only modestly, from over 45% in the mid-1990s to around 38% in 2018.
The unconditional ethnicity pay gap exhibits a rather different pattern than the gender pay gap. This gap has also been materially lower, averaging around 4% over the sample. As the gender gap fell sharply in the decade to 2005, the ethnicity pay gap was broadly stable at around 2% (yellow dots in Chart 11). The ethnicity pay gap then began increasing steadily between 2006 and 2014 (red dots), averaging 6% over the period. Recently, it has begun to fall (green dots), reaching just under 4% in 2018.

Chart 11 shows that higher ethnic minority participation in the workplace has only been associated with lower pay gaps very recently. This, and the relatively volatile pattern in the ethnicity pay gap over time, presents something of a puzzle. We might instead expect pay disparities to decline as ethnic minorities become better represented in the labour market through higher participation.
Looked at by qualification, white workers earn more than ethnic minorities for most levels of qualifications. The exception are those with “other” or no qualifications living outside London. Perhaps surprisingly given the significant share of ethnic minorities in the workforce, ethnicity pay gaps are larger in London than outside London, for all qualifications (Chart 12). These gaps are larger for those with higher levels of qualification, such as a degree. This presents a second puzzle in the unconditional pay gap data.

Recent data do not change this picture. In the latest calendar year (2018), ethnicity pay gaps are positive across all qualifications, averaging 8%. They remain larger in London than elsewhere, with the highest ethnicity pay gaps in degree and A-level qualification categories. Unconditional ethnicity pay gaps are still consistently smaller than unconditional gender pay gaps.
Ethnicity pay gaps differ significantly by occupation and sector. They are largest in managerial, professional and skilled occupations and lowest, or even negative, in elementary, personal service and sales and customer occupations (Chart 13). This is the mirror-image of gender, where pay gaps were largest among the lowest-paid occupations. By sector, pay gaps are largest in the professional and finance sectors (Chart 14). In other words, ethnicity pay gaps are largest among the highest-paid.
Chart 13: Median ethnicity pay gap by occupation, sample average

Note: A positive ethnicity pay gap in this chart indicates that ethnic minorities earn less than their white counterparts, whereas a negative ethnicity pay gap indicates that ethnic minorities earn more than their white counterparts.
If we look at ethnic minority workers at a more granular level, some interesting cohort effects emerge. There is a very wide dispersion of pay among different ethnic minority cohorts, with some having negative and others positive pay gaps compared with their white counterparts (Chart 15). Median hourly pay is highest for those of Chinese ethnicity, at just over £11, or around 15% higher than for whites. There are also negative pay gaps, though smaller ones, for workers from a mixed/multiple ethnic and Indian background.

At the other end of the spectrum, there are significantly positive pay gaps for other ethnic minority cohorts, including black and Afro-Caribbean workers. The largest pay gaps are for workers from a Pakistani and Bangladeshi background, which average 13% and 20%, respectively (Chart 15). These large pay gap differences between different ethnic minority cohorts beg the question of whether it is useful to think about a single “ethnicity pay gap”.

Note: A positive ethnicity pay gap in this chart indicates that ethnic minorities earn less than their white counterparts, whereas a negative ethnicity pay gap indicates that ethnic minorities earn more than their white counterparts.
Chart 15: Granular ethnicity pay gaps

Chart 15 shows the granular ethnicity pay gaps for various ethnic groups. The chart indicates that ethnic minorities earn less than their white counterparts, whereas a negative ethnicity pay gap indicates that ethnic minorities earn more than their white counterparts.

Whether an ethnic minority individual is born in the UK or not also plays an important role in their pay. Chart 16 shows that ethnic minorities born in the UK (apart from those from Bangladeshi and Pakistani backgrounds) earn more than UK-born white people. Educational attainment is part of the explanation here. Although ethnic minorities born in the UK are a small part of our sample (2%), they are almost twice as likely to have a degree relative to white UK-born workers (40% versus 21%).

In stark contrast, most ethnic minorities born outside the UK earn considerably less than white people born outside the UK. This in part reflects compositional effects, as a higher proportion of non-UK born ethnic minorities have no qualifications compared to their white counterparts.

Note: A positive ethnicity pay gap in this chart indicates that ethnic minorities earn less than their white counterparts, whereas a negative ethnicity pay gap indicates that ethnic minorities earn more than their white counterparts.
On average, ethnic minority women earn more than white women, whereas ethnic minority men earn less than white men (Chart 17). This is also true in the latest data. Unconditionally, there is a clear and well-defined pay gap for females, a clear and well-defined pay gap for ethnicity but, somewhat surprisingly, no clear, well-defined pay gap for ethnic minority females. This is a third puzzle in the unconditional pay data.
Section 4: Explaining Pay Gaps

In this section, we explore the factors contributing to gender and ethnicity pay gaps. Accounting for individual and job characteristics helps us to estimate *conditional* gender and ethnicity pay gaps. Can pay gaps be explained by characteristics of the individuals (such as their level of education or location) or the jobs they are doing (such as the sector or occupation)? How much of the pay gap remains “unexplained” once these characteristics are accounted for? As well as providing a greater understanding of the drivers of pay gaps, this approach helps resolve some of the puzzles otherwise apparent in the unconditional pay gap data.

The ability to “explain” pay gaps in terms of worker or job characteristics does not necessarily imply these pay gaps are justified or are not therefore a policy problem. For example, if the education system is working inequitably across gender or race, in a way that causes pay gaps to emerge, this would be a clear market failure that would justify policy intervention. In other cases the choice of an occupation or sector may be a personal decision, reflecting lifestyle and values, and less obviously a market failure or policy concern.
The decompositions we carry out aim to identify the role of individual and environmental factors. One way of doing so is by using the so-called Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition. This decomposes the gap between the wages of two groups into two parts. The first captures the share of the gap explained by the different compositional characteristics of the two groups. The second captures the sensitivity of pay to those characteristics, something which is not typically observable.

Suppose $y$ is our variable of interest, in this case wages. We have two groups, say male and female. We assume $y$ is explained by a vector of determinants, $x$, according to the following model:

\[
y_i = \begin{cases} 
\beta_{female} x_i + \epsilon_{i}^{female} & \text{if female} \\
\beta_{male} x_i + \epsilon_{i}^{male} & \text{if male}
\end{cases}
\]

where the vectors of the $\beta$ parameters include intercepts. To keep things simple, assume there is a single factor – education – and that males benefit more, wage-wise, than females from a given level of education. In other words, at each educational level ($x$), the level of wages ($y$) are higher for males than females. Assume, again for simplicity, that males also have higher levels of educational attainment than females. This means that, for compositional reasons, we would also expect males to earn more than females.

The gap between male and female wages, $y^{male}$ and $y^{female}$, is

\[
y^{male} - y^{female} = \beta^{male} x^{male} - \beta^{female} x^{female}
\]

where $x^{male}$ and $x^{female}$ are vectors of explanatory variables evaluated at their means for males and females, respectively. The Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition allows us to split up the overall gap into the part that is attributable to (i) differences in $x$'s (the so-called “accounted for” component capturing compositional differences) and (ii) differences in the $\beta$'s (the "unaccounted for" component reflecting the greater impact of a given factor on males versus females). In other words, the wage gap between the two groups can be expressed as:

\[
y^{male} - y^{female} = \Delta x \beta^{female} + \Delta \beta x^{male}
\]

where $\Delta x = x^{male} - x^{female}$ and $\Delta \beta = \beta^{male} - \beta^{female}$.

In this way, we can split the gender pay gap into a part that can be accounted for by females having different characteristics ($x$’s) than males, and a part resulting from females being treated differentially to males given those characteristics ($\beta$’s). This expression can be further rewritten as (4), which compares the regressions coefficients to their hypothetical value in a world of no labour market discrimination.

\[
y^{male} - y^{female} = \Delta x \beta^{female} + x^{male}(\beta^{male} - \beta^*) + x^{female}(\beta^* - \beta^{female})
\]

where $\Delta x = x^{male} - x^{female}$ and $\beta^* = \text{vector of non-discriminatory coefficients}$.
We use an extensive list of factors or characteristics, $x$, to help explain pay gaps. Some of these relate to the characteristics of the individual worker – for example, their number of years in employment, their tenure in post, where they live, their age and their educational qualifications. Other factors relate to the nature of the job itself – whether it is full or part-time, the occupation, sector and job-type. Both factors, individual and job-specific, are likely to be important in explaining pay.

Chart 18 shows the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition of the gender pay gap over the sample, when the average gender pay gap in the UK was close to 22%. From the decomposition, around half of that gap can be accounted for by compositional effects, arising from the different characteristics of either the worker or the job they are carrying out. That leaves around 11 percentage points of the pay gap unaccounted for by these factors. In other words, around half of the gender pay gap is difficult to justify on fundamental grounds, consistent at least with some significant degree of gender pay “bias”.

Of those factors explaining the gender pay gap, the most important relate to the characteristics of the job rather than the individual. Occupation, sector, and the full/part-time nature of work are the most important factors accounting for the gender pay gap. It is difficult to know how much these reflect personal choice (workers’ preference for a certain sector or way of working) rather than legacy environmental factors (such as the preponderance of males in certain professions or sectors).

Chart 18: Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition of gender pay gap, sample average

Note: A positive gender pay gap in this chart indicates that women earn less than men, whereas a negative gender pay gap indicates that women earn more than men. ‘Years’ refer to time-fixed effects, ‘Job type’ captures if the job is temporary or permanent.
Looked at over time, the halving of the gender pay gap since the mid-90s has been driven roughly equally by accounted and unaccounted for components (Chart 19). The main factor causing the shrinkage in the explained component is qualifications. While at the start of the sample the qualification component was adding to the gender pay gap, by the end it was dragging. This reflects the significant increase in relative educational attainment by females over the period. The unexplained – or “gender pay bias” – component has shrunk somewhat, though remains significant at just under 10% at the end of the period.

Chart 19: Gender pay gap Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition time series

Note: A positive gender pay gap in this chart indicates that women earn less than men.

Looked at regionally, although the unconditional gender pay gap is relatively stable over the sample in London, once we allow for compositional effects the picture is more promising. The unexplained (“pay bias”) component of pay has fallen over time in London, reaching 5.5% by the end of the sample. Outside London, the gender pay gap has also been on a downward trend, driven by both explained and unexplained factors.

Next we implement the same methodology for the ethnicity pay gaps. Chart 20 shows the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition of the ethnicity pay gap over the full sample. The conditional ethnicity pay gap averages a relatively modest 5% over the sample, smaller than for gender. This is no longer the case once we account for compositional effects. These point to higher, rather than lower pay, for ethnic minorities. Specifically,

10 The share of the ethnic minority population has been increasing over time in our sample from approximately 4% in 1994 to 10% in 2019. This means the median observation for the white group occurs a lot earlier than for the ethnic minority group. As a result, when we run a pooled Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition, more weight is placed on later observations, where the ethnic minority population is larger leading to a negative ethnicity pay gap. This is at odds with time-series results which take into account the relative shares of the two groups in each year. To ensure that the results are comparable with the gender pay gap, we aggregated the results from the time series regressions using the share of the two groups in each year as weights.
ethnic minority workers tend to be employed in regions where wages are higher (40% of ethnic minorities work in London) and tend to have higher qualifications than their white counterparts.

Once these compositional effects are accounted for, the unexplained ("pay bias") ethnicity pay gap is as large as for females. It averages just under 10 percentage points over the sample. This demonstrates one of the perils of interpreting raw, unconditional, pay gap data too literally. Replicating this analysis for people born in the UK reduces by half the size of the pay bias. Conversely, for people born outside the UK from ethnic minority backgrounds we estimate a significantly larger pay bias, at around 12 percentage points.

**Chart 20: Ethnicity pay gap Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition, sample average**

Looking over time (Chart 21), the unconditional ethnicity pay gap was broadly stable from the mid-1990s until 2015, since when it has declined. That decline can to a large extent be explained by the rise in the relative educational performance of ethnic minorities which, by the end of the sample, is subtracting 2 percentage points from the pay gap.

By contrast, the unexplained ethnicity pay gap has been largely unchanged over the sample. Not only is the unexplained ("pay bias") part of the ethnicity pay gap as large as for gender; it appears also to have been more persistent and has shown fewer signs of falling over time. The ethnicity pay gap problem in the UK is every bit as acute as the gender pay gap problem, contrary to the message from the raw pay gap data.
The decomposition also helps explain the otherwise puzzling finding of a larger ethnicity pay gap in London than elsewhere in the UK. That larger gap appears largely to reflect compositional effects. Once these are accounted for, the unexplained ethnicity pay gap in London, at 13 percentage points, is similar to the sample average, at just under 10 percentage points, and is about as persistent.

An alternative, and more flexible, way of exploring the determinants of pay gaps is by using regression techniques. In our baseline regressions, we use the approach of Goldin (2014) to estimate gender and ethnicity pay gaps. Given the rich set of controls in our dataset, this offers robust estimates of conditional gender and ethnicity pay gaps. It also provides useful insights into the factors, individual and job-specific, most important for driving headline pay gaps.

The Goldin specification is:

\[
(5) \ln(\text{pay}) = \alpha + \beta \times \text{Female} + \mu \times \text{Controls} + \varepsilon
\]

Where \(\text{Female} = \begin{cases} 
1 & \text{if female} \\
0 & \text{if male} 
\end{cases} \)

We regress the natural log of average gross hourly pay on a binary female coefficient and a set of controls, wider than the ones used in Goldin (2014). The set of controls comprises both individual and job-specific characteristics. It includes: age, female-age group interactions, usual hours worked, public or private sector, full time or part time, contract type, whether born in the UK, has a child under 2, female and child under 2
interaction, occupation, female and occupation interaction, educational qualifications, tenure, region of home and sector (Annex Table 1A).\textsuperscript{11}

Once we take account of these factors, Table 2 suggests that there was, on average, a conditional gender pay gap of just under -15% between 1994 and 2019.\textsuperscript{12} This gender pay gap is highly statistically significant. To understand how it has changed over time, we split the sample into five periods (1994-1998, 1999-2003, 2004-2008, 2009-2013, 2014-2019) and re-estimate (5). As Chart 22 shows, the gender pay gap has fallen over time, though it remains around -10% and is statistically significant by the end.

Table 2: Gender pay gap for specification (5)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Pay gap, per cent</th>
<th>Number of observations for females</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>-0.159*** (-11.17)</td>
<td>-15% 291,859</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>537,177</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Note: Coefficients are recalculated into percentages as per Palmquist (1980) due to log-linear specification. A negative pay gap in this chart indicates that women earn less than men.

Chart 22: Conditional gender wage gap under specification (5)


Note: A negative gender pay gap in this chart indicates that women earn less than men.

\textsuperscript{11} The regressions assume the effect of the controls on pay is homogenous between different groups. If we run a Chow test on this restriction, it fails in our sample. This would be a useful area for future research.

\textsuperscript{12} Coefficients are recalculated into percentages as per Palmquist (1980) due to log-linear specification.
We can replicate this regression for ethnicity with the same set of controls, except that the occupation, age groups, and children under 2 variables now interact with the ethnic minority variable.

\[
(6) \ln(pay) = \alpha + \beta \times \text{Ethnic minority} + \mu \times \text{Controls} + \varepsilon
\]

Where \( \text{Ethnic minority} = \begin{cases} 
1 & \text{if person does not belong to white ethnic group} \\
0 & \text{if person belongs to white ethnic group}
\end{cases} \)

With this specification, the conditional gap for ethnic minorities averages around -11% and is again significant at the 1% level. Looked at over time, Chart 23 shows that this gap was quite volatile in the early part of the sample, although the coefficients are also insignificant for this period. Since 2009, the ethnicity pay gap has remained in double digits for most of the period and has been statistically significant.\(^{13}\)

**Chart 23: Conditional ethnicity wage gap under specification (6)**

The raw, unconditional pay data suggests that wage patterns may vary significantly across different ethnic minority groups, with some pay gaps negative and others positive. To see whether these effects hold true having accounted for compositional effects, we can run (7) with separate binary variables for each ethnicity group \( i \) relative to a white control group, namely: mixed/multiple ethnic groups, Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Chinese, other Asian background, Black/African/Caribbean/Black British and “Other”.

---

\(^{13}\) This may in part because of the rising proportion of ethnic minorities in the sample population.
\[ (7) \ln(\text{pay}) = \alpha + \beta \ast \text{Ethnic minority}_i + \mu \ast \text{Controls} + \varepsilon \]

Where \( \text{Ethnic minority}_i = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if person does belong to ethnic group } i \\ 0 & \text{if person belongs to white ethnic group} \end{cases} \)

From Table 3, the mixed ethnic group does not have a statistically significant pay gap. All other ethnic groups do have a significant and negative pay gap, varying from -6% and -7% for Indians and Chinese through to -20% and -13%, respectively, for workers from a Bangladeshi and Pakistani ethnic background. In other words, once we account for compositional effects, a more consistent pattern of negative ethnicity pay gaps emerges, although the size of the gap varies significantly across different ethnic minority groups.

Table 3: Conditional granular ethnicity pay gaps for specification (7)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>Coefficient (compared to coefficient for White)</th>
<th>Pay gap, per cent</th>
<th>Number of observations for ethnic minority groups</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mixed ethnic</td>
<td>0.0186 -0.82</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>3,022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian</td>
<td>-0.0774*** (-10.29)</td>
<td>-7%</td>
<td>10,480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistani</td>
<td>-0.144*** (-13.19)</td>
<td>-13%</td>
<td>3,521</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladeshi</td>
<td>-0.228*** (-12.98)</td>
<td>-20%</td>
<td>1,235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>-0.0617*** (-3.35)</td>
<td>-6%</td>
<td>1,797</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any other Asian background</td>
<td>-0.139*** (-11.90)</td>
<td>-13%</td>
<td>3,893</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black/African/Caribbean/Black British</td>
<td>-0.135*** (-17.04)</td>
<td>-13%</td>
<td>10,222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other ethnic group</td>
<td>-0.0824*** (-7.34)</td>
<td>-8%</td>
<td>4,623</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>251,064</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Coefficients are recalculated into percentages as per Palmquist (1980) due to log-linear specification. A negative pay gap in this table indicates that ethnic minorities earn less than their white counterparts, whereas a positive pay gap indicates that ethnic minorities earn more than their white counterparts.
We can extend these specifications by considering interaction effects between gender and ethnicity. This is achieved by adding two dummy variables to the original specification (5):

\[
(8) \ln(\text{pay}) = \alpha + \beta \times \text{Female} + \rho \times \text{Ethnic minority} + \sigma \times (\text{Female} \times \text{Ethnic minority}) + \mu \times \text{Controls} + \epsilon
\]

Where \(\text{Ethnic minority} = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if person does not belong to white ethnic group} \\ 0 & \text{if person belongs to white ethnic group} \end{cases}\)

As shown in Table 4, we find that the conditional gender wage gap (for white women) remains around -15%. For female ethnic minorities this becomes larger at around -18%, suggesting an additional “pay bias”. This resolves another puzzle in the unconditional pay data. By contrast, ethnic minority men suffer no such additional bias. Indeed, at around -10 percentage points, their pay gap is smaller than for white women.

Table 4: Conditional gender pay gap for specification (5) and (8)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Specifications</th>
<th>(5)</th>
<th>(8)</th>
<th>Number of observations per group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coefficient</td>
<td>Pay gap, per cent</td>
<td>Coefficient</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>-0.159***</td>
<td>-15%</td>
<td>-0.163***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-11.17)</td>
<td>(-11.30)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic minority</td>
<td>-0.102***</td>
<td>-10%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-23.01)</td>
<td>(-13.57)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female*Ethnic minority</td>
<td>0.0719***</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-13.57)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>537,177</td>
<td>524,612</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Coefficients are recalculated into percentages as per Palmquist (1980) due to log-linear specification. In order to calculate the pay gap for female ethnic minorities, we have added up the coefficients of the female, ethnic minority, and the female-ethnic minority interaction dummies, as all of these dummies take the value 1 for a female ethnic minority.

If we run these regressions over time, the same broad pattern emerges. White men earn more than any of the other three categories (ethnic minority males and females and white females), although all of these pay gaps have shrunk somewhat over the past 25 years (Chart 24). Pay gaps for ethnic minority males have tended to be a little smaller, but have also fallen less rapidly. Pay gaps for ethnic minority women, while halving over the period, remain strikingly high.
Just because a pay gap can be explained by a set of individual and work-specific characteristics does not mean it is necessarily either reasonable or justifiable. Differences in these characteristics may themselves suggest inequalities or biases that need rectifying. It is interesting to examine what our regression results tell us about the relative importance of various factors in determining pay gaps. To assess this, we run separate regressions for white men, white women, ethnic minority men and ethnic minority women as the effect of various factors on pay is not homogenous for these groups. Some key findings include:

(a) **Education.** The “penalty” for having no qualification, compared to having a degree, is on average 39%. That penalty exists irrespective of gender or ethnicity. The penalty is not equal across these groupings, however. This penalty is highest for white women, at 41%, and lowest for ethnic minorities at 33%. The story is slightly different when we compare degrees with “other” qualifications. For ethnic minorities, where university degrees from abroad often end up in this category, the penalty is a lot smaller, at around 24%, compared with non-ethnic minorities.

(b) **Age.** Compared to the earnings of the 25-29 age group, each subsequent age group earns more up to around the mid-50s, where the earnings ‘premium’ flattens out a bit. For example, those aged 45-49 earn a pay premium, on average, of around 19% compared with those aged 25-29. This pay premium is notably larger for white men than women or ethnic minorities. Men aged 45-49 earn an “extra” wage premium of around 10% compared with the other sub-groups.
(c) **Part-time and non-permanent work.** Part-time work, compared with full-time employment, reduces earnings across all four sub-groups, on average by 16%. This discount is larger for white men (22%) than for ethnic minorities and white women (10%). If employment is not permanent, this also reduces earnings across the sub-groups, with white men again being affected the most (10% reduction in pay).

(d) **Children under 2.** Viewed on its own, having a child under 2 appears to have a positive effect on the earnings of both white men and women, of 6% and 1% respectively. For ethnic minority men, the effect is not statistically significant while for ethnic minority women earnings are reduced by 1%. The results are more interesting if we interact having a child under 2 with a variable capturing full or part-time employment. While for white men, the effect on earnings is still positive, for women the effect of having a child under 2 is only positive for women working part-time. For women working full-time, having a child under the 2 reduces earnings by around 6%. This suggests women in full-time jobs experience a ‘maternity penalty’, whereas men and women in part-time employment do not.

(e) **Financial sector.** Compared to earnings in the benchmark sector (agriculture), most sectors have higher pay. The sector with the highest relative pay is finance, with a 46% premium relative to the benchmark. This premium is notably higher for men than women (58% versus 32%), although it is highest for ethnic minority men (76%). These are large pay gaps, bearing in mind these estimates take account of differences in the individual characteristics of the workers, such as age and educational achievement.

(f) **Born in the UK.** Being born in the UK, on average, leads to slightly lower earnings than not. However, this average masks sharply opposing trends among whites and ethnic minorities. Being born in the UK and white reduces earnings by around 7% compared with whites born outside the UK. This largely reflects the effects of those with “other qualifications”, and the fact that white people born outside the UK tend to be more educated. By contrast, ethnic minorities born in the UK boosts earnings by around 7% relative to non-UK born ethnic minorities. UK-born ethnic minorities tend to be more educated and earn more across all the types of qualifications, compared with non-UK born ethnic minorities.

(g) **London.** Compared to the benchmark (the North), the region in which people live and work plays a relatively very small role in determining their pay, with one exception – London and the South East. A job there boosts earnings, relative to the North, by 21% and 12% respectively. This effect is present across all four sub-groups. The ‘London effect’ is if anything more pronounced among white women, who earn 26% more.

**Section 5: Conclusion**

Let us conclude by summarising some of our main findings and then setting out some of the potential next steps, policy-wise, that flow from this analysis.
First, the good news is that, once we control for various job and individual-specific factors, there is clear evidence of progress having been made in shrinking gender and ethnicity pay gaps in the UK over the past quarter-century or so. Based on the results from the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition, these gaps have shrunk by around half for females, and by a little less than that for ethnic minorities.

Second, the less good news is that these gender and ethnicity pay gaps remain large even once various compositional effects are taken into account, at around 10 percentage points. Pay gaps have not only been large but persistent, strikingly so among ethnic minorities, even once we make allowance for differences in skill and job attributes. This suggests, despite progress, much remains to be done.

Third, even where we can “explain” pay gaps using various fundamental factors, this should not be taken to imply these gaps are necessarily justifiable. For example, consistent and large education and skills differences between cohorts could themselves be taken as evidence of a policy failure. So too might a preponderance of certain types in certain sectors or occupations.

Fourth, consistent with that, our results suggest that existing pay biases can be amplified and exaggerated by the effects of age, the nature of the employment contract, educational qualifications and having children under the age of 2. On average, these too tend to further the pay disadvantage for women and ethnic minorities.

In terms of policy implications, a number of important government initiatives are already underway, among central banks and more widely. The Bank of England began publishing its gender pay gaps in 2017 and has chosen voluntarily to publish its ethnicity pay gap too since 2018. In 2019, the median gender pay gap was 23% and the median ethnicity pay gap was just under 7%, reflecting lower representation of both groups at senior levels. Published pay gaps were a further useful prompt for action by the Bank.

The Bank is committed to closing these pay gaps, including by setting stretching targets for representation, in general and at senior levels. Good progress is being made. The share of BAME and female staff below senior management in the Bank currently stands at 19% and 46%, respectively, compared to targets of 20% and 50%. At senior management, BAME and female representation is 5% and 31%, compared to targets of 13% and 35%.14 A wide array of initiatives are underway to ensure the Bank meets these targets.

Other central banks have also made a further push towards improving their staff diversity, although few publish pay gaps. The ECB’s Executive Board introduced gender targets in 2013 in order to double the share of women in management by 2019. As of the end of 2018, 29% of management positions were held by women compared with a target of 35% for the end of 2019. For the most senior management roles the share was 22% against a target of 28% for the end of 2019. The ECB announced additional measures last

---

14 Carney (2019a) discusses diversity and inclusion in the Bank. Carney (2019b) notes that the Bank’s gender pay gap is lower than for most companies in the financial sector.
year. The Fed announced a Diversity and Inclusion Strategic Plan for 2016-19, aimed at fostering diversity in the organisation. In order to foster transparency and accountability, they report the composition of their employees by diversity statistics annually.

Looking beyond central banks, the analysis presented here suggests some clear directions of travel. First, at present gender pay gap reporting in the UK only covers companies with more than 250 employees. In practice, this means it covers only around 40% of the UK working population in the private sector.\textsuperscript{15} To tackle the pay gap comprehensively, this suggests there is a strong case for extending the pay reporting regime to smaller companies – say, those with 30 or more staff.

Second, there is currently no compulsory system of company reporting on the ethnicity pay gap in the UK, though the government has consulted on doing so. The ethnicity pay gap is at least as large as for females, and if anything has been more persistent, as shown by the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition results. In my opinion, there are therefore strong grounds for extending compulsory reporting to ethnicity as well as gender. This analysis also emphasises the importance of looking at labour market outcomes for different ethnic minority groups, rather than necessarily treating ethnic minorities as a single group.

Third, at present only a handful of countries internationally require companies to publish gender and ethnicity pay gaps. There is a strong case for reporting diversity pay gaps, on an internationally-harmonised basis, to allow cross-country as well as cross-company comparison. Given their expertise on labour market issues, this might be something on which the OECD could lead. The international central banking community could also help lead by example.

The benefits of internationally-harmonised disclosures, as an incentive device for action, have recently been demonstrated in the case of climate change disclosures. Today, financial firms with around $34 trillion assets under management have committed to harmonised reporting using the Task-Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures (TCFD) template.\textsuperscript{16} This has encouraged wider scrutiny of, and actions to mitigate, the risks to companies’ profits and balance sheets posed by climate change. Pay gap disclosure could have a similarly profound behavioural effect on companies.

Fourth, there is also a strong case for improving the sets of data available publicly to monitor progress towards equality of pay and opportunity in the workplace. One example of useful additional data would be longitudinal data tracking individuals from school into employment, perhaps using administrative data or new surveys. This would help to understand the key determinants, and obstacles, to career and pay progression.

Fifth and finally, published pay gap data are imperfect and can sometimes give a misleading impression of diversity patterns. We have demonstrated how raw pay gap data can sometimes give rise to puzzles. We


\textsuperscript{16} TCFD (2019).
have also demonstrated, however, that a careful consideration of various compositional factors can resolve these puzzles and provide a clearer picture of underlying patterns. There is no reason why companies could not use these techniques when interpreting their own results.

Others have argued that publishing pay gap data may discourage companies from investing in a pipeline of diverse talent for the future, as hiring younger and lower-paid workers could actually show up as a worsening pay gap in the near-term, even if it bears fruit longer-term. These are legitimate concerns. But they are far from being knock-down arguments when it comes to publishing pay gap data.

Published pay gaps are a starting point for corporate and national accountability and explanation, not an end-point. No single metric can perfectly summarise all dimensions of diversity. But publication of a single metric can, and has, served as the catalyst for an explanation and action, at the company and national levels. For example, it prompts companies to justify their misses and to explain how and over what horizon they expect their pay gap and diversity targets to be hit.

There is an analogy here with my day job – inflation-targeting using monetary policy. The single target does not wholly or perfectly summarise all dimensions of the economy. But having the target serves as a catalyst for explanation and action – an explanation for misses and an action plan for returning inflation to target. That improves policy accountability and societal outcomes. The same could be true of companies when it comes to diversity policies and outcomes.
## Annex

### Table A1: Variables used

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Calculation/Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age groups</td>
<td>'AGEGROUPS'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children under 2</td>
<td>'FDPCH2' Number of dependent children in family aged under 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>A combination of 'HIQUAPD', 'HIQUALD', 'HIQUAL4D', 'HIQUAL5D', 'HIQUAL8D', 'HIQUL11D', and 'HIQUL15D' to create 6 classes of highest qualification attained</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnicity</td>
<td>A combination of 'ETHUKEUL', 'ETHCEN15', 'ETHCEN' to create 9 classes of ethnicity as these change across time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full-time / Part-time</td>
<td>'FTPT' Whether working full or part-time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>'SEX' Sex of respondent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Job Type (Permanent or Temporary)</td>
<td>‘JOBTYP’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation</td>
<td>Occupation (main job). Calculated through a combination of ‘SOC2KM’, ‘SC102KM’, SC2KMJJ, ‘SOC10M’ and ‘SOCMAIN’ to create 10 classes of occupations as these change across time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pay</td>
<td>Log of average gross hourly pay in main job (‘HOURPAY’)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public sector or private sector</td>
<td>‘PUBLICR' Whether working in the public or private sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region</td>
<td>Region of usual residence ‘URESMC’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sector</td>
<td>A combination of Sector (SIC2007) ‘IND07’ and industry section (main job) ‘IND07M’ as these change across time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenure</td>
<td>Length of time continuously employed 'EMPLEN'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UK-born</strong></td>
<td>A combination of varying country of origin and country of birth variables: ‘CRYOX’, ‘CRYOX7’, ‘CRYO’, ‘CRYO7’ and ‘CRY01’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Usual hours worked</strong></td>
<td>Log of total usual hours in main job (including overtime) ‘TTUSHR’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Wave</strong></td>
<td>‘THISWV’ Wave to which the data refers to</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
References


ONS (2018), 'Gender pay gap in the UK: 2018', *Office for National Statistics*.


