The Bank of England’s approach to using its requirements and permissions powers to facilitate mobilisation of new CCPs: Policy statement

Published on 16 November 2026
The Bank of England (the Bank) has published a statement of policy (SoP) on its approach to using its requirements and permissions powers to facilitate the mobilisation of new CCPs. This SoP sets out the Bank’s approach to using its voluntary requirements powers to impose de minimis limits under which a CCP would operate during mobilisation and, where sought, its permissions power to give permissions for certain temporary rule waivers or modifications on the basis set out within. This SoP sets out the factors the Bank will consider when assessing mobilisation applications and the processes that prospective CCPs should follow to apply.

1: Overview

1. This Bank of England (the Bank) policy statement (PS) provides feedback to the responses the Bank received to the consultation paper (CP) on its draft statement of policy (SoP) setting out the Bank’s proposed approach to using its requirements and permissions powers to facilitate the mobilisation of new CCPs.

2. In particular, this SoP sets out the Bank’s approach to using its requirements powersfootnote [1] to impose a requirement on the new CCP to operate under de minimis limits, which are calibrated and imposed on a case-by-case basis, throughout the duration of the agreed mobilisation period. It also sets out the Bank’s approach to using its permissions power,footnote [2] where appropriate, to give the CCP permission to modify or waive certain rules on a temporary basis during mobilisation.

3. This SoP also includes the information that a prospective CCP should include in its mobilisation application and the factors that the Bank will consider when assessing mobilisation applications, which should be submitted alongside prospective CCPs’ recognition applications. Mobilisation applications should consist of a provisional voluntary requirement (VREQ) application and, where permissions are being sought, a provisional permissions application. These provisional applications will be provisionally assessed alongside prospective CCPs’ recognition applications so that they can be legally made and immediately assessed at the point of recognition.

4. This PS is relevant to all prospective UK CCPs seeking recognition by the Bank.

5. The Bank’s supervisory approach to onboarding new financial market infrastructure (FMI) firms (the new FMI onboarding approach) was published in July 2025. It clarified that new FMIs, including CCPs, could pursue the discretionary stage of mobilisation, which takes place after a firm has been authorised or recognised and prior to a discretionary scaling stage or business-as-usual operations. It also noted that the Bank would consult on using its permissions power to amend relevant regulatory requirements to support new CCPs, if it deemed appropriate to do so.

6. Mobilisation can provide an efficient way for new CCPs to provide further assurance that they are able to meet their business-as-usual regulatory requirements, build out their capabilities, and facilitate live testing with de minimis amounts of business.

7. In determining its policy, the Bank considered representations received in response to its consultation on the Bank’s proposed approach to using its requirements and permissions powers to facilitate the mobilisation of new CCPs. The Bank provides a summary of those representations below and a more detailed response in Chapter 2 on ‘The Bank’s response to consultation feedback’.

8. The Bank’s final SoP on its approach to using its powers to facilitate the mobilisation of new CCPs is set out in the Annex.

Summary of responses

9. The Bank’s consultation ran from 4 March to 4 June 2026. The Bank received three responses, one from an established CCP, one from a prospective FMI, and one from a trade association.

10. Respondents were generally supportive of the proposals and welcomed the detail provided by the Bank on its proposed approach. Some responses requested additional clarifications, particularly around the calibration of de minimis limits and the scope of rule permissions, as well as certain elements of the application process and mobilisation process more generally. Respondents also requested clarity on the implications of the transition from UK EMIR to the Bank’s CCP Rulebook, as well as on interactions with other regimes and regulatory requirements.

11. Some respondents raised comments around the Bank’s support of innovation by established CCPs and expressed interest in mobilisation or a similar process when introducing a new product or service. Mobilisation is not available for established UK CCPs as it applies only to prospective UK CCPs undergoing their initial onboarding process, before they begin business-as-usual operations. However, established CCPs are eligible to apply for both general rule permissions under s.138BA FSMA and waivers or modifications under s.138A FSMA, as well as for requirements under s.55L of FSMA. The Bank’s SoP on rule permissions and waivers has taken further steps to support innovation by taking into account considerations relevant to innovation when assessing general permissions applications. The Bank has also streamlined and increased the proportionality of its supervisory processes, including the review of model changes and new products, by shortening timelines, simplifying internal procedures and introducing a single materiality threshold which determines whether a proposed change requires review. The Bank strongly welcomes engagement by established CCPs seeking to innovate. More detail on this is set out in the Bank’s response to consultation feedback under ‘Potential extensions of policy to established CCPs’ in paragraphs 57-60 below.

Changes to draft policy

12. The Bank has considered the responses to the CP and decided to maintain its proposed approach, subject to minor changes to the SoP aimed at providing greater clarity on the scope of permissions, the consequences of breaching requirements on de minimis limits, extensions to mobilisation, and required disclosures regarding mobilisation status and details of requirements and permissions. These changes are described in detail in later sections of this PS and can be summarised as follows:

  • The Bank has added a new Chapter 7 on ‘Varying a requirement’, which includes the Bank’s expectations regarding varying a VREQ and the potential consequences of a breach of de minimis limits.
  • The Bank has strengthened the language in paragraph 1.7 to clarify that the Bank expects that Permissions during mobilisation would only be given where the prospective CCP successfully applies for a VREQ to operate under de minimis limits. The Bank has also reflected this updated language in Question 3 of the mobilisation application form.
  • The Bank has amended the language in paragraph 8.2 on extensions to mobilisation to provide greater flexibility to take into account of exceptional circumstances. The CCP should engage with the Bank and its supervisors regarding any challenges in a timely manner ahead of key milestones. In paragraphs 8.1 and 8.2 the Bank has modified the notification period to ‘ideally’ three months.
  • The Bank has added a new paragraph 4.5 setting out the information that it will publish and that it will require CCPs to share with current and prospective clearing members and, where feasible, clients. This includes new clarifications that the Bank will publish a new CCP’s mobilisation status on its website once recognised and require new CCPs to share details of their de minimis limit requirements and any permissions given with current and prospective clearing members during mobilisation so that its regulatory status is transparent.

13. The Bank has also made minor drafting and clarificatory changes to the SoP. These include:

  • Clarifying in paragraph 2.6 that the Notification of Third-Party Arrangements and Operational Incident Reporting Rules (heron IOREP reporting rules) fall within the scope of this SoP;
  • Clarifying in paragraph 3.2 that the mobilisation plan should include demonstration that the CCP has sufficient capital to cover its operational funding during mobilisation, as referred to in Chapter 4 on ‘Factors the Bank will consider’; and
  • Explicitly stating in paragraph 4.10 under factors that the Bank will consider that the Bank does not expect to give permissions to modify or waive a large number of the CCP rules.

Statutory obligations

14. Producing general policy on how the Bank proposes to perform functions under FSMA is an ‘FMI function’ within the meaning of section 30D(3) of the Bank of England Act 1998 (‘BoE Act’). The Bank considers that these changes to the draft SoP further support both its primary financial stability objective and secondary innovation objective by providing greater transparency of and clarity on its approach to facilitating the establishment of new CCPs in a safe manner.

15. The Bank considers that its assessment against its objectives, ‘have regards’, and recommendations as set out in the CP remain applicable to the final policy. Where changes have been made, these further support the transparency of the Bank’s approach to considering applications.

Implementation

16. The final SoP will enter into effect alongside the Bank’s final CCP rules and once HMT have applied the permissions power to the Bank’s rules through the relevant statutory instrument (hereon the effective date). The Bank will seek to make the final CCP rules in line with the new legislation coming into force, which is expected by the end of the first quarter of 2027, following an implementation period of at minimum three months from the date of publication of the Bank's near-final policy statement on ensuring the resilience of CCPs.

17. Prospective CCPs applying for authorisation prior to the effective date should apply for authorisation under UK EMIR and may apply for mobilisation as set out in the Bank's supervisory approach to onboarding new financial market infrastructure (FMI) firms. This does not include rule permissions, which will only form part of mobilisation once this new SoP and the Bank’s CCP rules are in force and HMT has applied the permissions power. Prospective CCPs applying before the effective date cannot apply for mobilisation under this SoP as it will not yet have come into force. Further guidance is set out under ‘Transition from UK EMIR to the Bank's CCP Rulebook’ in paragraphs 54-56 below.

2: The Bank’s response to consultation feedback

De minimis limits and use of the requirements powers

Areas of policy change

Variation of de minimis limits and consequences of breaches

18. Respondents requested clarity on whether de minimis limit(s) might be relaxed during mobilisation or set flexibly to reflect the level of capital held during mobilisation. One respondent requested clarification on the consequences of a breach of de minimis limits, including how this would be communicated to the CCP’s clearing members and their contractual right to withdraw from the CCP if a material VREQ breach is not remediated within a defined period.

19. The Bank expects that the de minimis limit(s) that the prospective CCP proposes and that serve as the basis on which the prospective CCP receives its mobilisation, and therefore recognition, approvals will remain appropriate for the duration of the CCP’s mobilisation period. VREQs would be cancelled on application by the CCP and are not otherwise time limited, as the Bank has clarified in paragraph 8.1 of the SoP. The Bank expects this to last up to twelve months but may be shorter. Where a CCP considers there has been a change in circumstances that mean its de minimis limit(s) are no longer appropriate, it should engage with the Bank regarding whether a variation in its VREQ would be appropriate.

20. The Bank does not consider it appropriate to set out conditions of a clearing member’s right of withdrawal from contracts in the case of a breach of de minimis limits. The Bank would engage with the CCP in the first instance and may take a variety of actions depending on the circumstances, which could include varying the CCP’s VREQ and imposing a requirement to disclose details of the breach to clearing members. The Bank may also consider, depending on the circumstances, revoking the CCP’s permission(s) and other supervisory or enforcement actions (including, for example, use of the Bank’s power of direction under s.296 of FSMA and/or revocation of a CCP’s recognition order).

21. The Bank has set out its expectations on varying requirements in the case of a change in circumstance or a breach of requirements in a new Chapter 7 of the SoP. The Bank has also added that in the case of a breach it could consider imposing a requirement on the CCP to disclose that breach to clearing members in paragraph 4.5 of the final SoP (further detail on disclosures is set out under ‘Mobilisation application process and timelines’ in paragraphs 40-43 below).

Areas of no policy change

Calibration of ‘de minimis’ limits

22. Two respondents requested additional quantitative detail on the definition of ‘de minimis’ in regard to different categories of potential limits. One respondent requested confirmation that de minimis limits may be expressed using metrics appropriate to the relevant market. One respondent sought clarity on whether the level of activity allowed supports enough economic viability to allow for meaningful testing. One respondent sought clarity on the risks that different de minimis limits are meant to address and the relative trade-offs that a prospective firm might need to consider.

23. On balance, given the significant variation in prospective CCPs’ potential business models, risk profiles, and other characteristics, the Bank considers that it remains appropriate to set ‘de minimis’ limits on a case-by-case basis and not to prescribe a single threshold or give other quantitative examples that may not be relevant to all prospective firms. In future, once a sufficient number of applications have been received, the Bank is open to revisiting whether providing further quantitative details would be beneficial.

24. To confirm, appropriately calibrated de minimis limits are designed to support live testing while constraining a CCP’s volume of risk or activity to minimal levels below that associated with a scaling phase or during business-as-usual operations. A prospective CCP should therefore not expect the same economically viable levels of activity during mobilisation

25. The Bank encourages prospective CCPs to engage with the Bank before submitting an application to discuss potential de minimis limits, including the trade-off in risks that different limits might offer, appropriate metrics and pertinent methodology, and the implications of any desired rule permissions. The Bank is willing to consider metrics appropriate to the relevant market.

Permissions and use of the permissions power

Areas of no policy change

General scope and duration of permissions

26. Responses varied on the scope of rule permissions. One respondent welcomed all rules being potentially in scope and sought further examples. One respondent acknowledged understanding that large swathes of the rulebook would not be modified or waived. One respondent requested that any waivers and modifications be time limited.

27. The Bank has set out in paragraphs 2.6 and 2.7 of the SoP that the broader CCP Rulebook is in scope, excluding the Fundamental Rules. As such, the Bank does not propose to expand the list of specific rules in paragraph 2.5 that it expects to be of most relevance at this stage but may consider reviewing this list in due course once a suitable number of applications have been received.

28. For clarity, the Bank confirms that all permissions given under the mobilisation period would be time-limited (eg, for the duration of mobilisation) and that its giving of permissions would be proportionate to the Bank’s assessment of what would be appropriate in the circumstances. However, the Bank would not expect to consider giving permission to waive or modify a large number of the Bank’s CCP rules. The CCP must be able to meet the unmodified version of all modified or waived rules by the end of its agreed mobilisation period. The prospective CCP should set out how it will do so in its mobilisation plan, which it should submit as part of its application.

Specific rule permissions

29. One respondent raised concerns regarding some of the specific rules that the Bank drew out in the draft SoP, preferring certain restrictions.

The IOREP reporting rules

30. One respondent queried the inclusion of the IOREP reporting rules in the scope of rules eligible for permissions during mobilisation and preferred that such rules not be modified.

31. The Bank confirms that the IOREP reporting rules are in scope of permissions during mobilisation and has now explicitly clarified this in paragraph 2.6 of the SoP. The CCP would, at a minimum, still have an obligation during mobilisation under Fundamental Rule 7 to disclose to the Bank appropriately anything of which the Bank would reasonably expect notice.

SITG and SSITG and minimum capital requirements

32. One respondent preferred explicit constraints on the modification or waiver of SITG and SSITG, noting that this increases risks to clearing members and preferring explicit constraints on how these rules might be modified or waived. The respondent preferred that any waiver be time-limited and sought reductions in clearing members’ default fund contributions where SITG is waived. The respondent queried the Bank’s rationale for a £1mn floor for minimum capital requirements under rule 2.1 of the Capital Part and questioned whether capital held would be disproportionate to the risks stemming from the CCP’s activities.

33. The Bank considers that allowing for the modification or waiver of SITG and SSITG requirements and the modification of minimum capital requirements, with a £1mn floor, during mobilisation remains appropriate. This reflects the constraints placed on the volume of risk or activity undertaken by the CCP while de minimis limits are imposed, that the prospective CCP is required to submit a credible mobilisation plan to fully meet the unmodified rules, and the time-limited nature of permissions (for the duration of mobilisation), all of which should minimise risks to clearing members.

Governance (independent board members and external risk committee members)

34. One respondent recommended constraints to the potential modification or waiver of rules relating to the hiring of independent board members and external risk committee members. The respondent requested requiring at least one independent board member during mobilisation and requiring CCPs to establish a clearing member advisory committee from the start.

35. Given the constraints on the volume of risk or activity undertaken during mobilisation and the potential costs of and challenges to hiring external board and committee members prior to recognition without the credibility provided by a recognition decision, the Bank considers it appropriate to keep the appointment of independent board members and external risk committee members in scope for permissions. The Bank’s CCP Rulebook requires CCPs to include representatives of clearing members on their risk committee (rule 13.1 of the Management and Governance Part of the CCP rules). CCPs will be required to make disclosures on their mobilisation status to clearing members and clients, as set out in paragraph 4.5 of the SoP, to provide greater transparency during mobilisation.

Mobilisation application process and timelines

Areas of policy change

Link between VREQ and permissions applications

36. One respondent suggested the Bank make it a requirement that the CCP apply for de minimis limits before the Bank gives permissions during mobilisation, strengthening the Bank ‘does not expect that it is likely to’ give permissions language used in the draft SoP.

37. The Bank has strengthened the language in paragraph 1.7 of the SoP regarding the role of VREQ applications when considering permissions applications. This makes it clearer that the Bank generally expects to give permissions during mobilisation only where a CCP has also successfully applied for a VREQ to operate under de minimis limits.

Extensions to mobilisation

38. One respondent requested clarification that the Bank would, where appropriate, accommodate extensions to mobilisation periods due to factors outside of the CCP’s reasonable control.

39. The Bank recognises the potential for exceptional circumstances to occur, including events beyond the CCP’s control. The Bank has reflected this in the language of Chapter 8 of the SoP on ‘Exiting mobilisation’ to read that CCPs should ‘outline any challenges in a timely manner, including if any key milestones might be missed and if it might require an extension to its mobilisation period, ideally at least three months before the end of mobilisation and in any case with enough notice to allow the Bank time to review materials’ instead of ‘it should engage with the Bank as early as possible during the mobilisation period and at least three months before the end of mobilisation’. This change is to allow greater flexibility to respond to exceptional circumstances if required. However, CCPs are strongly encouraged to inform the Bank of any challenges as early as possible, and the Bank retains its discretion when considering requests for extension.

Disclosures

40. Respondents raised a range of views regarding disclosure requirements. One respondent requested that a CCP’s VREQ constraints and de minimis limits be disclosed to clearing members and clients. Two respondents made comments around the disclosure of CCPs’ mobilisation status, one that disclosures of status including where permissions were being given should be made to prospective clients and another that disclosures of mobilisation status should be made in a public register. Another respondent considered that permissions approval or rejection decisions by the Bank should be made on an anonymised basis.

41. Disclosure requirements about a new CCP’s status are an important tool for transparency. The Bank will generally expect a mobilisation VREQ to require a CCP to share with its current and prospective clearing members and, where feasible, clients during mobilisation its mobilisation status, permissions given, and VREQ details, as well as any variations to its VREQ. In the case of a breach of a CCP’s VREQ, the Bank could consider imposing a requirement to disclose that breach to clearing members.

42. The Bank will also publish a new CCP’s mobilisation status on its website. As set out in the SoP, the Bank is required to publish details of permissions that have been approved, unless it considers that it would be inappropriate or unnecessary to do so. The Bank retains its discretion to publish information about a VREQ application that it has approved. A prospective CCP can set out any concerns with the publication of VREQ or permissions details in its mobilisation application for the Bank to consider.

43. The Bank has set out what information it will publish on its website and what information it will require CCPs to disclose to current and prospective clearing members and clients in a new paragraph 4.5 of the SoP.

Areas of no policy change

Application timelines

44. One respondent queried the 60-business day extension for submitting a detailed provisional voluntary requirement (VREQ) application and its impact on the Bank’s ability to conduct a risk assessment. This period follows a firm’s initial attestation of intent to submit its provisional VREQ as part of its mobilisation application. One respondent queried what CCPs may or may not do during that period

45. On balance, the Bank considers that providing up to an additional 60 business days remains suitable, allowing time for the Bank both to engage on appropriate de minimis limits on the basis of the prospective CCP’s final recognition application materials and to conduct its risk and application assessments. In many cases, the Bank expects that it may have completed an initial risk assessment by the time a prospective CCP formally submits its mobilisation and recognition applications. However, it is possible that a prospective firm may not engage with the Bank prior to applying. The Bank encourages early engagement and for a prospective CCP to submit its provisional VREQ application as early in the assessment window as possible. This 60-day extension occurs during the statutory recognition application assessment period and, as a prospective CCP has not yet been recognised, it cannot undertake clearing or other activities for which it requires a recognition order.

Potential information duplication

46. One respondent requested confirmation that information provided as part of the recognition application need not be duplicated in the mobilisation application, with appropriate cross-referencing.

47. The prospective CCP should ensure that all required information is provided and clearly set out to facilitate the effective assessment of its recognition and mobilisation applications, which should be submitted concurrently. Where the prospective CCP believes that supporting information would be duplicative, it may consider repurposing material or signposting clear cross-references. The prospective CCP should ensure that any cross-references are clear to avoid any delays to the assessment of its mobilisation application.

Inclusion of a mobilisation plan to fully meet unmodified rules

48. One respondent emphasised the need for a plan demonstrating how the prospective CCP intends to meet the unmodified version of any rules for which it receives permission to modify or waive during mobilisation.

49. For clarity, the Bank requires a CCP to submit such a plan as part of their mobilisation application. The requirement to include such a plan is referred to in the SoP as the ‘mobilisation plan’ and is set out in paragraphs 3.1 and 3.2 of the SoP. As set out in paragraph 4.8 of the SoP, the Bank will consider the feasibility of this plan when assessing the prospective CCP’s mobilisation application.

Application supporting evidence

50. One respondent requested confirmation that the Bank will engage constructively where a novel operational model might mean the way of evidencing looks different from that of established CCPs. One respondent requested confirmation of the extent to which independent assurance and validation reports, such as SOC 2 and ISO 27001, may be relied upon as supporting evidence.

51. The Bank welcomes constructive engagement on supporting materials and, in principle, the Bank is open to considering reasonable different ways of evidencing compliance where the framework and assurance against it provide evidence of sufficient relevance, depth, and quality. The prospective CCP should indicate in its application which specific requirements the alternative evidence is intended to cover. A prospective CCP considering the relevance of alternative forms of evidence for their recognition or mobilisation applications should discuss this with the Bank as early as possible prior to submitting their final application materials. All prospective CCPs will be required to demonstrate compliance with the relevant regulatory requirement(s) to exit mobilisation.

Exiting mobilisation

52. One respondent requested clarity on the Bank’s supervisory expectations to exit mobilisation and what ‘toll gates’ it must clear to exit mobilisation.

53. The Bank notes that, to exit mobilisation, a CCP should fully meet the unmodified version of any rules for which it had received a modification or waiver permission and have completed its build out.

Other areas of clarification

Transition from UK EMIR to the Bank’s CCP Rulebook

54. One respondent requested clarity on the impact on mobilisation applications that straddle key dependencies, including the publication of the final CCP rules and HMT applying the permissions power.

55. A prospective CCP that applies for recognition and mobilisation prior to the date on which the Bank’s CCP rules come into force should apply for authorisation under UK EMIR and may apply for the mobilisation regime set out in the Bank's new FMI onboarding approach. This does not include rule permissions, which will form part of mobilisation when this new SoP and the Bank’s CCP Rulebook are in force and HMT has applied the permissions power. If a new CCP applying before the date on which this SoP comes into force subsequently wishes to seek permissions, as any recognised CCP may do, it may apply under the Bank’s general approach to giving rule permissions. The CCP should engage with the Bank regarding the continuing suitability of its de minimis limit(s) in such instances and whether it might need to apply for a variation of its VREQ or a new VREQ. A CCP that is in mobilisation is a recognised CCP and therefore cannot apply for permissions under this SoP, which only applies to prospective CCPs.

56. Early engagement with the Bank is strongly encouraged. Prospective and new CCPs should consider, as relevant, the potential costs and benefits of seeking temporary permissions or alternative requirements and the remaining duration of their mobilisation period.

Potential extensions of policy to established CCPs

57. Two respondents requested the Bank consider either extending the mobilisation policy regarding permissions to established CCPs, given similarities in risk when introducing a new product or service, or in due course setting out a statement of policy on the Bank’s approach to innovation at existing firms.

58. The Bank is supportive of innovation by established CCPs. The Bank welcomes engagement from established firms seeking to innovate, including by introducing new products or services, and in the first instance encourages established CCPs to engage with their usual supervisory contacts to discuss how this is feasible under the existing processes.

59. The near-final statement of policy on supervisory processes and margin permissions sets out how an established CCP can apply for a variation of recognition order when introducing new products or services. In addition, established CCPs may also apply for permissions or voluntary requirements. In the policy statement on the Bank’s approach to rule permissions and waivers, the Bank clarified that it would take into account considerations relevant to innovation subject to consideration of financial stability risks when assessing applications for permissions by established CCPs under the general permissions application process. As reflected in its near-final policy statement on ensuring the resilience of CCPs, the Bank has also streamlined and increased the proportionality of its supervisory processes, including the review of model changes and new products, by shortening timelines, simplifying internal procedures and introducing a single materiality threshold which determines whether a proposed change requires review. Established CCPs may reach out to their usual Bank supervisory contacts to discuss potential applications.

60. The Bank also encourages established CCPs to engage with their usual supervisory contacts regarding any potential barriers to innovation.

Guidance for DLT-native CCPs

61. One respondent requested the Bank consider including DLT-specific supervisory expectations for DLT-native CCPs.

62. The approach to mobilisation set out in this SoP is applicable to all new CCPs, and the Bank takes a technology-neutral approach based on achieving the same regulatory outcomes. The Bank’s broader work on its approach to digital assets and tokenisation is ongoing, including a recent publication consulting on a draft supervisory statement setting out the Bank’s expectations regarding the use of tokenised collateral in October 2026.

Interaction with other initiatives

63. One respondent requested clarification on the interaction of mobilisation with other initiatives, such as the Digital Securities Sandbox (DSS).

64. The Bank notes that CCPs cannot enter into the DSS, but where a prospective FMI is seeking to establish multiple entities, those specific entities will be subject to the relevant set of rules and regimes (eg, for the CCP, CSD, and/or payments entity). Depending on the nature of those activities, certain entities within the group may be eligible to participate in the DSS.

Application of other requirements during mobilisation

65. One respondent requested clarification on how the enforcement of other provisions outside the CCP rules (such as the PFMI self-assessment) would apply during mobilisation.

66. New CCPs, as recognised CCPs, must comply with all regulatory requirements. Where they have received permissions for the duration of mobilisation for the modification or waiver of one or more CCP rules, they must comply with the modified version of that rule. As part of its usual supervisory approach, the Bank will supervise a new CCP proportionately, reflecting the new CCP’s risk profile in light of its de minimis limits and any permissions given. The Bank encourages prospective or new CCPs to engage with the Bank and their regular supervisory contacts on this.

Assessment of the effectiveness of mobilisation

67. Two respondents suggested the Bank commit to publishing an assessment of the effectiveness of its final approach in supporting innovation, once there has been sufficient practical experience, to facilitate lessons learned.

68. Beyond facilitating the establishment of new CCPs, the Bank is supporting innovation by FMIs in other ways. As set out in the policy statement on the Bank’s approach to rule permissions and waivers and the near-final policy statement on ensuring the resilience of CCPs, this includes taking into account considerations relevant to innovation when assessing general permissions applications and increasing the efficiency and proportionality of its supervisory processes, including the review of model changes. The Bank will keep its mobilisation regime under review and may consider whether updates to aspects of its approach would be appropriate once a sufficient number of applications have been received to enable the Bank to assess the effectiveness of its approach in facilitating the onboarding of new CCPs.

Appendix

Appendix 1:
Statement of Policy: The Bank of England’s approach to using its requirements and permissions powers to facilitate mobilisation of new CCPs.

Appendix 2:
Mobilisation application form for CCPs.

  1. As under section 55L as applied by paragraph 9B of Schedule 17A of Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA).

  2. As under section 138BA of FSMA, as applied by paragraph 10 of Schedule 17A of FSMA.