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Insiders versus Outsiders in Monetary Policy-Making
These papers report on research carried out by, or under the supervision of, the external members of the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) and their economic staff.
Published on
20 December 2007
External MPC Unit Discussion Paper No. 20
Timothy Besley, Neil Meads and Paolo Surico
There is a wide variety of institutional arrangements for determining the stance of monetary policy around the world. One of the key differences between systems concerns the extent to which such decisions are made by career central bankers (insiders) or those outside the central banking fraternity (outsiders). Some countries operate at one extreme on this spectrum with close control by central bank insiders or decisions made by politicians. But many locate somewhere in the middle.