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# Staff Working Paper No. 816 Machine learning explainability in finance: an application to default risk analysis Philippe Bracke, Anupam Datta, Carsten Jung and Shayak Sen

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## Abstract

We propose a framework for addressing the 'black box' problem present in some Machine Learning (ML) applications. We implement our approach by using the Quantitative Input Influence (QII) method of Datta *et al* (2016) in a real-world example: a ML model to predict mortgage defaults. This method investigates the inputs and outputs of the model, but not its inner workings. It measures feature influences by intervening on inputs and estimating their Shapley values, representing the features' average marginal contributions over all possible feature combinations. This method estimates key drivers of mortgage defaults such as the loan-to-value ratio and current interest rate, which are in line with the findings of the economics and finance literature. However, given the non-linearity of ML model, explanations vary significantly for different groups of loans. We use clustering methods to arrive at groups of explanations for different areas of the input space. Finally, we conduct simulations on data that the model has not been trained or tested on. Our main contribution is to develop a systematic analytical framework that could be used for approaching explainability questions in real world financial applications. We conclude though that notable model uncertainties do remain which stakeholders ought to be aware of.

Key words: Machine learning, explainability, mortgage defaults.

JEL classification: C55, G21.

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Bank of England, Threadneedle Street, London, EC2R 8AH Email publications@bankofengland.co.uk

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<sup>(1)</sup> UK Financial Conduct Authority. Email: philippe.bracke@fca.org.uk

<sup>(2)</sup> Carnegie Mellon University. Email: danupam@cmu.edu

<sup>(3)</sup> Bank of England. Email: carsten.jung@bankofengland.co.uk

<sup>(4)</sup> Carnegie Mellon University. Email: shayaks@london.edu

## 1 Introduction

Machine learning (ML) based predictive techniques are seeing increased adoption in a number of domains, including finance. However, due to their complexity, their predictions are often difficult to explain and validate. This is sometimes referred to as machine learning's 'black box' problem.

It is important to note that even if ML models are available for inspection, their size and complexity makes it difficult to explain their operation to humans. For example, an ML model used to predict mortgage defaults may consist of hundreds of large decision trees deployed in parallel, making it difficult to summarize how the model works intuitively.

Recently a debate has emerged around techniques for making machine learning models more explainable. Explanations can answer different kinds of questions about a model's operation depending on the stakeholder they are addressed to. In the financial context, there are at least six different types of stakeholders: (i) Developers, i.e. those developing or implementing an ML application; (ii) 1st line model checkers, i.e. those directly responsible for making sure model development is of sufficient quality; (iii) management responsible for the application; (iv) 2nd line model checkers, i.e. staff that, as part of a firm's control functions, independently check the quality of model development and deployment; (v) conduct regulators that take an interest in deployed models being in line with conduct rules and (vi) prudential regulators that take an interest in deployed models being in line with prudential requirements.

Table 1 outlines the different types of meaningful explanations one could expect for a machine learning model. A developer may be interested in individual predictions, for instance when they get customer queries but also to better understand outliers. Similarly, conduct regulators may occasionally be interested in individual predictions. For instance, if there were complaints about decisions made, there may be an interest in determining what factors drove that particular decision. Other stakeholders may be less interested in individual predictions. For instance, first line model checkers likely would seek a more general understanding of how the model works and what its key drivers are, across predictions. Similarly, second line model checkers, management and prudential regulators likely will tend to take a higher level view still.

#### Table 1: Different types of explanations

*Note*: lighter green means these questions are only partially answered through our approach.

|  |           |          | Stakehold    | ler interest |           |            |
|--|-----------|----------|--------------|--------------|-----------|------------|
|  |           | 1st line | 5 tonionoire | 2nd line     |           |            |
|  |           | model    | Manage-      | model        | Conduct   | Prudential |
|  | Developer | checking | ment         | checking     | regulator | regulator  |
| 1) Which features mattered in<br>individual predictions?   | Х         |          |              |              | Х         |            |
| 2) What drove the actual predictions more generally?   | X         | X        | X            |              | Х         |            |
| 3) What are the differences between<br>the ML model and a linear one?  | Х         | Х        |              |              |           |            |
| 4) How does the ML model work?   | Х         | Х        | Х            | Х            | Х         | Х          |
|  |           |          |              |              |           |            |
| <ul><li>5) How will the model perform<br/>under new states of the world?<br/>(that aren't captured in the training data)</li></ul> | Х         | Х        | Х            | Х            | Х         | Х          |

Especially in cases where a model is of high importance for the business, these stakeholders will want to make sure the right steps for model quality assurance have been taken and, depending on the application, they may seek assurance on what the key drivers are.

While regulators expect good model development and governance practices across the board, the detail and stringency of standards on models vary by application. One area where standards around model due diligence are most thorough are models used to calculate minimum capital requirements. Another example is governance requirements around trading and models for stress testing.<sup>1</sup>

In this paper, we use one approach to ML explainability, the Quantitative Input Influence method of [1], which builds on the game-theoretic concept of Shapley values. The QII method is used in a situation where we observe the inputs of the machine learning model as well as its outputs, but it would be impractical to examine the internal workings of the model itself. By changing the inputs in a predetermined way and observing the corresponding changes in outputs, we can learn about the influence of specific features of the model. By doing so for several inputs and a large sample of instances, we can draw a useful picture of the model's

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>See for instance https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/-/media/boe/files/prudential-regulation/ supervisory-statement/2018/ss518.

functioning. We also demonstrate that input influences can be effectively summarised by using clustering methods [2]. Hence our approach provides a useful framework for tackling the five questions outlined in Table 1.

We use this approach in an applied setting: predicting mortgage defaults. For many consumers, mortgages are the most important source of finance, and the estimation of mortgage default risk has a significant impact on the pricing and availability of mortgages. Recently, technological innovations—one of which is the application of ML techniques to the estimation of mortgage default probabilities—have improved the availability of mortgage credit [3]. We hence use mortgage default predictions as our applied use case. But our explainability approach can be equally valuable in many other financial applications of machine learning.

We use data on a snapshot of all mortgages outstanding in the United Kingdom and check their default rates over the subsequent two and a half years. In contrast with some of the most recent economics literature [4], we are interested in *predicting* rather than *finding the causes of* mortgage defaults. Thus we do not employ techniques or research designs to establish causality claims as understood in applied economics. Such claims would be necessary for the discussion of policy interventions. We restrict our exercise to a prediction effort and its explainability, which is in line with most machine learning applications in the industry. We acknowledge that there is currently an important debate on making causal inference more prominent in machine learning.

In a related paper, [5] use a machine learning model to estimate default probabilities in US data and evaluate the effect of machine learning adoption on the outcomes of different ethnic groups. Rather than focusing on outcomes such as mortgage pricing or mortgage availability, in this paper we focus on the estimating process itself and its explainability to relevant parties. For us, predicting mortgage defaults is just one example of a wide range of problems where ML explainability techniques can be useful.

The results section of the paper follows Table 1, moving from the particular to the more general questions. We also examine how explanations change in an out-of-sample setting (in a simulated stress testing scenario) for logistic regression models and gradient boosted trees, and find some notable differences. In sum, we find that explainable artificial intelligence (AI) approaches can indeed illuminate which factors were important for making specific predictions and help understand the logic behind a model's operation. However, we conclude that some notable model uncertainties do remain which stakeholders ought to be aware of.

# 2 Theory: Explaining the functioning of machine learning models

#### 2.1 Existing approaches to explainability

Explainability has become an active area of research, with several existing approaches.

Naturally, the most straightforward path to explainability is developing a simple, explainable model. For instance, linear regression models are considered relatively interpretable, especially when their regression coefficients have a clear economic meaning. Other models that are considered as being easy to understand are (small) decision trees or decision rules.

However, in many applied settings it can be advantageous to develop more complex models, which may require an explainability approach. Such approaches attempt to 'reverse engineer' how the workings of the complex model. This means not necessarily trying to explain the model itself, but to highlight its salient features. There are six ways to do so:

First, one way of reverse engineering a complex ML model is to construct a simpler model — such as a regression model or small decision tree — that approximates the workings of the complex one. This is called 'surrogate model' [6]. We would refer to this as a 'global' model, as it tries to explain the workings of the complex for all input data.

Second, another global approach is that of Feature Importances, an explainability technique which has been developed for Random Forest ML models. While it does not build a surrogate model (that could be used to make predictions) it provides the relative importances of features for all input data, i.e. on a global level. It does so by estimating the how much the model prediction variance changes due to the exclusion of individual features. It does not straightforwardly capture feature interactions.

Third, another option is to build one or several *local* surrogate models. Local surrogate

models approximate the complex model's predictions on selected sub-sections of the data. In a mortgage example, one would construct different explainable models for different types of mortgage applicants. Such a local approach, is the essence of the Local Interpretable Model-Agnostic Explanation (LIME) method [7]. Related local approaches are 'example-based explanations' which try to explain aspects of a model by focussing on how it classified selected input regions.

Fourth, another approach is to build instance-based explanations. This approach does not build a 'model' (global or local). Rather, it provides explanations on a prediction-by-prediction basis. It answers questions like 'what were the driving factors in the case of individual A'? This is the approach taken by methods which use Shapley values and Individual Conditional Expectations. The key advantage of Shapley approaches over other instance-based approaches is that it captures feature-interactions.

Finally, Partial Dependence Plots (PDPs) show the impact of one or two variables have on the predictive outcome. These are very useful tools to display the non-linearities and other complexities in the underlying ML model. They are global approaches in the sense that they are plots that show importances over all the input data. But they are 'partial' in the sense that they can only display one or two features at a time. They also do not consider interactions in the display on features impact on predictive outcomes.

Our approach is novel in that it combines various elements of the above approaches. By using a Shapley-based approach, we start out with an instance based approach. We then proceed to use these to give global explanations. This is similar to a Feature Importances approach, but allows us to capture interactions between features. Next, we show plots that are conceptual similar to Partial Dependency Plots, but again are based on Shapley values. This allows us to show non-linearities, similar to PDPs, yet at the same time capturing feature interactions. Next, we use also show a local approach which — similar to a local surrogate model approach — aims to capture the workings of the model on a more granular level.

In this paper, we draw on various of the existing approaches from the explainability toolbox introduced above and apply them to the '5-types-of-explainability' framework we set out in the previous section.

#### 2.2 Quantitative Input Influence (QII)

As stressed in the previous section, at the heart of our framework developed in this paper is an instance-based explanation approach - the Quantitative Input Influence (QII) approach. We outline it in this section, before moving to combining it with other approaches. Traditionally, influence measures have been studied for feature selection, i.e. informing the choice of which variables to include in the model [8]. Recently, influence measures have been used as explainability mechanisms [1, 7, 9] for complex models. Influence measures explain the behavior of models by indicating the relative importance of inputs and their direction. While the space of potential influence measures is quite large, we point out two requirements that they need to satisfy: (i) taking into account variable correlations, and (ii) capturing feature interactions. When inputs to a model tend to move together (e.g. income and loan size), simple measures of association (such as the correlation between income and defaults) do not distinguish the direction in which each affects outcomes. In complex non-linear classifiers effects arise out of the interaction between inputs (e.g. if only individuals with high age *and* high income are deemed creditworthy), and therefore influence measures should account for these.

QII [1] controls for correlations by employing randomising interventions on inputs, and accounts for input interactions by measuring the average marginal contributions of inputs over all sets of features they may interact with. In other words, with this technique, we attempt various changes of input variables and analyse what changes to output variables they produce.

To see how this works in practice, we focus on the example highlighted in this paper, mortgage defaults. Suppose we are interested in the influence of a particular input—say, the borrower's income—on the probability of default estimated by the model, which becomes our *quantity of interest*. (Any property of the system conditional on a particular distribution of inputs can be a quantity of interest for measuring QII.) In what follows, we start by concentrating on individual outcomes, i.e. on questions such as "why was the loan application of this individual rejected?" or "what would it take for that particular individual to lower their default probability?". (These are type-1 explanations according to Table 1.) We will then build up from these individual-level questions to the the overall functioning of the model, and focus on global questions such as "how important is this input for all individuals that are affected by the model's decisions?" (type-2 explanations). These more general questions are especially relevant for regulators, because they allow an assessment of whether the overall model makes economic sense and whether it is generally fair towards the people affected by its decisions.

Accounting for input correlations: Unary QII Correlations in data are unavoidable. Attribution of outcomes in the presence of correlated inputs using associative measures can result in unsound results. For example, consider the inputs loan size and income that may be correlated. A model that only uses loan size may yield results that depend on the association of the income with output, but appear as driven by the loan size alone.

Suppose we want to explain the decision of a machine learning model, or algorithm,  $\mathcal{A}(.)$ , which takes inputs  $X = \{x_1, ..., x_n\}$ . To isolate the effect of loan size  $(x_i)$  on the model outcome for a specific borrower, we start with a *randomising* intervention whereby we replace the individual's  $x_i^{\text{ind}}$  with a value drawn from the distribution of  $x_i$  in our sample. This intervention breaks the link between the relevant input and the other inputs of the model, and, if repeated multiple times, allows us to compute the expected outcome of the model when this input is randomised,  $\mathbb{E}\mathcal{A}(X_{i*}^{\text{ind}})$ . The influence of  $x_i$ ,  $\iota(x_i)$ , is computed as the difference between the actual outcome of the model for the individual and the expected outcome of the model when  $x_i$  is randomised:

$$\iota(x_i) = \mathcal{A}(X^{\text{ind}}) - \mathbb{E}\mathcal{A}(X^{\text{ind}}_{i*}).$$
(1)

In the special case in which the machine learning model happens to be a linear regression, i.e.  $\mathcal{A}(X) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 x_1 + ... + \beta_n x_n$ , the expectation term can be carried inside the regression equation and we have that:

$$\iota_{\text{linreg}}(x_i) = \beta_i \left[ x_i - \mathbb{E}(x_i) \right].$$
<sup>(2)</sup>

While limited to a very specific class of models, this equation helps us build intuition around the two reasons why an input is influential for a given individual: the model put weight on changes of the input ( $\beta_i$ ) and the individual is far from the average with respect to that input (as captured by  $x_i - \mathbb{E}(x_i)$ ). Accounting for input interactions: Aggregate marginal influence The method described above will provide a distorted view of a variable's influence on the quantity of interest if, in reality, the effect of the variable on the outcome is channelled through interactions with other variables. For instance, one might encounter a model in which a low income increases the likelihood of default only if coupled with a large loan (giving rise to a large loan-to-income ratio and, depending on the interest rate and maturity of the contract, a high debt-service ratio). In this case the randomising intervention on loan size alone would not be effective in identifying the effect of this interaction. It is necessary to *intervene on the two variables at the same time*. The principle of the intervention is the same (to replace an input of the model with a randomised version of it, obtained by drawing from the joint marginal distribution of two or more features of the model) and the method of evaluating the outcome is the same (i.e., by focusing on a quantity of interest and deciding how to quantify the distance in the quantity of interest when the system operates over the real and hypothetical input distributions). In this case, we speak of *joint* (or *set*) QII.

But, going back to the effect of income, how can we make sure that we measure the individual effect of that variable or, in other words, its true *marginal* effect? This can be done by taking the difference between two set QII's: the one obtained by varying only loan size, and the other obtained by varying income and loan size together. In this way, we shine a light on the marginal effect driven by income.

This method naturally leads to another question: given that there are multiple combinations of possible sets of features, how do we aggregate together all the different marginal contributions of a variable to construct a measure of *aggregate marginal influence*, which could be viewed as the ultimate measure of the influence of a variable? The answer relies on Shapley values.

Shapley values are a concept originally developed in game theory to share the revenues of a game among all participants [10]. A particular instance of revenue division that has received attention in this space is the measurement of voting power: how much influence has voter (or state or constituency)  $x_i$  on the total outcome? Providing such an answer requires examining all the possible coalitions that  $x_i$  can form with other players—which we can indicate as the set  $\prod(X)$  of all permutations of X. For each of these coalitions,  $x_i$  can add a marginal contribution (defined as  $m(x_i)$ ) to the final outcome (the result of the vote). The Shapley value of input  $x_i$ , which we indicate as  $\psi_i$ , is the expected marginal contribution of that input:

$$\psi_i = \mathbb{E}[m(x_i)] = \frac{1}{n!} \sum_{\prod(X)} m(x_i).$$
(3)

The Shapley value has interesting axiomatic properties that make it a good choice to measure the aggregate marginal contribution of an input (see [1]). It is also possible to use Shapley values as a tool to perform statistical inference on machine learning models [11], which falls outside the scope of the present paper.

Because its foundations lie in the problem of revenue division, the sum of the Shapley values of all input is equal to the outcome of the model. Taking again the specific (and simplified) example of a linear regression (this time including one interaction term), it is easy to see how this property is verified:

$$\mathcal{A}(X) = \beta_0 + \dots + \beta_i x_i + \beta_j x_j + \beta_{ij} (x_i * x_j) + \dots + \beta_n x_n.$$
(4)

When there are no interactions (i.e., the model does not contain the term  $\beta_{ij}(x_i * x_j)$ ), the Shapley value is just the Unary QII shown in equation (2). The sum of all Unary QII's for an observation is equal to the predicted value for that observation,  $\mathcal{A}(X)$  minus a constant,  $\beta_0$ . In the presence of an interaction term, one needs to check the influence of input  $x_i$  under all possible combinations of the other inputs. In a linear regression setting, this task is simplified by the fact that all inputs except  $x_i$  and  $x_j$  have no effect on the influence of  $x_i$ . Because of the interaction between  $x_i$  and  $x_j$ , the marginal influence of  $x_i$  depends on the value of  $x_j$  and its distribution in the sample.

**Global measures of influence** When thinking about the global influence of an input on a machine learning algorithm, it is best to see it as an aggregation over all the individual influences of this input on the loans or elements of the sample. However, because a given input will have a positive influence on the classification (or estimated default probability) of some borrowers and a negative influence on some other borrowers, it is useful to take the absolute value of the influences, or their square, before summing or averaging them. Otherwise, in the context of a linear regression model, if we were to intervene on an input by reshuffling its values across all the individuals in the sample, we would end up with an overall effect of zero on the average prediction.

#### 2.3 Global cluster explanations

The QII approach allows us to identify the features that are most relevant for the model's estimation of default probabilities. We then use this insight to cluster the mortgages in our population based on these important features, ending up with an intuitive characterisation of how the model discriminates between loans. These global cluster explanations consist of two parts: *clustering* on QII explanations, and a *succinct cluster description* in terms of combinations of features [2].

Clustering methods rely heavily on a suitable distance metric to distinguish between points that should be considered distant versus points that should be considered adjacent. In this work, we choose the distance between QII explanations as a distance metric for clustering. The intuition behind the use explanation space for clustering is that explanations suitably raise the importance of important features and suppress the importance of the features unimportant for the prediction task at hand. For example, consider a linear model with input vector X, where each  $x_i$  is uniformly distributed on  $\{-1, 1\}$ . Clustering on the feature space will lead to  $2^n$ clusters. However, the QII of each feature  $x_i$  will be  $\beta_i x_i$ . If for any individual most  $\beta_i$ 's are small, then one would expect a smaller number of explanation clusters corresponding to high  $\beta_i$ 's.

## 3 Data

For our analysis we use data on the universe of outstanding UK regulated mortgages collected by the UK Financial Conduct Authority (FCA). Starting from June 2015, this dataset is updated every six months and contains information on loan characteristics (e.g. original and current balance, type of mortgage, current interest rate) and performance (e.g. whether the loan was

| Name              | Description  | Source                                |
|-------------------|--|---------------------------------------|
| Original features |  |                                       |
| year              | Year of origination  | Mortgage performance snapshot         |
| region            | 10 English regions, Northern Ireland, Scotland or Wales          | Mortgage performance snapshot         |
| loan_val          | Loan Value   | Mortgage performance snapshot         |
| out_balance       | Outstanding balance  | Mortgage performance snapshot         |
| repayment         | Repayment method: interest only, capital and interest            | Mortgage performance snapshot         |
| curr_ratetype     | Current Rate type: Fixed or variable                             | Mortgage performance snapshot         |
| $curr_interest$   | Current interest charged   | Mortgage performance snapshot         |
| age_borrower      | Borrower age   | Mortgage performance snapshot         |
| $mortgage\_term$  | Mortgage remaining term  | Mortgage performance snapshot         |
| past_arrears      | Loan has been in arrears in the past                             | Mortgage performance snapshot         |
| advtype           | Mortgage type: First time buyer, home mover, other               | Mortgage origination information      |
| ratetype          | Origination Rate type: Fixed or variable                         | Mortgage origination information      |
| gross_income      | Gross Income   | Mortgage origination information      |
| employment        | Employment status: Employed, self-employed, retired              | Mortgage origination information      |
| mgpaymprotect     | Mortgage payment protection insurance (MPPI) applies             | Mortgage origination information      |
| impaired          | Borrower has impaired credit record (e.g. bankruptcy or arrears) | Mortgage origination information      |
| incomeverified    | Verified income  | Mortgage origination information      |
| income_basis      | Mortgage based on single or multiple earners                     | Mortgage origination information      |
| new_dwelling      | New dwelling   | Mortgage origination information      |
| dealtype          | Length of incentivised period in years                           | Mortgage origination information      |
| Derived features  |  |                                       |
| LTV               | loan-to-value ratio at origination                               | Performance + origination information |
| CLTV              | current loan-to-value ratio                                      | Performance + origination information |

repaid or entered arrears). We use the six half-year snapshots on the universe of outstanding mortgages until December 2017, and ask ourselves "among the outstanding loans as of June 2015, can we predict which of these mortgages fall into arrears in the next 30 months?".<sup>2</sup>

We supplement the mortgage performance data with information on mortgage originations (from another FCA dataset which we merge into our data) and local house prices (which we use to estimate a measure of current loan-to-value ratios). Detailed information on the steps to prepare and clean the data are available in the Appendix. Table 2 reports the list of features used in the predictive model.<sup>3</sup>

After cleaning the data, we have a sample of 6 million loans, among which 2.5% went into arrears during the relevant period. (We define being in arrears as being more than 3-month delinquent on mortgage payments.) In the context of this paper, we use the terms 'being in

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>We exclude from the data those mortgages that were already in arrears in 2015H1.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup>To compute the derived features (LTV at origination and current LTV), we use information on the house value at origination together with the loan size. To impute current LTV, we update the house value according to the local-authority house price index as measured by the UK Office for National Statistics. UK local authorities are larger than US municipalities but smaller than metropolitan areas.

Figure 1: Percentage of the stock of mortgages in arrears, UK Note: Aggregate data from https://www.fca.org.uk/data/mortgage-lending-statistics.



arrears' and 'default' interchangeably. When setting the ML model, we need to keep in mind that the event we are trying to predict is a rare one—we will explain some of the issues that arise with this type of class imbalance in the next section. It is also worth noting that, compared to the US, mortgages in the UK default less, for three reasons [12]. First, the absence of long-term fixed rate mortgages in the UK mean that interest rate declines were readily transmitted to borrowers, who become subject to lower payments, following the 2008-09 crisis. Second, most lenders take a favourable view towards forbearance, given that the percentage of mortgages that are securitised is much lower than in the US. Third, in the UK, all mortgages are recourse, providing a lower incentive for borrowers to default. Figure 1 contains data from the Bank of England and the FCA on the percentage of mortgages in arrears in the UK. While not directly comparable to the numbers used in our analysis (this measure is stock-based; our measure reflects the flow of new arrears over a certain period), it shows that the default rates used for this study, which cover the period from June 2015 to December 2017, are not necessarily representative of those in more stressful conditions, such as the 2007-2009 crisis.

## 4 Results

We estimate two models to predict arrears: a linear logistic regression (Logit) and gradient tree boosting model (GTB). Using a linear model such as Logit can serve as a benchmark and helps build intuition around some of the explainability metrics we propose. At the same time, having a more 'black-box' model such as GTB helps us highlight the benefits of our methodology. Also, the approach we propose is useful to discriminate between models in general, and we show here how it can be used to develop insight into why some models appear to perform better than others.

We tried various machine learning classifiers, such as random forest and support vector machine. We picked the GTB classifier over those other classifiers based on its superior predictive performance. We chose the hyper-parameters of the GBT model via a grid-search algorithm, using 3-fold cross validation, optimising for predictive accuracy.

**Training and testing the models** In line with standard practice, we split the sample in a training and a test set. These samples are made of randomly-selected mortgages and comprise 70% and 30% of the dataset, respectively. The model is estimated on the training set, but its predictive performance is assessed on the test set.

There are alternative ways to create the training and test set. While our training and test sets are drawn from all years in the sample, one could have used the early period as training set and test the model on the later period. This approach mimics a real-world situation in which a model is trained on past data and then used to predict the performance of subsequent cohorts of mortgages. At this stage we have not explored this route, given the relatively short period covered by our dataset; but it is an avenue for future work when more years of data become available. (This is the approach of [13], who have access to US mortgage data for the period 1995-2014, and use the last two years of the dataset as test set.)

**Predictions** To assess the performance of the two models, we start by showing the distribution of estimated default probabilities in Figure 2.

In this section, we take a vector of estimated default probabilities for the loans in the test set as the primary outcome of our two models. Panel A of Figure 2 shows these estimated probabilities. In terms of predicted probabilities of default, the GTB model appears to discriminate somewhat more between borrowers, with the group of very-low default probability or very-high default probability being more populated than in the case of the logistic regression.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup>Strictly speaking, while the Logit model directly produces default probabilities, the GTB model is geared

This pattern is not specific to our dataset or our application; rather, it reflects a fundamental fact: more accurate predictive models discriminate more between individual instances [3].

Because predicted probabilities cannot be negative, and because the overall incidence of default in our dataset is low, at 2.5%, most mortgages tend to cluster around very low estimated probabilities, below two percent. Such compression may be unhelpful if we are interested in showing the workings of the models and, in particular, how the machine learning algorithms predict outcomes. A better picture of mortgage differentiation can be given by log odds of the probabilities  $\left(\log\left(\frac{p}{1-p}\right)\right)$ , which can take any value. We show these Logit scores in Panel B of Figure 2.

To move to a measure of model performance, we need to switch our attention from predicted probabilities to a predicted classification (i.e. will default versus will not default). We then compare these classifications with actual outcomes. There are different comparisons that can be performed, but most of them share the same building block: the counting of true and false positives, and true and false negatives.

**ROC curve** The receiver operating characteristics (ROC) curve plots the true positive rate ('sensitivity' or 'recall', i.e. how many mortgages that actually defaulted are classified as defaulting) against the false positive rate ('fall-out', i.e. how many mortgages that did not default are classified as defaulting) as the discrimination threshold (the predicted default probability above which a mortgage is classified as default) goes from one to zero.

With a high discrimination threshold, the model identifies few true defaults and creates few false positives. As the threshold diminishes, more mortgages are classified by the model as in default—some of these actually defaulted, whereas some of them did not. As we reach a discrimination threshold of one, all mortgages are classified as default, leading to a true positive rate and a false positive rate of one.

A random classifier would lay on the 45-degree line, because all true defaults and all mort-

towards producing classifications (i.e. whether loans will default or not default). The estimated probabilities for the GTB model are usually produced by counting the number of predicted defaults in the leaves, where that specific loan ends up, of the different trees produced by the algorithm. This probability measure may not be the optimal one, and there are alternatives (see for instance the related discussion in [3]). However, given that our focus is on explainability and the different probability measures are unlikely to change the main insights of the model, in this paper we stick to the standard measure.

#### Figure 2: Predicted default probabilities

Note: The vertical axes report the number of loans that fall in the relevant probability bins.



Panel A: Probabilities





gages that did not default would have a 50-percent chance of being classified as defaulting. A good classifier would improve on this random allocation by pushing the curve towards the top-left corner of the chart, trading off a better recall for any level of fall-out. A commonly used summary indicator for this is called the area under the curve (AUC), which describes how far above the 45-degree line the ROC curve is. A 100% AUC indicates perfect predictive accuracy.

The left-hand chart of Figure 3 shows that the greater capacity of the GTB model to discriminate between 'good' and 'bad' mortgages appears to lead to better predictions, with the ROC curve for the GTB model being above the one for the Logit model—we find an AUC of 81% for the GTB model, compared to 78% for the Logit model.

**Precision-recall curve** Both recall and fall-out, the two arguments of the ROC curve, do not directly depend on the actual frequency of the event of interest. With more defaults, for example, both the numerator and the denominator in recall would rise, and both the numerator and denominator in fall-out would decrease, leaving the two measures, as well as the ROC curve, unchanged.

Our application is clearly one in which there are very few observations of the class that we are aiming to predict (in this case defaults), compared to the other class (non-defaults). In some models, this could lead the algorithm towards ignoring one class altogether. In other words, the model may not have sufficient data to learn what actual defaults look like. In such a situation it might treat the defaulting loans as outliers or totally random events.<sup>5</sup> In such a situation, it might be useful to have an additional metric that focusses on how good the classifier is at making sure that most of the mortgages identified as defaulting actually defaulted. The ratio between true positives and all positively-classified observations (true and false positives) is defined as 'precision'. The precision-recall curve identifies the trade-offs in datasets with rare events.

The right-hand side of Figure 3 plots the precision-recall curve for the Logit and GTB models. Once again, the GTB model appears to offer a better trade-off in terms of predictive

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup>One way to address this problem is to do 'oversampling'. In essence, this generates additional synthetic data of the minority class (in this case defaulting borrowers) in the hope that the model can learn more from this additional synthetic data. We tried this, but found that it in our case it did not improve the ROC curve.



Figure 3: Performance of the predictive models

performance.<sup>6</sup>

But the precision-recall chart also shows the important predictive limitations of the model. If, as is desirable in this application, we want to achieve a high recall ('catching' as many defaults as possible) we will have to sacrifice predictive accuracy of the model. In our example, to catch half of all actual defaults in the test set (a Recall rate of 0.5), we could have to incur a precision of only about 10%. In other words, 90% of all predictions would be incorrect, as most cases flagged as defaulting would in fact not be defaulting. This shows how, in the case of class imbalance, one can achieve high AUC values (a widely used predictive accuracy measure), while the model performs poorly at identifying the imbalanced class.

# 4.1 Type-1 explanations: Which features mattered in individual predictions?

We use our QII measures to identify the relevant features that drove the estimated default probabilities for individual loans.

Figure 4 shows explanations for two individuals. In this chart, as throughout the rest of the paper, we plot them as the difference that the feature made, for an individual loan, compared to

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup>The first part of the curve is unstable because precision can vary a lot with high thresholds. For example, starting from the highest possible threshold one may encounter only a few false positives at first, which makes precision start at zero. Precision may then jump up if a group of several true positives comes next, and decline again after a sequence of false positives. As the threshold goes down, more observations are included in the precision ratio, making it more stable.

#### Figure 4: Which features mattered in individual predictions?

*Note*: The vertical axes show the feature influences in log-odd terms, as compared to the average prediction.



the mean log odds prediction. For, instance, if the current LTV (CLTV) explanation is shown as 0.2, this means that the individual's CLTV increased the default probability by 0.2 log odds units.

Individual A took out a mortgage in 2006, has an income of £66k and a current LTV of 85%. Individual B took out a mortgage in 2013, has an income of £15k and a current LTV of 33%. These different feature values result in different feature influences. For instance, individual A's mortgage is relatively old, which, in both models, drives up the default probability compared to the average mortgage. Individual A also has a relatively high income, which in turn lowers the default probability. Individual B, in comparison, has a relatively low LTV which decreases the default probability. The charts indicate that the Logit and GTB models assign broadly the same types feature influences, but with notable differences. For instance, the Logit model assigns much higher influence to the current rate type of the mortgage.

Repeating this exercise for all individuals in the test set allows us to make a more general judgment about feature influences in the model.

# 4.2 Type-2 explanations: What drove the explanations more generally?

We now move to the next two explainability questions from Table 1, which asks for a more general characterisation of the model. In the first instance, we do this by simply averaging the absolute values of the individual predictions in the test set.

Similar to the cases of individual A and B above, we find that, on a global level, the Logit and GTB model end up with a similar ranking of feature influences (see Figure 5). For instance, variables with high feature influences in both models include the current loan-to-value and loan interest rate, which are reminiscent of the 'double-trigger hypothesis' for mortgage defaults and in line with findings in the economics literature. According to this view, a borrower would default only when in negative equity (which is captured by the current LTV), as, for instance, in the theoretical model of [14]. However, this condition is not sufficient; defaulters are usually affected by a drop in income or a sudden increase in payments (which in our analysis is captured by the mortgage interest rate).<sup>7</sup> Our findings on the role of LTV and interest rate are consistent with [16], who also study UK mortgage defaults but use a different data source (mortgages used as collateral for Bank of England monetary operations).

Therefore, this type of analysis may constitute an important tool for developers who want to sense-check an opaque ML model against the more transparent results of a Logit regression. (We report the Logit regression coefficients in Appendix Table A2.)

While the overall ordering of feature influences is sensible, there could nonetheless be potential oddities that developers and model users would not be able to see without an explainability lens. For instance, in our application the variable 'year' is one of the most influential features in both models. That is, the older a loan, the more likely is it that a borrower defaults on it. There may be an economic rationale behind this: for instance, older loans could have been issued in a time when underwriting standards were laxer. Or, because in the UK older mortgages tend to switch to a higher variable rate after the end of the initial incentive period, this

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup>See [15] for a recent analysis of how changes in mortgage payments affect delinquency rates in the US. Their paper uses hybrid adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs), which have fixed payments for a limited number of years and then reset to another rate periodically until the loan is repaid. Hybrid ARMs have features similar to the majority of UK mortgages studied here.



Note: The vertical axes show the mean absolute feature influences in the test set.



result could reflect the increased payments affecting those borrowers. But this finding could also point to a problem with the model, especially when it is deployed to new data. So while there may be an economic rationale for the influence of the year variable in the test set, one may want to exclude it in live deployment, because this rationale may not hold universally, in new conditions. In other words, the explainability tool gives a lens into checking if the model 'makes sense' and allows the developer to tweak the data if something is at odds with economic theory. In the example of the year variable, this may mean excluding it. In other cases it may mean better investigating why the unexpected influence of a variable has occurred.

#### 4.3 Type-3 explanations: What is the difference to a linear model?

We already alluded above to the difference between the Logit and the GTB models. We propose that discussing the difference between a linear (benchmark) model and a non-linear model can be considered as a separate type of explanation.

To do so, in Figure 6, we plot the Logit and GTB models next to each other. The figure indicates, as mentioned above, that the general ordering of features between the two is highly similar. However it also points out the differences between the two models, for instance with regards to the influence of 'current rate type' (whether it is a fixed or adjustable rate mortgage) which is more than twice as important in the Logit model than in the GTB model. Conversely,

#### Figure 6: Global Shapley influences, Logit vs GTB

Note: The vertical axes show the mean absolute feature influences, in log odds, in the test set.



the GTB model puts more emphasis on the current interest rate.<sup>8</sup>

Investigating the differences between the two models can be useful for instance-level (type 1) or aggregate (type 2) explanations, as there may also be interaction terms in a machine learning model that exist on a micro level (only for a few individuals). Of course, using a Logit model is only one example for a benchmark. It may be practical to use another well-known or more interpretable model to plot against the machine learning one. Further, it can be insightful to consider the difference between the unary and the Shapley values for the Logit versus the GTB model. The global influences in the right-hand chart of Figure 5 also allow us to see whether the GTB model captures any interaction terms, which—by definition—are not captured in our Logit model. Comparing the GTB model's Shapley values with its unary scores helps us identify whether the Shapley approach picks up any interaction terms. While for most features the unary and the Shapley scores are similar, there are some differences. In fact, the Shapley values are consistently lower for most features. This implies that, once feature interactions are taken into account, most features are less important than they appear when considered in isolation. We thus proceed by using the Shapley method in order to account

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup>An explanation, using this information, might state: "The input features in the GTB model, in aggregate, have similar relative influences as the linear Logit model. But the GTB model ascribes significantly less importance to the current rate type, while ascribing more importance to the current interest rate".

for these interactions. As we will show below, such interactions are more clearly visible when considering input regions of the model. Note that unary and Shapley influences are identical for a linear model such as Logit, which does not take into account feature interactions if they are not explicitly built in the model.

#### 4.4 Type-4 explanations: How does the model work?

Mapping feature influences to feature values in the global model Note that Figure 5 purely indicates the relative sizes of influences, not their direction. For instance, it states that on average year was the most important factor in determining the default probability, more so than CLTV. However, often for interpreting 'how the model works' it is important to also understand for what type of feature values the influence was higher and for which lower. For instance, did a high LTV generally increase or decrease default probability in the model? This type of question is easily answered at the instance or individual level, as shown in Figure 4. However, because influences that affect some regions of the data do not necessarily translate into global patterns, a different analysis is needed. To get a sense of the direction of influence, we need to start mapping the feature values to feature influences. The more comprehensively and accurately we can do this, the better we understand how the model works for all input regions of the test set. (The final part of this Results section deals with looking at input regions that are not in the test set.)

As an initial high-level exercise, we map influences to feature values, by showing their bivariate correlations, in Table 3. Later years of issuance have a more negative impact on default probability. In other words, the model finds that more recent mortgages have a lower likelihood of default. (Note that, from the global influences figure, the direction of influence could not be inferred given that we looked at absolute values.) The converse seems to be true for current LTV (CLTV): the higher values of CLTV, the higher their overall impact on default probability. Higher borrower age is also associated with a higher default probability.

These findings of course rely merely on investigating bivariate correlations. They obscure non-linearities captured in the model. For instance, in the scatter plots in Figure 7, the CLTV

|  | Year of issuance | CLTV | Current<br>interest |       | Age of<br>borrower |
|--|------------------|------|---------------------|-------|--------------------|
| Correlation between feature values and their influence | -0.94            | 0.91 | 0.88                | -0.53 | 0.81               |

#### Table 3: Correlation matrix between feature values and the influence of the feature

and age influences follow clear non-linear trends. Similarly, feature influences follow an almost binary structure between low-income borrowers and the rest.

Looking at global feature influences obscures possible feature interactions (that we found were present in our analysis above) captured by the machine learning model. To account better for these complexities of the model, in the next section we suggest an approach for clustering similar kinds of explanations.

#### 4.4.1 Clusters of loans

In the next step, we try to add further intuition to the type-4 explainability ("How does the model work?"). In particular, we try to further explore how the model works for different input regions. We propose that there are four steps to do this: (1) Can we summarise the different explanations into sub-regions? (2) What are the relative influences in and across clusters? (3) How heterogeneous are explanations in clusters? (4) Mapping type of individuals in clusters.

**Summarising sub-regions** To better understand how explanations might look different between different input regions, we use clustering methods on influences. This gives us a sense of how many different types of explanations we might find for the loans in the test data set.

Using k-means clustering we arrive at four distinct clusters of influences. In Figure 8, we plot these clusters by their default probability (in log odds). For ease of reference, we label them 'lowest', 'low', 'medium' and 'high' probability of default (PD), based on their mean PD. (Recall though that they are clustered based on similar influences, not similar PDs). Different types of explanations can give rise to similar default probabilities.

#### Figure 7: Bivariate correlation of feature influences and values

*Note*: The vertical axes show log-odd scores. Feature influences are measured with respect to the mean prediction.



Figure 8: Clusters of explanations and their default probability distributions (GTB model)



**Relative influence within clusters** Next we look into the clusters that are constructed based on explanation similarities, to understand what these explanations actually are. We show the explanations by cluster, for the six features that are most important on a global scale (year, CLTV, gross income, original loan value, rate type and borrower age).

The left-hand chart in Figure 9 gives important insights into the non-linear nature of the GTB model. In the lowest PD cluster are explanations where year and current interest have a large negative effect on PD. For the next 'low PD' cluster, CLTV is the main explanation for a lower PD, while year has a large positive contribution. This shows that, while both clusters are at the lower end of PDs, they contain fundamentally different types of explanations. The medium and high probability clusters seem to have more similar explanations. However, this is only because in the chart we are not showing the past arrears feature, which is of low influence for the first three clusters. However, in the high PD cluster it is the single most important explanation (shown in the right-hand side chart in Figure 9)

Heterogeneity within explanation clusters. To check for robustness of the cluster, in Appendix Figure A1 we look at the distribution of explanations within clusters, by adding one standard deviation above and below the mean to the influences in the left-hand chart in Figure 9. It highlights that the direction of year and CLTV are the most consistent explanations

#### Figure 9: Mean feature influences in the four clusters

Note: Vertical axes show log-odd influences, as compared to the average prediction.



within clusters. In other words, their size and direction seem to be the main commonalities within these groups.

Mapping input regions to clusters We can only statistically approximate what features give rise to different explanations. Table 4 summarises the values of features (e.g. age, income etc) the individuals in different clusters tend to have. In the columns next to the feature values in the different clusters, we show the influence and direction of the feature in the cluster. (Note that in this case we do not calculate absolute values, taking into account the sign of the explanation.)

This mapping provides further insight into the working of the model, beyond global influences. In particular, it helps us further illuminate the interaction terms that the machine learning model picks up. We see that the feature values for year and current LTV have the expected direction in each cluster. But if loans were issued after 2009, the influence of the LTV decreases: in the lowest PD cluster that has more recent loans, CLTV is of more modest influence, while in the other two clusters CLTV is of higher influence. Thus, this provides concrete support for the hypothesis from above that the GTB model picks up an interaction between year of issuance and CLTV. The machine learning model thus gives us insight into the data structure that we might not have found through theory alone. Following this insight, the model developer could change the features of the Logit model to account for this interaction.

#### Table 4: Mapping features to influences

| Cluster | Probability | Year           | Year                 | CLTV   | CLTV                 | Past    | Past arrears      |
|---------|-------------|----------------|----------------------|--|----------------------|---------|-------------------|
| Cluster | of default  | values         | impact               | values   | impact               | arrears | impact            |
| 0       | Lowest      | After<br>2009  | Strongly<br>negative |  | Low                  |         |                   |
| 1       | Low         | Before<br>2010 | Medium<br>positive   | $egin{array}{c} { m Below} \ 42\% \end{array}$                 | Strongly<br>negative |         |                   |
| 2       | Middle      | Before<br>2010 | Strongly<br>positive | $\begin{array}{c} \textbf{Above} \\ 42\% \end{array}$          | Medium<br>positive   | No      |                   |
| 3       | High        | Before<br>2010 | Strongly positive    | $\begin{array}{c} \textbf{Above} \\ \textbf{42\%} \end{array}$ | Medium<br>positive   | Yes     | Strongly positive |

*Note:* 'Strong', 'medium' and 'low' impact refers to the first, second and third most important explanation in the cluster. An empty field means that the influence is less than 0.1.

Table 4 also sheds further light on the observation made above that, in the high PD cluster, past arrears is of huge importance. In fact, we find that all individuals in the high PD cluster have past arrears. This makes economic sense. As shown by [17] using survey evidence, almost half of borrowers in arrears report that a loss of income was the main reason behind their failure to keep up with payments. Given that income volatility is persistent, especially among certain groups of households [18], borrowers who have experienced arrears in the past are likely to experience them in the future. The tendency of British lenders to apply forbearance on those debtors, as noted in section 3, makes this repetition of arrears episodes more likely, because the cycle is rarely interrupted by foreclosure. The importance of year and CLTV in defining our clusters follows directly from the role of these two variables in explaining mortgage defaults—as explained in section 4.2, this role is perfectly consistent with economic theory and the evolution of the UK mortgage market and underwriting standards over the last decade.

Overall, these findings lead to the conclusion that the model in effect can be summarised in three steps: (1) if people have had past arrears they are classified as high default probability; (2) if they have recently taken out a mortgage they are classified as low default probability, unless they have a very high CLTV value; (3) if they took out a mortgage before 2010, the prediction depends heavily on CLTV and the current interest rate on the mortgage. The three steps that summarise the default predictions give stakeholders a good sense of the overall workings of the model. Importantly, however, these are just attempts to generalise. As indicated with the error bars in Appendix Figure A1, which shows the ranges of explanations in clusters, these are still merely averages. In ML models there will likely be a number of explanations that defy these generalisations. Nonetheless we think that the steps shown above constitute useful steps in the direction of explaining 'how the model works' for the individuals in the test set. We next turn to explaining how the model works for a hypothetical 'stress test set'.

#### 4.5 Type-5 explanations: Testing the model with simulations

Mortgage default models can be used in simulations to understand better how individual assets and balance sheets perform under stress conditions—for instance, in an economic downturn. We thus turn to analysing how the model predictions of our Logit and ML models change in a modified, synthetic test set. Importantly, our goal is to highlight the difference between the two models, not to say that one is superior to the other.

To do so, we use the assumptions in the Bank of England's most recent stress-test scenario for banks, which includes a sharp drop in property prices and a significant increase in unemployment. We then estimate the average default rate, in both models, for this scenario. As in our original test set, we find more dispersion in the predictions of the ML than the Logit model as well as a higher average predicted default rate. Finally, we use the QII approach to bring out what the explanations for predictions were in the stress test scenario. We find that this explainability method helps shed light on the difference in predictions of the two models. It again stresses that the ML model explanations vary depending on the input region. This needs to be taken into account to assess how a model will make predictions in situations that are significantly different from the training data set, including in tail events.

**Background on stress testing.** Financial institutions, regulators and central banks have always been interested in estimating potential losses on their asset portfolios, and how these losses would affect the balance sheets and ultimately the solvency of financial institutions. After the financial crisis, stress testing has become one of the most prominent approaches to assess the resilience of the financial system. Stress testing consists of two steps [19]: (i) generation of stress scenarios, and (ii) stress projections. ML methods can be used in both steps, but in this paper we focus on the stress projections—for which we employ the model estimated on the historical data—and take as given the Annual Cyclical Scenario (ACS) proposed by the Bank of England for its own stress testing exercise.

As described in [20] and [21], the Bank of England uses concurrent stress testing (that is, stress testing applied to several financial institutions at the same time) to assess the impact of the adverse scenario on banks' capital and advance the Bank macro- and microprudential objectives. Each year the Bank publishes an adverse scenario and asks financial institutions to submit data and questionnaires related to the impact of the scenario on their balance sheets.

While banks' submissions constitute the backbone of the exercise, the Bank and other regulators also carry out their own modelling of the impact of the adverse scenario, as a crosscheck and corroboration of individual submissions. Some of these internal models focus on a particular sector, such as the owner-occupied mortgage market. The goal of these models is not to predict the failure of entire institutions (as in [22], for instance); rather, they aim at the intermediate step of evaluating the effect of the scenario on defaults of individual securities. This is the context in which we want to test our ML model of mortgage defaults.

While other countries and institutions may have their own particular approach to stress testing, including specific differences in focus (for example, whether the ultimate goal is an assessment of the financial health of individual institutions or the whole system), the US Federal Reserve, the European Banking Authority and the Bank of Japan all have similar procedures.

**Constructing the synthetic data for the scenario** Given that owner-occupied mortgages constitute a substantial part of banks' balance sheets, mortgage arrears and defaults are an important component of stress testing. We implement our simulation by running the estimated model on some synthetic data meant to represent the relevant scenario.

Constructing such data is therefore the main preparatory step for this analysis. A scenario is usually described in terms of macroeconomic variables. The most recent stress test scenario proposed by the Bank of England includes a fall in UK residential property prices of 33%, a fall in GDP of 4.7%, and an increase in the official Bank Rate to 4%.<sup>9</sup>

In the simulations presented here, we take the simplifying step of assuming a one-to-one effect of these variables on the inputs of our model. For some features, such as interest rates, this assumption does not lead us too far from the actual mechanics of the UK mortgage market. For instance, a change in Bank Rate would ultimately translate into higher mortgage rates for all borrowers. (This pass-through would be slowed by the large share of mortgages that are initially fixed. The fixed-rate period however only last for a limited—two to five—number of years.) For other variables such as GDP, the impact on borrower-level features such as income is not straightforward. Reducing every borrower's income by the same percentage amount, e.g. 4.7%, would understate the seriousness of the downturn. Economic shocks inflict different levels of distress to different households, and it is often the most vulnerable people who suffer the most. An average decline of 4.7% GDP would likely be the result of averaging parts of the population who suffered no impact together with parts of the population who have suffered much steeper declines. Because these households are already more likely to default than other borrowers, an ideal simulation would carefully distribute the shock to different parts of the population in different magnitudes according to historical experience. At this stage we abstract from these distributional issues to focus on the main question of extrapolating the results of machine learning model by feeding them with synthetic inputs, and we restrict the level of complexity of those input changes. To engineer the scenario mentioned above, we increase the 'current interest' feature of our model by 3.5%. (The mortgage characteristics in our sample refer to June 2015, when the Bank Rate was 0.5%.) We increase all current LTVs by 50% to reflect the 33% decline in house prices, and reduce all incomes by 5% to incorporate the decline in GDP.

**Simulation findings** Applying the scenario above, we find that there are significant differences in the stress predictions of the linear and GTB model. Both models predict a shift towards higher probability of default, but the GTB model more so: the average default prob-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup>The Bank of England scenario also includes changes in other variables which, at the moment, we ignore in our simulation.

#### Figure 10: Predicted default probabilities in simulated scenario

*Note*: The vertical axes show the frequency of individual loans in relevant probability bins. The analysis is run on a subset of the test set in which inputs have been modified according to the stress-test scenario.





Panel B: Log odds



ability becomes 11% for the Logistic regression and 15% for the GTB algorithm. Similar to the estimation on actual data, GTB predictions are more dispersed—creating more mortgages with either a very low or a very high default probability—while the Logit predictions are more clustered around the sample mean. In particular, the GTB model predicts a significant amount of cases that are almost certain to default, as indicated by the mass of mortgages in the bottom right corner of the upper chart in Figure 10).

Of course, we have no way of knowing what the actual defaults will be in this hypothetical scenario, and we cannot compare the predictive accuracy of the two models (as we did with the actual-data sample). But we can use the same explainability approach applied above to make further sense of these predictions.

Appendix Figure A2 does this and compares aggregate influences between the test and the simulated data. The influences for the Logit model are identical across test set and the simulation. This highlights the robustness of the linear model across different input data. It allows us to explain *ex ante* how the model works, in terms of relative influences, before we know which data it is applied to. This is consistent with equation (2) because, with linear models, the two components of our influence measure are unchanged. The coefficient  $\beta$  remains the same by definition and, because we created stress-test scenario through a linear transformation of some inputs for *all* individuals, the term  $[x - \mathbb{E}(x)]$  also remains the same for all individuals. In short, the coefficients and the normalised inputs are unchanged in the simulation.

Conversely, the GTB influences substantially change when the GTB model is applied to the simulated data. This highlights the general point that machine leaning models often 'work' substantially differently for different input regions, due to non-linearities and interactions between inputs. For instance, the influence of CLTV and joint income increase substantially—both are features that drive the simulation. But also features that were not modified in the simulation see their relative influence change—for instance current interest is less than half as important as in the test set and original loan value increases about six-fold in influence. Overall, this means that the ordering of feature influences significantly changes in the simulation.

This highlights the more general point, already outlined in the clustering section, that explanations for machine learning models can significantly differ between input regions. And thus explaining the model for a given test is insufficient for explaining it for other input regions. The upshot of this is that, to make sure the model works as intended under various scenarios, the developer will have to rely on extensive testing for several potential states of the world, combined with explainability techniques.

# 5 Conclusion

In this paper we tackle the explainability problem of AI by studying the inputs and the outputs of a machine learning model, but not its inner workings. Such a scenario can arise in many settings, including financial applications; one example could be a mortgage lender with an automated tool to accept or reject loan applications of prospective customers.

The recent literature has offered several approaches to the explainability problem. Here we employ one that is well suited for a number of financial applications, the QII method of [1], to derive local and global measures for the influence of a model's inputs on its outputs. We further condense the insights from a model by clustering observations with similar input influences.

We demonstrate how to use the QII tools on a gradient tree boosting model of mortgage defaults, estimated on data comprising all outstanding UK mortgages during the 2015-2017 period.

In the introduction we listed various stakeholders and the types of explanations they may be interested in. For instance, in the case of a lender which uses a machine learning model to make its mortgage underwriting decisions, an explainability approach would outline a way to query the algorithm. By experimenting with multiple application inputs—with features reshuffled in a methodical way— one could estimate the key drivers of its decisions.

In an alternative example of a different stakeholder, a regulator may be interested in the workings of machine learning model of mortgage defaults of a bank to assess the riskiness of its loan book. A regulator could usefully consider an influence-based explainability approach implemented by the bank. But our paper also highlights that, in this type of situations, it is still difficult to estimate how a complex model would behave out of sample, for instance in stress-test scenarios where inputs are deliberately stretched.

In sum, in this paper, we show that explainable AI tools are an important addition to the data science toolkit, as they allow for better quality assurance of black box ML models. They can usefully complement other aspects of quality assurance, including various ways of model performance testing, understanding the properties of the data set and domain knowledge.

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# Appendix

## A Data preparation

We start from the June 2015 snapshot of the universe of outstanding residential mortgages in the UK, which contains 8,710,173 loans. As shown in Table 2, we need to merge this dataset with another source (the data on mortgage originations) to add a few relevant variables to our dataset. In the absence of a unique ID variable shared by the two datasets, we perform the match sequentially.<sup>10</sup> We first look only for those matches that use all the possible common variables in the two datasets: full postcode, date of birth of the borrower, date in which the mortgage account was opened, original size of the loan and originating bank. Once we have performed this first high-quality merge, we drop the requirement that the matched observations need to share the same originating bank, and perform the match again. We then remove another variable from the match, original loan amount, and merge again. Finally, we use a less restrictive match that is based only on full postcode and date of birth of the borrower.

We end up with 6,588,635 mortgages, and we then look for those mortgages in subsequent snapshots of lenders' books. Not all mortgages are matched to the subsequent snapshot, either because the information has been inputed with errors or because the mortgage was genuinely terminated. This could be because of a sale or a repossession.<sup>11</sup>

At this stage the sample still contains a wide set of diverse mortgage products; we decide to drop some of these products given that they differ quite substantially from standard mortgages. The dropped loans include: lifetime mortgages (a form of equity release), second-charge mortgages (these represent only 0.16% of the data), buy-to-let mortgages (these loans for investors are usually not recorded in the Product Sales Data (PSD); the ones that are reported represent only 0.03% of the data), shared ownership mortgages (a government scheme whereby a households partly owns and partly rents a property), shared appreciation mortgages (in which the borrower pays to the mortgage lender part of the appreciation of the property in exchange for

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup>This approach is also employed by [23] on the same datasets.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup>Repossession are preceded by arrears and therefore will be captured by our analysis.

an equity release early on), and mortgages to businesses (which are usually not recorded in this dataset). We also drop mortgages with an initial term of more than 40 years (these are likely to be mistakes) or less than 5 years (these are uncommon; in fact many lenders require that a new mortgage has a term of at least 5 years). Similarly, we drop mortgages with an outstanding amount greater than £23m and lower than £1000. These data-cleaning steps reduce the number of observations to 6,409,213. Finally, a substantial number of loans in the snapshot are recorded with zero outstanding balance—likely because these mortgages have been repaid but they are still included in the books. By excluding them the size of the dataset shrinks to 5,834,773 mortgages.

Before running the machine learning predictive model, we prepare the model features, which are listed in Table 2. We treat the following features as categorical: year, region, advtype, ratetype, current\_ratetype, dealtype, repaytype, current\_interest, and employment. Some features are zero-one variables: mgpaymprotect, impaired, incomeverified, joint\_income, newbuild, and past\_arrears. For the continuous features in the Logit model, we split the variables into bins to allow the model to pick up some of the nonlinearities in the data. We split the following variables: loan size at origination (at £75k, 125k, 175k), current loan size (at £50k, 100k, 150k), gross income at origination (at £30k, 40k, 60k), LTV at origination (at .5, .7, .85), current LTV (at .5, .7, .85, .9, .95), mortgage term (at 15, 20, 25), and borrower age (at 30, 40, 50).

# Table A1: Summary statistics of features

|                                       | count                  | mean      | std          | min     | 25%      | 50%       | 75%       | max           |
|---------------------------------------|------------------------|-----------|--------------|---------|----------|-----------|-----------|---------------|
| year                                  | 5,834,773              | 2009.89   | 3.11         | 2005.00 | 2007.00  | 2010.00   | 2013.00   | 2015.00       |
| orig_loan_val                         | 5,834,773              | 137921.54 | 124270.13    | 1002.00 | 75050.00 | 112495.00 | 165150.00 | 2500000.00    |
| outstanding_balance                   | 5,834,773              | 122135.02 | 120722.43    | 1.00    | 60630.00 | 98459.00  | 150617.00 | 22550000.00   |
| current_interest                      | 5,834,773              | 3.23      | 1.18         | 0.01    | 2.50     | 3.09      | 3.99      | 19.37         |
| gross_income                          | 5,834,773              | 52990.76  | 431895.22    | 1000.00 | 28240.00 | 40000.00  | 58900.00  | 9999999999.00 |
| LTV                                   | 5,834,773              | 64.85     | 22.47        | 0.01    | 49.03    | 70.00     | 84.38     | 186.67        |
| CLTV                                  | 5,834,773              | 52.83     | 31.83        | 0.00    | 33.80    | 54.59     | 71.19     | 26149.37      |
| mortgage_term                         | 5,834,773              | 22.00     | 7.28         | 5.00    | 17.00    | 23.00     | 25.00     | 40.00         |
| age_borrower                          | 5,834,773              | 39.08     | 10.02        | 18.00   | 31.00    | 38.00     | 46.00     | 105.00        |
| advtype_Council/social tenants buying | 5,834,773              | 0.01      | 0.10         | 0.00    | 0.00     | 0.00      | 0.00      | 1.00          |
| advtype_First time buyer              | 5,834,773              | 0.24      | 0.42         | 0.00    | 0.00     | 0.00      | 0.00      | 1.00          |
| advtype_Not known                     | 5,834,773              | 0.00      | 0.04         | 0.00    | 0.00     | 0.00      | 0.00      | 1.00          |
| advtype_Other                         | 5,834,773              | 0.02      | 0.13         | 0.00    | 0.00     | 0.00      | 0.00      | 1.00          |
| advtype_Remortgagors                  | 5,834,773              | 0.41      | 0.49         | 0.00    | 0.00     | 0.00      | 1.00      | 1.00          |
| ratetype_Capped                       | 5,834,773              | 0.00      | 0.06         | 0.00    | 0.00     | 0.00      | 0.00      | 1.00          |
| ratetype_Discount                     | 5,834,773              | 0.06      | 0.25         | 0.00    | 0.00     | 0.00      | 0.00      | 1.00          |
| ratetype_SVR                          | 5,834,773              | 0.04      | 0.19         | 0.00    | 0.00     | 0.00      | 0.00      | 1.00          |
| ratetype_Trackers                     | 5,834,773              | 0.18      | 0.38         | 0.00    | 0.00     | 0.00      | 0.00      | 1.00          |
| ratetype_other                        | 5,834,773              | 0.00      | 0.06         | 0.00    | 0.00     | 0.00      | 0.00      | 1.00          |
| dealtype_3 year fixed term            | 5,834,773              | 0.05      | 0.22         | 0.00    | 0.00     | 0.00      | 0.00      | 1.00          |
| dealtype_5 year fixed term            | 5,834,773              | 0.09      | 0.28         | 0.00    | 0.00     | 0.00      | 0.00      | 1.00          |
| dealtype_No fixed term                | 5,834,773              | 0.69      | 0.46         | 0.00    | 0.00     | 1.00      | 1.00      | 1.00          |
| current_ratetype_Capped               | 5,834,773              | 0.00      | 0.02         | 0.00    | 0.00     | 0.00      | 0.00      | 1.00          |
| current_ratetype_Discount             | 5,834,773              | 0.01      | 0.10         | 0.00    | 0.00     | 0.00      | 0.00      | 1.00          |
| current_ratetype_SVR                  | 5,834,773              | 0.29      | 0.46         | 0.00    | 0.00     | 0.00      | 1.00      | 1.00          |
| current_ratetype_Trackers             | 5,834,773              | 0.21      | 0.41         | 0.00    | 0.00     | 0.00      | 0.00      | 1.00          |
| current_ratetype_other                | 5,834,773              | 0.05      | 0.21         | 0.00    | 0.00     | 0.00      | 0.00      | 1.00          |
| past_arrears_1                        | 5,834,773              | 0.02      | 0.13         | 0.00    | 0.00     | 0.00      | 0.00      | 1.00          |
| repaytype_Interest only               | 5,834,773              | 0.18      | 0.39         | 0.00    | 0.00     | 0.00      | 0.00      | 1.00          |
| repaytype_Mixed capital and interest  | 5,834,773              | 0.05      | 0.21         | 0.00    | 0.00     | 0.00      | 0.00      | 1.00          |
| repaytype_Not known                   | 5,834,773              | 0.00      | 0.02         | 0.00    | 0.00     | 0.00      | 0.00      | 1.00          |
| employment_Other                      | 5,834,773              | 0.02      | 0.13         | 0.00    | 0.00     | 0.00      | 0.00      | 1.00          |
| employment_Retired                    | 5,834,773              | 0.01      | 0.11         | 0.00    | 0.00     | 0.00      | 0.00      | 1.00          |
| employment_Self-employed              | 5,834,773              | 0.14      | 0.35         | 0.00    | 0.00     | 0.00      | 0.00      | 1.00          |
| mgpaymprotect_1                       | 5,834,773              | 0.04      | 0.20         | 0.00    | 0.00     | 0.00      | 0.00      | 1.00          |
| impaired_1                            | 5,834,773              | 0.02      | 0.13         | 0.00    | 0.00     | 0.00      | 0.00      | 1.00          |
| incomeverified_1.0                    | 5,834,773              | 0.69      | 0.46         | 0.00    | 0.00     | 1.00      | 1.00      | 1.00          |
| joint_income_1                        | 5,834,773              | 0.50      | 0.50         | 0.00    | 0.00     | 1.00      | 1.00      | 1.00          |
| newbuild_1                            | 5,834,773              | 0.04      | 0.20         | 0.00    | 0.00     | 0.00      | 0.00      | 1.00          |
| region_East Anglia                    | 5,834,773              | 0.04      | 0.19         | 0.00    | 0.00     | 0.00      | 0.00      | 1.00          |
| region_East Midlands                  | 5,834,773              | 0.06      | 0.23         | 0.00    | 0.00     | 0.00      | 0.00      | 1.00          |
| region_London                         | 5,834,773              | 0.13      | 0.33         | 0.00    | 0.00     | 0.00      | 0.00      | 1.00          |
| region_North                          | 5,834,773              | 0.05      | 0.21         | 0.00    | 0.00     | 0.00      | 0.00      | 1.00          |
| region_North West                     | 5,834,773              | 0.11      | 0.32         | 0.00    | 0.00     | 0.00      | 0.00      | 1.00          |
| region_Northern Ireland               | 5,834,773              | 0.03      | 0.17         | 0.00    | 0.00     | 0.00      | 0.00      | 1.00          |
| region_Scotland                       | 5,834,773<br>5,834,773 | 0.09      | 0.17         | 0.00    | 0.00     | 0.00      | 0.00      | 1.00          |
| region_South West                     | 5,834,773<br>5,834,773 | 0.09      | 0.29         | 0.00    | 0.00     | 0.00      | 0.00      | 1.00          |
| region_South west<br>region_Wales     | 5,834,773<br>5,834,773 | 0.08      | 0.27<br>0.21 | 0.00    | 0.00     | 0.00      | 0.00      | 1.00          |
| region_West Midlands                  | 5,834,773<br>5,834,773 | 0.05      | 0.21<br>0.27 | 0.00    | 0.00     | 0.00      | 0.00      | 1.00          |
| 0                                     |                        |           |              |         |          |           |           |               |
| region_Yorkshire & Humber             | $5,\!834,\!773$        | 0.09      | 0.29         | 0.00    | 0.00     | 0.00      | 0.00      | 1.00          |

|  |                                       | Std.Err.                   | Z                               | P> z               | [0.025                      | 0.975]                      |
|--|---------------------------------------|----------------------------|---------------------------------|--------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|
| current_interest                       | 0.1991                                | 0.0033                     | 60.6934<br>5.7500               | 0.0000             | 0.1926                      | 0.2055                      |
| year_2006                              | -0.0766<br>-0.1746                    | $0.0133 \\ 0.0132$         | -5.7590<br>-13.2310             | $0.0000 \\ 0.0000$ | -0.1027<br>-0.2004          | -0.0505<br>-0.1487          |
| year_2007<br>year_2008                 | -0.1740<br>-0.2162                    | 0.0152<br>0.0141           | -15.2310<br>-15.2929            | 0.0000             | -0.2004<br>-0.2439          | -0.1487                     |
| year_2008                              | -0.2102<br>-0.3594                    | 0.0141<br>0.0173           | -20.8020                        | 0.0000             | -0.2439<br>-0.3933          | -0.1885<br>-0.3256          |
| year_2009                              | -0.3594<br>-0.4798                    | 0.0173                     | -26.3764                        | 0.0000             | -0.5955<br>-0.5155          | -0.3250<br>-0.4442          |
| year_2011                              | -0.6400                               | 0.0182                     | -34.0891                        | 0.0000             | -0.6768                     | -0.6032                     |
| year_2012                              | -0.8129                               | 0.0100                     | -41.3607                        | 0.0000             | -0.8514                     | -0.7744                     |
| year_2013                              | -0.8736                               | 0.0200                     | -43.7023                        | 0.0000             | -0.9127                     | -0.8344                     |
| year_2014                              | -0.9385                               | 0.0206                     | -45.5083                        | 0.0000             | -0.9790                     | -0.8981                     |
| year_2015                              | -1.2281                               | 0.0308                     | -39.8749                        | 0.0000             | -1.2885                     | -1.1677                     |
| advtype_Council/social tenants buying  | 0.3751                                | 0.0273                     | 13.7384                         | 0.0000             | 0.3215                      | 0.4286                      |
| advtype_First time buyer               | 0.0939                                | 0.0106                     | 8.8701                          | 0.0000             | 0.0731                      | 0.1146                      |
| advtype_Not known                      | 0.0945                                | 0.0651                     | 1.4513                          | 0.1467             | -0.0331                     | 0.2222                      |
| advtype_Other                          | 0.2173                                | 0.0259                     | 8.3846                          | 0.0000             | 0.1665                      | 0.2681                      |
| advtype_Remortgagors                   | 0.2614                                | 0.0088                     | 29.8487                         | 0.0000             | 0.2443                      | 0.2786                      |
| ratetype_Capped                        | -0.4413                               | 0.0756                     | -5.8374                         | 0.0000             | -0.5895                     | -0.2931                     |
| ratetype_Discount                      | -0.0328                               | 0.0126                     | -2.5999                         | 0.0093             | -0.0576                     | -0.0081                     |
| ratetype_SVR                           | -0.3750                               | 0.0216                     | -17.3305                        | 0.0000             | -0.4174                     | -0.3326                     |
| ratetype_Trackers                      | -0.2216                               | 0.0110                     | -20.1315                        | 0.0000             | -0.2431                     | -0.2000                     |
| ratetype_other                         | -0.6985                               | 0.0884                     | -7.8979                         | 0.0000             | -0.8718                     | -0.5251                     |
| current_ratetype_Capped                | -0.1430                               | 0.2540                     | -0.5631                         | 0.5734             | -0.6409                     | 0.3549                      |
| $current_ratetype\_Discount$           | 0.2711                                | 0.0362                     | 7.4914                          | 0.0000             | 0.2002                      | 0.3420                      |
| $current_ratetype\_SVR$                | 0.4819                                | 0.0107                     | 45.1650                         | 0.0000             | 0.4610                      | 0.5028                      |
| $current_ratetype\_Trackers$           | 0.5590                                | 0.0128                     | 43.6923                         | 0.0000             | 0.5339                      | 0.5840                      |
| current_ratetype_other                 | 0.5461                                | 0.0176                     | 31.0663                         | 0.0000             | 0.5117                      | 0.5806                      |
| past_arrears_1                         | 2.5915                                | 0.0096                     | 270.4278                        | 0.0000             | 2.5727                      | 2.6103                      |
| dealtype_3 year fixed term             | 0.0189                                | 0.0148                     | 1.2752                          | 0.2023             | -0.0101                     | 0.0479                      |
| dealtype_5 year fixed term             | -0.1447                               | 0.0150                     | -9.6272                         | 0.0000             | -0.1742                     | -0.1153                     |
| dealtype_No fixed term                 | -0.0278                               | 0.0093                     | -3.0027                         | 0.0027             | -0.0459                     | -0.0097                     |
| repaytype_Interest only                | -0.1546                               | 0.0097                     | -15.8605                        | 0.0000             | -0.1737                     | -0.1355                     |
| repaytype_Mixed capital and interest   | -0.4527                               | 0.0195                     | -23.2029                        | 0.0000             | -0.4909                     | -0.4145                     |
| repaytype_Not known                    | -0.4112                               | 0.1525                     | -2.6965                         | 0.0070             | -0.7101                     | -0.1123                     |
| employment_Other                       | 0.1814                                | 0.0261                     | 6.9502                          | 0.0000             | 0.1302                      | 0.2326                      |
| employment_Retired                     | 0.1244                                | 0.0334                     | 3.7208                          | 0.0002             | 0.0589                      | 0.1899                      |
| employment_Self-employed               | 0.3776                                | 0.0089                     | 42.2840                         | 0.0000             | 0.3601                      | 0.3951                      |
| mgpaymprotect_1<br>impaired_1          | -0.1178<br>0.5603                     | 0.0180                     | -6.5414<br>27.7402              | $0.0000 \\ 0.0000$ | -0.1532                     | -0.0825                     |
| incomeverified_1.0                     | -0.0035                               | $0.0148 \\ 0.0078$         | 37.7492<br>-0.4497              | 0.0000<br>0.6530   | 0.5313<br>-0.0187           | $0.5894 \\ 0.0117$          |
| joint_income_1                         | -0.0035<br>-0.2291                    | 0.0073                     | -31.0131                        | 0.0000             | -0.2436                     | -0.2146                     |
| newbuild_1                             | -0.1013                               | 0.0221                     | -4.5766                         | 0.0000             | -0.1448                     | -0.0579                     |
| region_East Anglia                     | 0.0302                                | 0.0221                     | 1.4776                          | 0.0000<br>0.1395   | -0.0099                     | 0.0702                      |
| region_East Midlands                   | -0.0255                               | 0.0169                     | -1.5064                         | 0.1320             | -0.0586                     | 0.0077                      |
| region_London                          | 0.0980                                | 0.0135                     | 7.2819                          | 0.1020             | 0.0716                      | 0.1244                      |
| region_North                           | 0.0403                                | 0.0174                     | 2.3173                          | 0.0205             | 0.0062                      | 0.0744                      |
| region_North West                      | 0.0942                                | 0.0132                     | 7.1437                          | 0.0000             | 0.0683                      | 0.1200                      |
| region_Northern Ireland                | 0.3105                                | 0.0197                     | 15.7664                         | 0.0000             | 0.2719                      | 0.3491                      |
| region_Scotland                        | 0.0719                                | 0.0144                     | 4.9869                          | 0.0000             | 0.0436                      | 0.1002                      |
| region_South West                      | -0.0808                               | 0.0160                     | -5.0490                         | 0.0000             | -0.1121                     | -0.0494                     |
| region_Wales                           | 0.0999                                | 0.0174                     | 5.7458                          | 0.0000             | 0.0658                      | 0.1340                      |
| region_West Midlands                   | 0.0322                                | 0.0146                     | 2.2072                          | 0.0273             | 0.0036                      | 0.0608                      |
| region_Yorkshire & Humber              | 0.0510                                | 0.0142                     | 3.6043                          | 0.0003             | 0.0233                      | 0.0788                      |
| orig_loan_val_(75000, 125000]          | -0.1991                               | 0.0112                     | -17.7068                        | 0.0000             | -0.2211                     | -0.1771                     |
| orig_loan_val_(125000, 175000]         | -0.2710                               | 0.0166                     | -16.3518                        | 0.0000             | -0.3035                     | -0.2385                     |
| orig_loan_val_(175000, 10000000]       | -0.2642                               | 0.0216                     | -12.2120                        | 0.0000             | -0.3066                     | -0.2218                     |
| outstanding_balance_(50000, 100000]    | 0.2414                                | 0.0129                     | 18.6490                         | 0.0000             | 0.2161                      | 0.2668                      |
| outstanding_balance_(100000, 150000]   | 0.3929                                | 0.0174                     | 22.5544                         | 0.0000             | 0.3588                      | 0.4270                      |
| outstanding_balance_(150000, 10000000] | 0.5994                                | 0.0225                     | 26.6028                         | 0.0000             | 0.5552                      | 0.6435                      |
| gross_income_(30000, 40000]            | -0.1420                               | 0.0100                     | -14.1510                        | 0.0000             | -0.1617                     | -0.1224                     |
| gross_income_(40000, 60000]            | -0.3013                               | 0.0117                     | -25.8123                        | 0.0000             | -0.3242                     | -0.2785                     |
| gross_income_(60000, 10000000]         | -0.4200                               | 0.0149                     | -28.2107                        | 0.0000             | -0.4492                     | -0.3908                     |
| LTV_(50, 70]                           | 0.1750                                | 0.0127                     | 13.8148                         | 0.0000             | 0.1502                      | 0.1998                      |
| LTV_(70, 85]                           | 0.2809                                | 0.0145                     | 19.3221                         | 0.0000             | 0.2524                      | 0.3094                      |
| LTV_(85, 90]                           | 0.2427                                | 0.0173                     | 13.9927                         | 0.0000             | 0.2087                      | 0.2767                      |
| LTV_(90, 95]                           | 0.3074                                | 0.0194                     | 15.8272                         | 0.0000             | 0.2693                      | 0.3454                      |
| LTV_(95, 200]                          | 0.3195                                | 0.0232                     | 13.7475                         | 0.0000             | 0.2740                      | 0.3651                      |
| CLTV_(50, 70]                          | 0.3130                                | 0.0118                     | 26.4967                         | 0.0000             | 0.2898                      | 0.3361                      |
| CLTV_(70, 85]                          | 0.4340                                | 0.0150                     | 28.9405                         | 0.0000             | 0.4046                      | 0.4634                      |
| CLTV_(85, 90]                          | 0.5076                                | 0.0213                     | 23.8123                         | 0.0000             | 0.4659                      | 0.5494                      |
| CLTV_(90, 95]                          | 0.6038                                | 0.0237                     | 25.5202                         | 0.0000             | 0.5575                      | 0.6502                      |
| CLTV_(95, 100000]                      | 0.6473                                | 0.0213                     | 30.4001                         | 0.0000             | 0.6056                      | 0.6891                      |
| mortgage_term_(15, 20]                 | -0.0780                               | 0.0123                     | -6.3291                         | 0.0000             | -0.1022                     | -0.0539                     |
| mortgage_term_(20, 25]                 | -0.0618                               | 0.0128                     | -4.8292                         | 0.0000             | -0.0869                     | -0.0367                     |
| mortgage_term_(25, 40]                 | -0.1041                               | 0.0156                     | -6.6841                         | 0.0000             | -0.1346                     | -0.0736                     |
| age_borrower_(30, 40]                  | 0.0514                                | 0.0098                     | 5.2544                          | 0.0000             | 0.0322                      | 0.0705                      |
| age_borrower_(40, 50]                  |                                       |                            |                                 |                    |                             | 0 1091                      |
|  | 0.169241                              | 0.0116                     | 14.5289                         | 0.0000             | 0.1464                      | 0.1921                      |
| age_borrower_(50, 120]<br>intercept    | 0.169 <b>2</b> ]<br>0.2559<br>-4.9556 | 0.0116<br>0.0156<br>0.0286 | 14.5289<br>16.3935<br>-173.3582 | 0.0000             | 0.1464<br>0.2253<br>-5.0117 | 0.1921<br>0.2865<br>-4.8996 |

# Table A2: Coefficients of the logistic regression

Figure A1: Mean feature influences in the four clusters, with standard deviation *Note*: The vertical axis shows log-odd feature influences. The bars represent a one standard deviation above and below the mean influences.





Figure A2: Average feature influences (using log-odd scores)