Privacy statement
Chapter 12 of this near-final Policy Statement includes a consultation the Bank’s draft instrument revoking rule 4 of the Recognised Clearing House Rules Instrument for CCPs 2018. By responding to this consultation, you provide personal data to the Bank of England (the Bank). This may include your name, contact details (including, if provided, details of the organisation you work for), and opinions or details offered in the response itself.
The response will be assessed to inform our work as a regulator and central bank, both in the public interest and in the exercise of our official authority. We may use your details to contact you to clarify any aspects of your response.
The consultation will explain if responses will be shared with other organisations. If this is the case, the other organisation will also review the responses and may also contact you to clarify aspects of your response. We will retain all responses for the period that is relevant to supporting ongoing regulatory policy developments and reviews. However, all personal data will be redacted from the responses within five years of receipt. To find out more about how we deal with your personal data, your rights, or to get in touch please visit Privacy and the Bank of England.
Information provided in response to this consultation, including personal information, may be subject to publication or disclosure to other parties in accordance with access to information regimes including under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 or data protection legislation, or as otherwise required by law or in discharge of the Bank’s functions.
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Responses are requested by 30 November 2026.
Comments or enquiries can be submitted via email at FMI-IOREP-CP@bankofengland.co.uk.
Consent to publication
The Bank publishes a list of respondents to its consultations, where respondents have consented to such publication.
When you respond to this consultation paper, please tell us in your response if you agree to the publication of your name, or the name of the organisation you are responding on behalf of, in the Bank’s feedback response to this consultation.
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Please note that you do not have to give your consent to the publication of your name. If you do not give consent to your name being published in the Bank’s feedback response to this consultation, please make this clear with your response.
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You have the right to withdraw, amend or revoke your consent at any time. If you would like to do this, please contact the Bank of England using the contact details set out below.
Responses can be sent via email at FMI-IOREP-CP@bankofengland.co.uk.
Alternatively, please address any comments or enquiries to: Post Trade Policy Team, Financial Market Infrastructure Directorate, Bank of England, 20 Moorgate, London, EC2R 6DA.
Foreword
The UK is home to central counterparties (CCPs) that sit at the heart of global financial markets, managing risks on which market confidence depends. When the Bank of England (the Bank) consulted on its future framework for CCPs last year, we set out to restate the CCP-facing requirements from the on-shored European Market Infrastructure Regulation (UK EMIR) into a new Bank rulebook. Our proposals included targeted policy changes designed to ensure the resilience of these vital firms, to align with updated international standards, and to enable safe innovation.
We greatly appreciate the high level of industry engagement with our proposals. Respondents shared a common interest in ensuring that incentives for clearing remain strong. Clearing members and clients supported resilience-enhancing measures while noting the potential for pass-through costs. CCPs balanced a focus on resilience with comments around speed to market, efficient capital allocation, and support for innovation. We have considered these perspectives, while ensuring the final rules advance the Bank’s own statutory objectives.
The result is a carefully refined CCP rulebook, which the Bank has published in near-final form alongside this near-final policy statement (PS) and accompanying near-final policy materials. The Bank has not made final rules or policy at this stage as the final rule instrument and accompanying policy documentation is subject to HM Treasury (HMT) revoking the relevant parts of the UK European Market Infrastructure Regulation (UK EMIR) and passing an associated Statutory Instrument (SI) to implement the new CCP framework. The process for making these SIs is expected to commence before the end of 2026. The Bank intends to make all the final policy and rules, and publish a final PS, once the new framework comes into force in the first quarter of 2027.
Under the near-final CCP rulebook, clearing members and clients will benefit from margin transparency measures that are aligned to updated international standards. This is alongside the introduction of a Second Skin in the Game (SSITG), which strengthens a CCP’s incentive to prudently manage risk through the latter part of the default waterfall. In response to CCPs’ comments, the Bank has reconsidered the calibration of this new tranche of capital to ensure the same incentive outcomes can be achieved in a proportionate manner. We have also refined the model review process, enabling the Bank to focus on changes that are material while supporting speed to market. Looking ahead, we will engage with industry to identify novel solutions to improve porting likelihood. The financial stability benefits of porting are clear, but it is important that we get this right, and insights from industry have a key role to play.
The new CCP rulebook will give us the flexibility to adapt at pace to the evolving clearing landscape. The near-final CCP rulebook is part of a package of changes designed to enhance resilience and support innovation at both new and established CCPs. For new firms, the Bank has published a statement of policy regarding an optional mobilisation stage that will allow new CCPs to build capabilities and undertake live testing while operating under de minimis limits.
For established firms, the Bank has increased the proportionality and flexibility of its approach. This includes changes that are designed to further support responsible innovation, as set out at Chapter 10 of this PS. The permissions framework has been broadened to address instances where rules may otherwise impede higher-quality and more efficient FMI services, while retaining financial stability as the primary consideration under the application of the permissions power. We are introducing a New Collateral Pathway to ensure that established firms have the opportunity to test and experiment with new collateral within safe limits before needing to apply for a material model change permission. This is alongside our work to progress proposals regarding tokenised collateral and use of uncollateralised letters of credit.footnote [1]
In addition, we are shortening the implementation period for the majority of CCP rules from six months to a minimum of three months from the publication date of the near-final CCP rulebook. This change means that the rules will be made as soon as possible once HMT’s SIs come into force, allowing CCPs to benefit from aspects of the new framework that streamline processes and facilitate innovation sooner. We recognise that some new requirements will take longer to operationalise, such as introducing a SSITG, and integrating the international recommendations on margin transparency. These requirements will continue to have a longer implementation period as set out in the consultation, with adjustments where appropriate considering respondent feedback.
This near-final PS sets out the Bank’s decisions following consultation on its proposed CCP rulebook and accompanying policy materials. But these rules and accompanying policy materials are designed to be agile, transparent and adaptable. These features are essential in a rapidly changing environment and reflect our objectives: primarily to protect financial stability but also to facilitate safe innovation where possible. The rulebook will enable both the Bank and industry to respond proactively as new risks, technologies and market practices emerge. Our consultation demonstrated the value of dialogue, and the Bank looks forward to continuing that engagement across the clearing chain as the new framework embeds and evolves.
1: Overview
The Bank has published its near-final CCP rulebook and associated near-final policy materials after a consultation on how to restate CCP-facing requirements in the UK European Market Infrastructure Regulation (UK EMIR) within Bank rules. As part of this, the Bank has made targeted policy changes.
1.1 This near-final PS provides a response to feedback received from stakeholders in relation to the Bank’s consultation paper (CP) ‘Ensuring the resilience of CCPs’.
1.2 The PS also contains the Bank’s near-final rules for CCPs, associated statements of policy and supervisory statement. In addition, the PS includes an updated mapping table, which shows how the near-final rules relate to provisions under UK EMIR that are due to be revoked, and the Bank’s analysis regarding the calibration of pro-rata Second Skin in the Game (SSITG) requirements. It is relevant to UK CCPs, and non-UK CCPs that are seeking or have received recognition to provide clearing services to clearing members or trading venues established in the UK. It is also relevant to firms clearing or intending to clear as clearing members, or as clients of clearing members these CCPs, and to industry and trade bodies.
1.3 Most CCP-facing requirements in Titles III-V of UK EMIR have been restated in the Bank’s near-final CCP rulebook with no changes, or with minor clarificatory changes. As outlined in the CP, the Bank made material proposals in seven areas to:
- implement updated international guidance related to the transparency of margin requirements;
- increase the likelihood of successful porting of client positions;
- introduce an additional tranche of CCP capital into the default waterfall; referred to as Second Skin in the Game (SSITG);
- enhance the change in control framework;
- provide additional clarity regarding liquidity risk controls;
- streamline and improve the proportionality of supervisory processes; and
- complete the framework for approval of interoperability arrangements.
1.4 The CP also set out the Bank’s proposals to restate CCP-facing requirements related to the recognition of non-UK CCPs. The Bank did not propose material changes in this area, with minor consequential amendments to the Bank’s existing statements of policy regarding the tiering of non-UK CCPs and comparable compliance. As set out in the Overseas Part of the CCP rulebook, systemic overseas CCPs are also required to comply with other Parts of the rulebook unless a comparable compliance permission to waive or modify those Parts has been granted. Non-systemic overseas CCPs are only subject to a small number of rules (relating to notification requirements) under the Overseas Part.
1.5 In determining its policy, the Bank considered representations received in response to consultation. This PS provides an account of those representations and the Bank's response.
1.6 Chapter 10 of this PS explains how CCP rules and the Bank’s related policy publications support responsible innovation at both new and established CCPs, bringing together the Bank’s policies on CCP mobilisation, rule permissions, and modified supervisory processes. Some of these policies relate to post-consultation changes to the CCP rulebook and accompanying policy documents in response to feedback, while others are set out in separate publications.
1.7 Chapter 12 of this PS follows on from the Bank’s March 2026 consultation on revoking Rule 4 of the Recognised Clearing House Rules Instrument 2018 (RCH 4) and consults on the draft legal instrument for revoking this rule. The consultation will close on 30 November 2026. Further details on how to respond are provided at Chapter 12.
1.8 In addition, the CP included a discussion chapter on expanding the range of eligible collateral. The Bank welcomed the level of industry engagement on this topic and in October published two further consultation papers setting out policy proposals regarding letters of credit and tokenised collateral.footnote [2] A further marked-up version of the Collateral Part of the near-final CCP rulebook is provided at Annex 1. This marked-up version of the Collateral Part shows how the consultation proposals regarding letters of credit would be reflected (subject to the outcomes of that consultation) alongside the near-final changes made to the Collateral Part as set out in this PS at paragraphs 11.41–11.47.
Summary of responses
1.9 The Bank’s consultation ran from 18 July to 18 November 2025. The Bank received 19 responses to the CP. The names of respondents who consented to their names being published are set out in Annex 8.
1.10 Respondents broadly supported the overall objective of strengthening CCP resilience, and of restating and consolidating CCP-facing UK EMIR requirements into a clearer CCP rulebook. On material policy proposals, views differed in key areas between CCPs on one hand, and clearing members and clients on the other. Respondents provided numerous substantive comments, drafting suggestions and requests for clarifications which are addressed through Chapters 3 to 9 of this PS.
1.11 Some responses included comments and suggestions that did not relate directly to the proposals under consultation and are therefore outside the scope of the UK EMIR Titles III-V repeal and replace exercise. This included comments on the Bank’s approach to supervision, and the broader regulatory framework for FMIs beyond UK EMIR Titles III-V. While the Bank has not provided feedback to all responses outside the scope of the consultation, where appropriate the responses have been noted for future reference, and in some instances have been shared with the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) and/or HMT in line with the CP privacy statement.
Changes to proposed policy
1.12 In producing the near-final CCP rulebook and accompanying near-final policy materials, the Bank has made changes to four of its material policy proposals. The Bank decided to make these changes after careful consideration of the feedback provided by CP respondents. The key changes to policy are as follows:
1.13 Margin transparency: the Bank has refined the proposals to enhance transparency while ensuring proportionality and continued alignment with international standards. The near-final policy requires CCPs to provide client access to margin simulators where requested and feasible to do so, and to provide a forward-looking indication of potential future margin calls across relevant stress scenarios. The Bank has also clarified that only material add-ons need to be included in simulators and that public disclosures need only describe, at a high level, the model components affecting margin responsiveness. These changes are set out in Chapter 3.
1.14 Porting: the Bank has amended some of the proposals to address concerns regarding operational complexity and potential distortionary effects. The Bank continues to see the financial stability benefits of effective porting and will engage further with industry on approaches to increase the likelihood of porting. The amendments include the removal of the proposed requirement for CCPs to consider the portability of a clearing member’s clients in the allocation of default fund contributions. In addition, the rulebook now clarifies that, unless all clients in an omnibus account have designated the same alternative clearing member, CCPs are only required to take all reasonable steps to transfer all client positions and assets to an alternative clearing member designated by all clients following a default. Further detail is set out in Chapter 4.
1.15 SSITG: To further strengthen the resilience of UK CCPs, the Bank is introducing a new Second Skin in the Game (SSITG) requirement. Under the near-final rules, the Bank has recalibrated the amount of SSITG CCPs must hold (as a percentage of their risk-weighted capital requirement) – this is on the basis that the same incentive outcome can be achieved with a percentage that is lower than the Bank’s CP proposal, given the positioning of SSITG alongside the mutualised default fund in the default waterfall. The Bank has also clarified that both Skin in the Game (SITG) and SSITG are available to absorb non-default losses. Further detail on changes to SSITG is set out in Chapter 5.
1.16 Supervisory processes: the Bank has made changes to further clarify and streamline its supervisory processes while maintaining effective supervisory oversight. Amendments include clarification regarding which model changes require notification, changes to the quantitative thresholds for material model changes to ensure proportionality, and the introduction of processes for urgent model changes in exceptional circumstances, as well as model overrides. There are also changes which streamline supporting evidence requirements, and introduce an expected timeframe for CCPs to submit an application after a change has been confirmed as material. These changes are set out in Chapter 8.
1.17 In response to stakeholder feedback regarding supervisory processes, the Bank has also made additional policy changes to facilitate innovation for established CCPs. This includes a New Collateral Pathway which provides a proportionate route through which established CCPs may introduce new collateral on a limited basis before seeking permission for its use at greater scale. In addition, the Bank has clarified that it will aim to review material applications for innovative new products more quickly where the CCP can demonstrate that risks are limited. This is detailed further alongside other existing initiatives in Chapter 10.
1.18 The Bank has also made non-material changes and clarifications to other Parts of the CCP rules, details of which are outlined in Chapter 11 of this PS.
Statutory obligations
1.19 When making rules, the Bank is required to comply with several legal obligations. In its CP, the Bank published its explanation of why the policy and guidance proposed was compatible with its statutory objectives, and its analysis of the ‘have regards’ obligations that apply to the Bank. Where the Bank has made material updates to its proposals, an updated analysis against its objectives and ‘have regards’ obligations is included. Where the Bank is progressing with its proposals unchanged, or with minor clarificatory amendments, it considers the assessments against objectives and ‘have regards’ articulated in the CP to remain applicable to the near-final policy and rules.
1.20 As the Bank has made changes to its proposals it has paid due regard to equality considerations comprising the need to: (a) eliminate discrimination, harassment, victimisation and any other conduct that is prohibited by or under the Equality Act; (b) advance equality of opportunity between persons who share a relevant protected characteristic under the Equality Act and persons who do not share it; and (c) foster good relations between persons who share a relevant protected characteristic and persons who do not share it (the Public Sector Equality Duty).footnote [3]
1.21 While considering changes to proposals the Bank has also considered the effect of its changes and the requirement to consult with HMT where it considers there is a material risk that the action would be incompatible with an international trade obligation.footnote [4]
1.22 The Bank does not consider the difference between the rules proposed in the CP and the near-final rules set out at Annex 1 to be significant. The Bank has therefore not undertaken a new Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA) in relation to the near-final CCP rulebook. Where the Bank has made changes to its proposals, the subject-specific chapters outline how this could impact CBA considerations. For areas that remain as consulted, or with only minor clarificatory amendments, the Bank considers that the CBA published in the CP remains applicable.
1.23 The most material changes to the near-final CCP rules relate to margin transparency, porting, SSITG, and supervisory processes. In these areas, the Bank considers that the near-final policy package preserves the core benefits identified in the CP while improving proportionality, including through reduced implementation costs, mitigated distributional impacts, longer implementation timelines, and streamlined supervisory processes where appropriate.
Implementation
1.24 The Bank is reducing the implementation period for most CCP rules from six months to a minimum of three months from the date of publication of this near-final PS. Finalisation of the CCP rulebook is subject to HMT making the legislation regarding the revocation of UK EMIR and commencement of the new CCP framework.footnote [5] HMT’s first SI is expected to be laid in the fourth quarter of 2026, and all required legislation is expected to come into force by the end of the first quarter of 2027. The Bank will seek to make the final CCP rules in line with the new legislative framework coming into force. In practice, this means that the majority of rules could come into force three months following the publication date of the near-final rules if the required legislation is made in that time frame, but it may be longer than three months depending on the timings of HMT’s legislation.
1.25 An implementation period of at minimum three months will enable market participants to benefit from the new CCP rulebook and accompanying policies sooner, including the changes designed to enhance the proportionality and transparency of the Bank’s supervisory processes and support innovation. The Bank considers that an at minimum three-month implementation period for most CCP rules will provide enough time to allow market participants to make any necessary operational updates. Longer implementation periods will remain for certain provisions related to margin and SSITG, as detailed directly below.
1.26 The Bank has extended the implementation period for requirements related to margin simulators from twelve months to twenty-four months from the date rules come into force. The Bank has extended the implementation period for assessing margin procyclicality and certain new margin transparency provisions from six months to twelve months from the date rules come into force.
1.27 The Bank has amended the implementation period for the introduction of a SSITG so that CCPs will have to meet the requirement by 1 April 2028. The consultation had proposed phasing in the SSITG requirement over two years, with CCPs required to hold 50% of required capital by the end of year one, and fully comply by the end of year two. The adjusted implementation period in the near-final policy reflects the lower calibration of the SSITG requirement.
Savings and transitional arrangements
1.28 Under UK EMIR Titles III-V, CCPs must apply to the Bank for approvals or validations prior to undertaking certain activities. Such approvals and validations are being replaced under the new framework by the permissions power (section 138BA of FSMA). This change means that, once the new framework comes into force, going forward CCPs will be required to apply to the Bank for permission in areas where it previously applied for an approval or validation. It is the intent of HMT and the Bank that existing formal approvals and validations under UK EMIR will continue to apply under the new framework, meaning that CCPs will not be required to re-apply for a permission or waiver in relation to these existing activities when the CCP rules come into force.
1.29 Similarly, the existing recognition determinations for domestic CCPs under UK EMIR Article 14 and non-UK CCPs under UK EMIR Article 25 respectively will continue to be effective and recognised CCPs will not be required to re-apply under the new legislative framework under FSMA and related Bank Statements of Policy.
1.30 In addition to UK EMIR approvals, validations and recognitions, any ‘non-objection’ determination made by the Bank within the scope of requirements set out under UK EMIR Titles III-V will continue to apply when the new legislative framework, CCP rulebook and policies come into force.
1.31 Applications that are made in relation to approvals and validations under UK EMIR before the new legislation, rulebook and policies come into force will be assessed by the Bank in line with the existing UK EMIR framework. Where such an application is determined after the revocation of UK EMIR Titles III-V, the application will be assessed in line with UK EMIR processes and determined 'as if made' under the new legislation, rulebook and policies. This also applies to domestic recognition applications made under UK EMIR Article 14.
1.32 However, applications made by non-UK CCPs for recognition under UK EMIR Article 25 will be determined under the new FSMA provisions, unless they are determined prior to the new provisions coming into force. Non-UK CCPs that have submitted applications under UK EMIR Article 25 will not need to re-apply, though the Bank may require further information where appropriate. Applications received from non-UK CCPs prior to the commencement date of the new provisions under FSMA will be deemed to have been received on the commencement date.
1.33 Savings and transitional provisions will be set out under HMT’s main SI and/or commencement SI, and/or the UK Central Counterparties: Interpretation and General Provisions Instrument 2027 (included at Annex 1).
2: Bank response to consultation feedback received
2.1 Before making any proposed rules, the Bank is required by the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA) to have regard to any representations made to it in response to consultation, and to publish an account, in general terms, of those representations and its feedback to them.
2.2 The Bank has considered the representations received in response to the CP. In addition, the Bank carried out engagement throughout the consultation period to discuss proposals, which it has also considered in determining its near-final policy.
2.3 Chapters 3 to 9 of this PS contain sections addressing the areas where the Bank proposed substantive policy changes to requirements on CCPs. Each section indicates where consultation feedback has resulted in the Bank making policy changes, and areas where the Bank is not making policy changes in response to consultation feedback but is clarifying the Bank’s position. Chapter 11 then addresses additional areas where the Bank received consultation feedback, and the Bank’s response to that feedback.
3: Consultation feedback on margin transparency
3.1 In Chapter 14 of the CP, the Bank proposed enhancements to initial margin and variation margin practices and to introduce new proposals on procyclicality.
Enhancements to initial margin practices
3.2 The Bank proposed to make several targeted enhancements to the initial margin framework in line with the BCBS-CPMI-IOSCO margin proposals. The first of these related to the provision of a margin simulation tool to clearing members and, where requested, to their clients, and requirements on the minimum functionality of margin simulators. The second related to the qualitative information CCPs would be required to provide on their initial margin model. The third related to the public disclosure of certain information regarding their initial margin model in sufficient detail to support the replication of regulatory initial margin. The fourth related to the governance procedures for overriding initial margin models and ex-post reviews of instances when discretion is used. The fifth related to the information required to be disclosed to the Bank and to clearing members when manual overrides have been used.
3.3 The Bank proposed to make targeted enhancements in line with the BCBS-CPMI-IOSCO proposals and to restate in Bank rules the substance of the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) guidelines on the regular assessment of margin procyclicality. The enhancements required CCPs to identify and define an analytical and governance framework for assessing margin procyclicality and to regularly assess procyclicality, taking into account revisions to its model parameters. In addition, the Bank proposed to require CCPs to define a tolerance for procyclicality among other elements of a CCP’s anti-procyclicality framework that must be specified.
Policy changes
3.4 The Bank has amended the requirement for CCPs to permit margin simulator access to clients to be on a ‘where feasible’ basis. Several respondents raised concerns over the practicality of meeting the requirement to provide margin simulator access to all clients, especially when those clients are not known to the CCP. Whilst the Bank expects that, in the majority of cases, client access would be provided (for example where a client requests access either directly from the CCP or indirectly via their clearing member), the Bank acknowledges these concerns and will amend the requirement, as reflected in rule 5.2 of the Margin Requirements Part, to state that access should be provided to clients ‘where feasible’.
3.5 The Bank has amended the requirements for margin simulators to allow for a more outcome-based approach. In the consultation, the Bank proposed that CCPs use a number of their stress test scenarios, including key historical market stress events, as inputs to their margin simulation tools. Some respondents raised doubts over the efficacy of this approach, stating that a CCP’s stress scenarios are developed for a specific purpose and using them as an input to the margin simulator tool might not provide adequate indication of the build-up of margin calls over time during a period of stress. The Bank acknowledges the concerns that a CCP’s existing stress scenarios may not be the most appropriate input to provide a forward look to future initial margin calls. The Bank will, therefore, move to an outcome-based approach, as reflected in rule 5.3(1) of the Margin Requirements Part. This will require that margin simulator tools should provide a forward-looking indication of future initial margin calls in a range of stress scenarios relevant to the products that the CCP clears, and that those scenarios should also take into account key historical market stress events.
3.6 The Bank has clarified that add-ons included in the margin simulator tool should be material add-ons only. The Bank proposed that CCPs should include the ‘main’ add-ons in their margin simulators. Feedback from respondents was mixed, with some stating all add-ons should be included and others proposing that only material add-ons should be included. The Bank has considered the feedback and, on the basis of achieving proportionality and consistency with international standards, has chosen to amend the wording of the requirement to be material add-ons, as reflected in rule 5.3(2) of the Margin Requirements Part.
3.7 The Bank has altered its approach to replication such that CCPs are required to publicly disclose and describe, at a high level, the model components that affect the level of model responsiveness. Many respondents cited concerns that publicly disclosing specific information regarding their model for calculating initial margin to the level of detail sufficient to support replication would risk the disclosure of proprietary information and impact competitiveness and incentives to innovate. The Bank has considered this feedback and recognises that the CP proposal could be interpreted as going further than the CPMI-IOSCO recommendation regarding CCP disclosure of information. Therefore, the Bank will change the policy to align with CPMI-IOSCO’s implementation, as reflected in rule 4.5(1) of the Margin Requirements Part.
3.8 The Bank has introduced safeguards to balance enhanced transparency with appropriate protections for commercially-sensitive and security-sensitive information. The Bank will add a safeguard in rule 4.7 of the Margin Requirements Part, under which CCPs are not required to disclose information that is commercially sensitive or where disclosure would, or would be likely to, prejudice the security or integrity of the CCP. This is intended to help mitigate concerns regarding the disclosure of proprietary information. The Bank acknowledges that this change would mean that full replication would not be possible but believes that sufficient information would still be publicly disclosed to provide a good indication of the components driving model responsiveness. Clearing members and clients will also benefit from additional disclosures of material aspects of the initial margin model and the output from the margin simulator, which the Bank believes will greatly enhance the ability of market participants to anticipate how a CCP’s initial margin model would respond.
3.9 The Bank will clarify that disclosures concerning the CCP’s governance framework for margin model overrides, including the circumstances where discretion may be applied, are the only public disclosures regarding overrides required by the Bank. This amendment, as reflected in rule 4.5(3) of the Margin Requirements Part, will be made to clarify the Bank’s original intention regarding this part of the policy.
3.10 The Bank will amend the rule on the disclosure of margin model overrides such that, following their application, relevant information on individual overrides, or groups of related overrides where appropriate, should be disclosed to the members of the CCP's risk committee and the Bank. One respondent raised concerns that requiring disclosure of individual instances in which margin overrides are used would be unduly burdensome and that real-time disclosure during periods of market stress could send destabilising signals. The Bank believes the change to this policy, as reflected in rule 3.30(1)(c) of the Margin Requirements Part, strikes the appropriate balance between proportionality and ensuring that the CCP risk committee receives a qualitative explanation of each override, enabling effective ex-post challenge and consideration of model performance.
3.11 The Bank has extended the implementation timeframe to twenty-four months for margin simulators and twelve months for the remaining new requirements placed on CCPs under the Margin Requirements Part of the CCP rulebook. These commencement provisions are set out under section D of the near-final UK Central Counterparties Instrument 2027. Our consultation proposed that CCPs will have twelve months from the date at which the rules are published to comply with the proposals on the margin simulation tool and six months for all other new margin requirements. Respondents stated that this timeframe was too short, especially in regard to the development of margin simulators. The Bank accepts the request to expand the implementation periods is warranted given, in particular, the technology development work for margin simulators. As a result, rules 5.2 and 5.3 of the Margin Requirements Part will come into force twenty-four months after the UK Central Counterparties Instrument 2027 comes into force. Rules 3.20 to 3.27, 3.30, 4.1, 4.2, 4.3(3) and (4), 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6 of the Margin Requirements Part will come into force twelve months after the UK Central Counterparties Instrument 2027 comes into force.
Areas of no policy change
3.12 The Bank will maintain its requirement for CCPs to provide a margin simulator tool. Some respondents raised doubts as to whether the additional investment required to develop margin simulator tools was warranted, citing the low usage by market participants of existing tools that could be used for such purposes. The Bank believes that additional investment will improve the level and quality of data provided by margin simulators and this will increase their usage. The Bank is also of the opinion that the forward-looking information which will be provided by such tools will markedly improve margin transparency and the ability of market participants to anticipate how a CCP’s initial margin model would respond.
3.13 The Bank will not change its requirement for CCPs to disclose to the Bank the instances in which a margin model override has occurred. One respondent noted that model overrides can only be implemented by CCPs under relevant governance procedures and these would have been previously disclosed to the Bank. Whilst the Bank acknowledges this feedback, the substance of rule 3.30 will be retained with a new definition of an override which makes it clear that it is only those overrides that fall outside of the regular intended operation of the model that are captured. The Bank has also provided examples of reasons for a margin model override in paragraph 3.22 of the Supervisory Statement on CCP Margin.
3.14 The Bank will not make any policy changes to the procyclicality proposals. The Bank received a range of consultation feedback on its approach to procyclicality, with some respondents suggesting refinements to particular aspects of the proposed framework, while others cautioned against an overly prescriptive approach or welcomed the flexibility provided by the Bank’s proposals. The Bank has introduced greater clarity that CCPs may apply the anti-procyclicality (APC) buffer at the risk-factor level for non-linear products by introducing a new rule 3.18(2) under the Margin Requirements Part, ensuring alignment with the Supervisory Statement on CCP margin. This will ensure that CCPs can continue with existing practices permitted under UK EMIR.
3.15 One respondent questioned the proposed responsiveness metric and suggested assessing changes in initial margin requirements under a range of market stress scenarios instead. Furthermore, several respondents favoured the Bank’s aim to manage procyclicality in a balanced way, including having CCPs provide clear quantitative and qualitative measures.
3.16 The Bank will clarify expectations for daily and continuous monitoring of margin models. The Bank received feedback that certain monitoring requirements could be operationally burdensome. In response, the Bank wishes to clarify that the daily monitoring requirement in paragraph 3.26 of the near-final Supervisory Statement on CCP Margin involves a calculation against a CCP's procyclicality tolerance rather than a full model performance assessment. The Bank also considered feedback on paragraph 6.1 of the near-final Supervisory Statement, which refers to rule 2.3 of the Margin Requirements Part requiring CCPs to continuously monitor and, where necessary, revise margin levels to reflect current market conditions. One respondent argued that the requirement for 'continuous' monitoring could create unnecessary operational burdens and conflict with existing intraday margin practices. The Bank considers it appropriate to retain the requirement, as continuous monitoring does not require the continuous recalculation of margin.
3.17 The Bank will consider portfolio and cross-margining further. Respondents highlighted both the potential benefits and risks of portfolio and cross-product margining, and the Bank intends to undertake further work in this area in due course.
3.18 Other issues raised by respondents. One respondent noted that CCPs’ margin simulation tools and monitoring frameworks should be capable of accommodating tokenised assets and continuous settlement. Some respondents supported the proposed analytical framework for assessing margin procyclicality, including recognition of the trade-offs reflected in the margin trilemma. The Bank welcomes this feedback and will consider it as part of its ongoing policy work.
Enhancements to Variation Margin
3.19 The Bank proposed to amend the UK’s framework on CCP variation margin in line with the effective practices set out in the BCBS-CPMI-IOSCO report on variation margin in centrally cleared markets. The amendments require CCPs to consider the impact of their intraday collections and payments on the liquidity position of their clearing member and to provide certain information to its clearing members regarding the CCP’s processes and timing for intraday variation margin calls.
3.20 One respondent suggested that CCPs should consult their risk committees on intraday variation margin practices, to enable clearing members and their clients to provide their views. The Bank agrees that transparency is an important principle and is captured by its fundamental rules for FMIs, where the accompanying FMI Fundamental Rules SS sets out the expectation that FMIs should provide an appropriate level of transparency to support their participants’ understanding of the risks they faced.
Areas of no policy change
3.21 The Bank will not make any changes to the provisions in the near-final CCP rulebook relating to variation margin. While respondents generally supported greater transparency and predictability in variation margin practices, including around intraday and unscheduled variation margin calls, they also emphasised the importance of preserving CCP flexibility to manage risks during periods of market stress. The Bank continues to consider it appropriate to reflect a subset of CPMI-IOSCO's effective variation margin practices in its rules, as these practices support the effective implementation of existing international standards.
Bank’s objective analysis
3.22 The Bank considers that the near-final policy regarding margin transparency continues to advance its financial stability objective by enhancing transparency around CCPs’ margin practices and improving the ability of clearing members and clients to anticipate and meet margin calls. The Bank considers that the near-final policy also remains consistent with its secondary innovation objective. The changes maintain key policy outcomes while reducing burden on CCPs, and preserving flexibility for firms to innovate and enhance their risk management practices.
‘Have regards’ analysis
3.23 The Bank considers that the ‘have regards’ analysis set out in the CP continues to apply. Changes made following consultation preserve the policy’s transparency and resilience benefits while protecting commercially sensitive information and avoiding disproportionate costs for firms. The set of targeted changes made to the near-final rules are designed to maintain alignment with international standards while improving proportionality and addressing considerations regarding proprietary information. The near-final policy supports safe, resilient and efficient clearing services through a proportionate framework that preserves firms’ flexibility and facilitates growth.
Cost benefit analysis
3.24 The Bank considers that the benefits identified in the CP continue to apply. The near-final policy continues to enhance transparency and support clearing members’ and clients’ ability to understand and prepare for future margin calls. The Bank has made targeted changes to improve proportionality, including narrowing or clarifying aspects of the margin simulator, model disclosure and override requirements, and extending implementation periods for the margin transparency requirements. These changes are expected to reduce implementation pressure and address some of the cost, feasibility and confidentiality concerns raised by respondents, while preserving the main benefits of the proposals in supporting liquidity preparedness and market transparency.
4: Consultation feedback on porting
4.1 In Chapters 15 and 16 of the CP, the Bank proposed three changes to porting. First, to require CCPs to factor in portability to the allocation of clearing member default fund contributions. Second, to remove the regulatory requirement for the CCP to proactively seek consent for porting at the time of a default from clients in an omnibus account, so that porting would take place automatically unless all of the clients object or the receiving clearing member does not accept the new clients. Third, to require that all parts of default procedures be tested, rather than just the key aspects of default procedures.
Policy changes
4.2 The Bank has removed the requirement for CCPs to factor portability into default fund allocations. Though for some clearing services it may be appropriate for portability to be a factor in default fund allocations, respondents were concerned that mandating this would be counter-productive in clearing services that had a large number of net omnibus accounts. The Bank has determined that the policy could be distortionary if it incentivised clearing members to take on portfolios based on portability rather than reflecting underlying credit and market risk exposures, and that this could particularly affect niche, less liquid products. For business lines with high populations of net omnibus accounts, the Bank agrees that the policy may have a limited impact on porting outcomes, due to the operational challenges of porting such accounts. The Bank has therefore removed this requirement from rule 2.3 of the Default Fund Part.
4.3 The Bank has clarified that, where there is no single back up clearing member for an omnibus account, CCPs are only required to take all reasonable steps to transfer client positions and assets after a default. This is in line with the Bank’s interpretation of the current position under UK EMIR. Respondents were concerned that rules as drafted would require CCPs to transfer client positions and assets even where there was not a single back up clearing member for porting to take place to, which is highly unlikely to be practically feasible for net omnibus accounts during a porting scenario. The Bank has therefore clarified in rule 2.7 of the Default Procedure Part that where all clients of an omnibus account have not designated the same alternative clearing member, the CCP must take all reasonable steps to transfer all clients’ assets and positions to an alternative clearing member designated by all clients. As part of the Bank’s future review of Level 3 ESMA documentation, the Bank will clarify the position of ESMA EMIR CCP Q&A related to porting procedures.
4.4 The Bank has amended the requirement for a CCP to regularly test its default procedures, and specified that simulation exercises should include simulation of porting procedures. Respondents supported the proposal to include all parts of default procedures in testing, but one believed that simulation exercises were a more appropriate avenue to require porting testing. The Bank agrees with this assessment and has amended rule 3.2 of the Default Procedures Part to implement this.
4.5 The Bank has removed the requirement for CCPs to make public the results of default procedure testing. Respondents were concerned that publicly releasing results represented a disproportionate deviation from UK EMIR requirements with little benefit to portability. The Bank has removed this policy change on the basis of proportionality, as we believe the benefits of porting testing are not aided by full public disclosure. This requirement has been removed from rule 4.1 of the Default Procedures Part.
4.6 The Bank has specified that a CCP must ensure its default procedures do not obligate an alternative clearing member to accept a ported client unless the clearing member has entered into a contract to do so with the relevant client. The Bank considers that this protection helps ensure orderly porting, and thereby financial stability, by reducing the risk of uncertainty and disruption during the porting window, such that transfers can be executed on a clear basis. The protection is aligned with those outlined in UK EMIR Articles 48(5) and 48(6), and as such the Bank does not expect that CCPs would need to make amendments to their own rulebooks or procedures as a result of this amendment. This requirement is found in rule 2.9 of the Default Procedures Part.
Areas of no policy change
4.7 The Bank is not proposing to make further changes to porting as part of this rule making process. Respondents suggested areas of further work for the Bank to consider as they relate to porting, including but not limited to: seniorising the default fund contributions of a clearing member that assumes a portfolio of ported clients over clearing members that do not accept ported clients; the definition of collateral in the Settlement Finality Regulations and Companies Act; standardisation of templates; waivers for capital requirements and anti-money laundering / know your customer (AML/KYC) requirements; allowing for special purpose vehicles that could act as a clearing member of last resort; and more. The Bank is very grateful for the high level of engagement on porting, and follow-up work with industry may include consideration of these additional areas.
Areas of further work
4.8 The Bank will begin further engagement of market participants, on the basis of the feedback and analysis that has been received through the consultation process. The Bank considers enhancements to increase the likelihood of porting to be a priority given the benefits in a default scenario. The level of engagement with these proposals suggests it is also a key area of interest for industry. However, the Bank recognises that this is a complex challenge with no easy solution. The Bank will therefore, after this publication, together with the FCA and the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA), proactively engage with UK CCPs, clearing members and end users to identify, encourage, and where appropriate support initiatives to support higher levels of porting, including for omnibus accounts. The Bank expects to begin this work in 2027.
Bank’s objectives analysis
4.9 The Bank considers that the near-final policy continues to advance its financial stability objective and secondary innovation objective. The changes relate to aspects of the CP proposals that will have limited implications regarding the likelihood of porting, and are intended to avoid distortionary incentives while retaining the core financial stability benefits of the policy.
‘Have regards’ analysis
4.10 The Bank considers that the ‘have regards’ analysis under the CP continues to apply. The changes are intended to balance the aim of supporting the likelihood of successful porting, while taking account of the operational characteristics of different clearing services. The Bank has made targeted changes to ensure the proportionality of the near-final policy while supporting successful porting. In particular, in light of feedback it has removed the proposed requirement to factor portability into default fund allocations, reflecting the potential for distortionary incentives and limited benefits in some clearing services, and has clarified that CCPs should take all reasonable steps to port clients where a transfer may not be practically achievable.
Cost benefit analysis
4.11 The Bank considers that the final policy reduces the expected costs associated with the porting package compared with the CP. In particular, the Bank has removed the proposal to require CCPs to factor portability into default fund allocations. This removes the implementation costs that would have arisen from developing and implementing changes to default fund allocation models, as well as the potential distributional impacts for clearing members and clients from changes in default fund contributions. The Bank considers this change proportionate in light of feedback that the proposal could be distortionary in some clearing services and may have limited impact for omnibus accounts. The Bank continues to consider that improving porting outcomes remains important for financial stability and intends to continue engagement with market participants on practical ways to support higher levels of porting.
5: Consultation feedback on Second Skin in the Game
5.1 In Chapter 17 of the CP, the Bank proposed to introduce a second tranche of CCP capital into the default waterfall, referred to as Second Skin in the Game (SSITG). The proposal included calibrating the SSITG at a flat rate of 25% of a CCP’s risk-weighted capital requirement, and positioning it within the default waterfall alongside the mutualised default fund.
5.2 Respondents provided feedback on the rationale for SSITG, its calibration, positioning within the default waterfall, and its interaction with CCP capital requirements, with views ranging from support for its role in strengthening resilience and incentive alignment, to concerns regarding calibration, costs, and competitiveness impacts.
Policy changes
5.3 The Bank has reduced the calibration of SSITG from 25% to 10% of a CCP’s risk-weighted capital requirement, as reflected in Rule 2.4(2) of the Default Waterfall Part. Respondents expressed concern that the proposed 25% calibration could impose disproportionate costs on CCPs and questioned whether such a level was necessary to achieve the intended incentive effects. In light of this feedback and further analysis, the Bank considers that its policy objectives can be met with a lower level of capital at risk.
5.4 Positioning SSITG alongside the mutualised default fund of non-defaulting clearing members increases the likelihood that it will be utilised in a default scenario, compared to placing the SSITG after the mutualised default fund. This placement strengthens the incentive for CCPs to effectively manage a clearing member default via the default waterfall mechanism. The Bank therefore assesses that a lower percentage of risk-weighted capital can deliver the intended outcomes in terms of incentives and financial resilience, while reducing the risk of disproportionate costs. The Bank’s analysis regarding the calibration of pro-rata SSITG requirements is included at Annex 7.
5.5 The Bank has amended its approach to allow resources contributing to the 110% capital notification threshold to count towards the SSITG requirement. Respondents noted that the original proposal could require CCPs to hold additional capital beyond existing buffers above minimum requirements. The Bank agrees that, as the objective of SSITG is to place CCP capital at risk rather than to increase overall capital requirements, allowing existing capital buffers to count towards SSITG is more proportionate. This amendment, as reflected in Rule 3.7 of the Capital Part and Rule 2.8 of the Default Waterfall Part, ensures that CCPs are not required to set aside more capital than necessary to achieve the intended incentive effect.
5.6 The Bank has clarified that both SITG and SSITG are available to be used in non-default loss (NDL) scenarios. Respondents requested further clarity on whether SSITG could be used in NDL scenarios and how it should be treated in such cases. The Bank notes that SITG and SSITG form part of a CCP’s capital and are therefore available to absorb non-default losses as clarified by rule 2.7(2) of the Default Waterfall Part. Where SITG or SSITG is used to absorb NDLs, the one-month replenishment requirement would also apply. Given the range of possible NDL scenarios, the Bank has not introduced prescriptive requirements on the sequencing or use of these resources and instead expects CCPs to determine their appropriate use in line with their risk management frameworks, as reflected in 2.7(2) of the Default Waterfall Part.
5.7 The Bank has shortened the implementation period for SSITG requirements, but is maintaining its approach to SSITG replenishment. The near-final rules require CCPs to meet the SSITG requirement by 1 April 2028, as set out in section D of the commencement provisions of the near-final UK Central Counterparties Instrument 2027. The Bank considers the shorter implementation period sufficient, given the reduction of the SSITG requirement from 25% of the CCP capital requirement proposed in the consultation paper to 10%, and its decision to not prevent resources that contribute to the 110% capital notification threshold to count towards SSITG. CCPs will continue to be required to replenish SSITG within one month after its use. The Bank considers that this strikes an appropriate balance between preserving the incentive effect and allowing CCPs sufficient time to operationalise the requirement.
Areas of no policy change
5.8 The Bank continues to see value in SSITG, while recognising the need for proportionate calibration. Some respondents argued that the Bank should not proceed with the introduction of SSITG. The Bank has considered these representations but retains the view that SSITG delivers important resilience and incentive benefits by increasing the alignment between CCP risk management and default outcomes. The changes made to the final policy are therefore not intended to alter the underlying objective of introducing SSITG, but rather to improve proportionality and implementation while preserving the intended incentive effects. The Bank considers that the final policy strikes an appropriate balance between resilience, incentives and cost.
5.9 The Bank has not changed its proposal to position SSITG alongside, and to be consumed pro rata with, the mutualised default fund. Respondents expressed differing views on the appropriate positioning of SSITG within the default waterfall. The Bank considers that positioning SSITG at this point in the waterfall is central to the policy objective of strengthening incentives for effective default management. By placing CCP capital at risk alongside clearing member resources, this approach increases the likelihood that SSITG will be used and therefore enhances the incentive effect.
5.10 The Bank wishes to clarify that the allocation of SSITG losses may be operationalised on a pro rata basis after the conclusion of default management. Respondents raised concerns regarding the operational complexity of allocating SSITG alongside default fund contributions during the default management process. The Bank clarifies that allocation may be carried out after the conclusion of default management, in order to reduce operational complexity while preserving the intended economic outcome.
5.11 The Bank is maintaining its flat-rate methodology for calibrating SSITG. Some respondents supported a variable or range-based approach, similar to that used in other jurisdictions. The Bank considers that a flat-rate methodology based on risk-weighted capital requirements remains appropriate, as it provides a proportionate outcome that reflects the scale and risk profile of each CCP, while avoiding unnecessary complexity.
5.12 The Bank is maintaining the range of eligible instruments that may be used to meet the SSITG requirement. Respondents suggested allowing a broader range of instruments, including non-capital resources. The Bank considers that SSITG should be met using capital, including retained earnings and reserves, to ensure that the capital placed at risk is fully effective in delivering the intended incentive effect.
Bank’s objectives analysis
5.13 The Bank considers that the near-final policy continues to advance its financial stability objective and secondary innovation objective. The changes are intended to achieve the same incentive outcomes regarding a CCP’s effective risk management in the event of a clearing member default, while applying a more efficient and economic use of resources.
‘Have regards’ analysis
5.14 The Bank considers that the ‘have regards’ analysis under the CP continues to apply. The near-final approach provides the same resiliency outcomes, whilst taking a more proportionate approach to CCP capital resources.
Cost benefit analysis
5.15 The Bank considers that the near-final SSITG policy reduces the expected cost impact on CCPs compared with the proposal in the CP, while preserving the core benefits of the policy. The reduction in the calibration of SSITG, together with the ability for CCPs to count capital resources contributing to the 110% capital notification threshold towards the requirement, is expected to reduce the extent to which CCPs need to raise or set aside additional capital. The Bank considers that the near-final approach remains effective in strengthening incentives for prudent risk management, because it continues to place a material amount of CCP capital at risk further down the default waterfall. On balance, the Bank considers that the benefits of the near-final SSITG policy continue to outweigh the costs, with the changes made improving proportionality relative to the consultation proposal.
6: Consultation feedback on the change in control framework
6.1 In Chapter 8 of the CP, the Bank proposed to introduce a set of obligations on CCPs with respect to their controllers and any change in the circumstances of the controller of a CCP. The Bank’s proposed requirements for CCPs included providing detailed information about a change in control, including the names of controllers and descriptions of the event (ie acquiring, increasing or reducing control). The proposals further required CCPs to keep the Bank informed of any changes or inaccuracies in the information provided. CCPs would also be subject to ongoing notification and monitoring requirements, including an obligation to notify the Bank if they become aware of certain matters relating to the suitability of their controllers. The proposals further included a set of ongoing requirements including an annual controllers’ report that the CCP must submit to the Bank.
Areas of no policy change
6.2 The Bank is not making changes to the proposed Change in Control Part. Respondents noted that the ongoing notification requirement introduced within this part may be overly expansive and could impose unnecessary administrative burdens without commensurate supervisory benefit. The Bank does not agree with this assessment. The ongoing notification requirement included the obligation that a CCP submit an annual controller's report as well as a requirement for the Bank to be notified of a set of matters relevant to the CCP’s controller, including instances where the controller faces legal proceedings which may affect the controller’s integrity, has a significant deterioration in financial position or, undergoes substantial changes in its governing body. The Bank believes these requirements to be appropriate and proportionate to the risks that could arise to a CCP from a change in circumstance at the CCP’s controller.
6.3 The Bank believes that the proposed annual controllers report is proportionate, with information easily accessible to the CCP. The ongoing requirement to inform the Bank of the matters outlined above is proportionate to the risk that such circumstances could create to the credibility of the CCP and the risk such a loss of credibility could have on cleared markets in the UK.
Bank’s objectives, ‘have regards’ and cost benefit analysis
6.4 The Bank has considered the consultation feedback received on this proposal. The Bank is implementing the near-final policy as consulted. The Bank therefore considers that the objectives, ‘have regards’ and cost benefit analysis set out in the CP remains applicable to the near-final policy.
7: Consultation feedback on liquidity risk controls
7.1 In Chapter 18 of the CP, the Bank proposed to restate liquidity risk control requirements found in UK EMIR into the Liquidity Risk Controls Part of the CCP rules. The Bank also proposed to incorporate elements of the ESMA opinion on Liquidity Risk Assessment from guidance into the CCP rulebook, to clarify how CCPs should assess their liquidity needs.
7.2 The Bank has clarified that liquidity stress testing should apply to material currencies cleared by the CCP only, and not to all currencies cleared by the CCP. Multiple CCP respondents commented that the application of 3.1(3) of the Liquidity Risk Controls Part to all currency types was an expansion of existing supervisory expectations, and would be operationally intensive, and costly. The Bank has clarified in 3.1(3) of the Liquidity Risk Controls Part that this requirement applies to currencies which the CCP clears and in which the CCP has a material liquidity exposure.
Areas of no policy change
7.3 One respondent noted concern that incorporating elements of the existing ESMA Opinion on CCP liquidity risk assessment into the Bank’s CCP rulebook may put an unintentional burden on UK CCPs. This opinion provides clarity on how CCPs should assess their liquidity needs and has formed part of the Bank’s supervisory expectations for firms since the UK’s withdrawal from the EU. In the cost benefit analysis conducted as part of the consultation, the Bank noted that it expects the costs attached to this to be minimal, given that the expectations being incorporated had already been widely adopted by UK CCPs. The Bank has not seen evidence that changes this assessment and notes a further respondent welcomed the expectations being integrated into UK rules.
7.4 A respondent requested that the Bank clarify if the proposal excludes cash deposited at central banks from the calculation of liquidity exposures. The Bank does not assess there to be a clear rationale to exclude cash deposited at central banks from the scope of a CCP’s liquidity exposure calculations. The involvement of a central bank does not necessarily remove the underlying liquidity need faced by the CCP. The Bank considers this in keeping with its rule drafting and has not made a rule amendment in response to this. Near-final bank rules maintain the UK EMIR requirement for a CCP to assess the liquidity risk arising from the default of its two largest clearing members.
Bank’s objectives, ‘have regards’ and cost benefit analysis
7.5 The Bank has considered the consultation feedback received on this proposal. The Bank is implementing the near-final policy as consulted, with only minor clarificatory amendments that do not alter the substance of the policy. The Bank therefore considers that the objectives, ‘have regards’ and cost benefit analysis set out in the CP remains applicable to the near-final policy.
8: Consultation feedback on supervisory processes
8.1 In Chapter 21 of the CP, the Bank proposed to change its approach to three supervisory processes: model reviews, the recognition (referred to in UK EMIR as ‘authorisation’) of new UK CCPs, and variations of recognition for UK CCPs to cover additional services or activities.
8.2 For model reviews, the Bank proposed to establish a simplified and more proportionate materiality threshold for determining whether a CCP’s proposed model change would require the Bank’s permission pending a review. Secondly, it proposed the introduction of a ‘pre-notify only’ requirement for changes assessed as non-material relative to the threshold. Thirdly, it proposed to simplify and shorten the review process for changes assessed as material in line with the statutory deadline under HMT’s draft statutory instrument, The Central Counterparties (Amendment) Regulations 2025.footnote [6] As such the review for a material model change would be completed within a statutory deadline of 60 working days, with 10 days added to this deadline should the Bank require further information from the CCP to complete the review (any subsequent requests would leave the deadline unaffected).
8.3 HMT’s draft legislation (The Central Counterparties (Amendment) Regulations 2025) proposed to simplify processes and shorten timelines for the recognition of new UK CCPs and variations of recognition. Under the draft legislation, the recognition of a new UK CCP would be completed within a deadline of 120 working days and variations of recognition within 80 working days. Should the Bank require further information to complete its assessment, an additional 30 working days and 10 working days respectively would be added to these two deadlines upon the first request for further information only. Within these parameters, the Bank also proposed introducing a fast track for variations of recognition, meaning that applications assessed as non-material relative to the materiality threshold for model reviews would be assessed within 10 working days, with the potential for an additional 10 working days if further information is required.
8.4 Respondents provided feedback on: the Bank’s definition of a model change (and thus on the scope of changes which would need to be communicated to the Bank); the need to pre-notify the Bank of any change deemed to be in scope, including non-material changes; the criteria of the materiality threshold; the lack of a process covering urgent changes in exceptional circumstances; the frequency with which the Bank would report its performance against review deadlines; disclosure requirements on model changes from CCPs to their clearing members; and the supporting evidence the Bank proposes CCPs provide with their applications.
Policy changes
8.5 The Bank has clarified the scope of changes requiring pre-notification. Respondents commented that the original scope could be perceived as too broad, and likely to capture parameter-based updates and recalibrations. In response the Bank has explicitly included examples of changes which are deemed to be within the regular intended operation of the current model and therefore ‘business as usual’, or otherwise outside the scope of pre-notification requirements in its near-final Statement of Policy: The Bank of England’s approach to supervisory processes (model changes, recognition orders and variations of recognition orders) and margin permissions (the supervisory processes SoP), at section 2:2.2– 2.7. These include ongoing parameter changes; reactive changes with an intuitively simple impact on model output; corrections to model implementation (including emergency model overrides); changes required by a supervisory authority; and minor model adjustments to incorporate new products or collateral.
8.6 The Bank has raised the quantitative criteria of the materiality threshold. Respondents were unanimous in recommending that quantitative impact thresholds be raised. Respondents recommended various approaches to this, as well as ways of simplifying the thresholds, including by having a single impact threshold of 15%. In response, the Bank has raised the levels for changes to important model components (eg lookback period, add-ons) from 5% to 10%. The Bank has also raised levels for changes to key resources (eg initial margin, default fund) from 15% to 20%. These changes are set out in Annex 2 of the near-final supervisory processes SoP. The Bank will, however, monitor the effectiveness of these levels on an ongoing basis.
8.7 The Bank has amended the criterion relating to collateral in the materiality threshold in order to allow CCPs to experiment with new types of collateral within safe limits. Under the New Collateral Pathway, the acceptance of up to 2% (by post-haircut value) per clearing member of types of collateral eligible under the CCP rules will be considered a non-material model change, and thus subject to notification requirements only. Within that overall limit, the acceptance of up to 1% of collateral ineligible under the CCP rules will also be considered non-material. However, a CCP wishing to accept ineligible collateral in any amount will need to apply for a waiver or modification of the relevant collateral rule(s), the process and criteria for which are outlined in the SoP on the Bank’s approach to rule permissions and waivers. Further detail regarding the New Collateral Pathway is provided at Chapter 10 of this PS.
8.8 The Bank has introduced a process for allowing urgent model changes to be made in exceptional circumstances. Respondent feedback called for the inclusion of a pathway for urgent model changes in the new framework, as currently exists under UK EMIR. The Bank has amended its near-final policy such that the Bank may grant permission for urgent material changes prior to a full review where duly justified in the interests of financial stability and where the relevant waiver tests set out in s.138BA of FSMA are met. Following a post-hoc full review of the complete application, the Bank will communicate its decision on the application to the CCP, which may be to uphold the permission previously granted, vary it or revoke it. These additions are reflected in section 2:3.23–3.28 of the supervisory processes SoP.
8.9 The Bank has introduced a process and controls around the performance of model overrides. In order to address the ambiguity around the treatment of model overrides in UK EMIR, the Bank has set out an explicit process in 2:3.30–3.32 of the supervisory processes SoP. Underpinning the process are rules 13.7 to 13.9 of the Review and Testing of Models and Parameters and Overrides Part, which states that a CCP must notify the Bank as soon as is practicable and within one business day that an override, including a margin model override, has taken place; rule 13.8, which sets controls around the performance of non-margin model overrides (with equivalent controls around the performance of margin model overrides set out in rule 3.29 of the Margin Requirements Part); and rule 13.9, which sets out the information to be disclosed to the Bank once a non-margin model override has ceased (with equivalent rules for margin model overrides in 4.1 and 4.2 of the Margin Requirements Part). To provide CCPs time to prepare for the new obligations, rule 13.9 of the Review and Testing of Models and Parameters and Overrides Part and rules 4.1 and 4.2 of the Margin Requirements Part will come into force twelve months after the CCP rulebook comes into force.
8.10 The Bank has streamlined and made more proportionate the supporting evidence requirements for an application for permission to make a material change. Respondents noted various ways supporting evidence could be streamlined, including by making application forms more flexible and/or adjusting required supporting evidence in line according to different degrees of materiality of proposed changes. The Bank considers that some streamlining of the required documentation and consideration of proportionality with respect to the scope, complexity and potential impact of proposed changes are appropriate to decrease the burden on CCPs, while maintaining robust standards. The Bank nevertheless expects CCPs to provide sufficient information for the thorough assessment of proposed changes, and may reject incomplete applications.
8.11 The Bank has introduced an expected timeframe for the submission of an application by a CCP once a proposed change has been confirmed as ‘material’. The policy consulted on provided no expectation or requirement of a timeframe in which a CCP must submit an application for permission to make a material change after confirmation of materiality. As time elapses between initial notification and submission of the application, the data originally provided become less representative. The Bank has therefore introduced an expectation that an application must be submitted within 120 working days after confirmation of materiality in section 2:3.20 of the supervisory processes SoP. Applications submitted beyond this timeframe may be rejected.
8.12 The Bank has introduced a new criterion to the materiality threshold which allows the Bank to review successive, related model changes in aggregate if their cumulative impact is ‘material’. This is a safeguard to ensure that changes over time are taken into account, and is reflected in section 2:3.21 as well as in Annex 2 of the supervisory processes SoP.
Areas of no policy change
8.13 The Bank has not introduced post-notification for non-material changes. Respondents recommended this based on a perception that the proposed scope of notification requirements would capture too many ‘business as usual’ changes. The Bank considers that clarifying the scope establishes that routine parameter updates and recalibrations will typically not need to be communicated. Non-material changes within scope will be subject to a 10-working-day statutory deadline for a confirmation of non-materiality from the Bank, subject to HMT making the final legislation. In the Bank’s judgement this is a proportionate outcome, and represents a significant streamlining of the current process.
8.14 The Bank will not increase the frequency of its reporting on its performance against deadlines for model reviews, recognition applications and variations of recognition. The Bank does not consider that the volume of applications received on a yearly basis warrants quarterly reporting. The Bank will therefore maintain its proposal to report on these issues annually.
8.15 The Bank will not increase the disclosure requirements from CCPs to clearing members in respect of model changes. Respondents recommended various additions to disclosure requirements, including a requirement to disclose all material model changes and their impacts to clearing members sufficiently ahead of implementation, and the publication of stress-testing results. The Bank does not consider that this would be proportionate in view of CCPs’ existing disclosure obligations and the Bank’s Fundamental Rules for Financial Market Infrastructures: Supervisory Statement (FMI Fundamental Rules SS), which sets an expectation (in relation to Fundamental Rule 1) that FMIs will provide their participants with sufficient information to enable an accurate understanding of the risks they incur.footnote [7]
8.16 The Bank will not require CCPs to submit more detailed impact analyses as part of applications for permission to make a material model change. Some respondents called for the existing evidence requirements to be expanded to include analyses of impacts on end-users and indirect participants. The Bank considers that the existing supporting evidence requirements, which include analyses of impacts by portfolio and member type, provide sufficient information to assess the effects of material model changes proposed by CCPs, and has therefore not expanded them.
Bank’s objectives analysis
8.17 Consistent with the analysis in the CP, the Bank considers that the near-final policy supports its financial stability objective and secondary innovation objective. The changes will allow the Bank to focus on the changes that are significant to financial stability, while enabling CCPs to respond more effectively to business needs.
‘Have regards’ analysis
8.18 The Bank considers the ‘have regards’ under the CP continues to apply. The near-final policy introduces a more proportionate and efficient supervisory framework for review model and product changes, supporting efficient use of the Bank's resources.
Cost benefit analysis
8.19 The Bank considers that the changes to supervisory processes improve proportionality while maintaining the benefits identified in the CP. The Bank has raised the quantitative thresholds for material model changes, clarified the scope of changes requiring notification, introduced a process for urgent model changes in exceptional circumstances, and streamlined supporting evidence requirements. These changes are expected to reduce unnecessary compliance burdens and costs for CCPs and allow the Bank to focus supervisory resources on changes that are more likely to be material to risk. The Bank does not consider that these changes materially reduce resilience, as the framework continues to require appropriate oversight of material changes and includes safeguards to monitor the cumulative impact of successive non-material changes.
9: Consultation feedback on the interoperability framework
9.1 In Chapter 24 of the CP, the Bank proposed to restate UK EMIR provisions related to interoperability arrangements with minor changes, as well as three policy proposals:
- To expand the applicable scope of interoperability provisions beyond money market instruments and transferable securities.
- To require CCPs to seek a permission from the Bank prior to making a material change to an existing interoperability arrangement.
- To specify that the Bank has the power to revoke permission for an interoperability arrangement.
9.2 The Bank also set out its approach to giving, amending and revoking an interoperability permission in its draft Statement of Policy – The Bank of England’s approach to interoperability permissions (interoperability permissions SoP).
9.3 Submissions on the Bank’s approach to the Interoperability Arrangements Part of the CCP rulebook were broadly positive and the Bank has not identified any rule amendments that need to be made as a result of consultation feedback.
Policy changes
9.4 The Bank has amended the interoperability permissions SoP to clarify that a permission is required in advance of a change in the procedures for managing a default related to an interoperable CCP, only where that change is material. One respondent sought clarification on this point. The Bank does not consider that it would be proportionate for a permission to be required for routine operational or technical updates. The Bank has clarified in section 7.3.4 of the near-final interoperability permissions SoP that only material changes in the procedures for managing a default that relates to an interoperable CCP are in scope of the materiality criteria.
Areas of no policy change
9.5 One respondent noted that the criteria for revoking an interoperability permission should be transparent and that CCPs should have the opportunity to remediate any issues before revocation. The Bank considers that the interoperability permissions SoP, in combination with the Statement of Policy – the Bank of England’s approach to rule permissions and waivers, provides a transparent approach to the Bank’s exercise of its permission power, including its approach to varying or revoking a permission. In relation to the opportunity to remediate any issues before revocation, the interoperability permissions SoP notes that the Bank would exercise its power to revoke an interoperability arrangement permission in a proportionate manner.
9.6 One respondent supported the inclusion of interoperability arrangements for derivatives in the Interoperability Part but highlighted that the Bank does not allow CCPs in an interoperability arrangement to contribute to each other’s default funds. The respondent further suggested that the Bank increase the amount of margin CCPs post to each other, and that the default fund can be used during the default of a CCP in an interoperability arrangement. The Bank agrees that an interoperability arrangement for derivatives does carry with it increased risks in comparison to money market instruments and transferable securities. Each proposed arrangement would be assessed on a case-by-case basis. However, the Bank does not consider that increasing the costs of such arrangements would be appropriate in light of the benefits such arrangements can provide. The Bank also considers that contributions by an interoperating CCP to the other CCP’s default fund may increase the likelihood of contagion between the CCPs.
9.7 One respondent noted that CCPs should be required to adequately consult their clearing members through the risk committee about potential material changes to existing interoperability arrangements. The Bank agrees that transparency is an important principle and is captured by its fundamental rules for FMIs, where the accompanying FMI Fundamental Rules SS sets out the expectation that FMIs should provide an appropriate level of transparency to support their participants’ understanding of the risks they faced.
9.8 One respondent agreed with the Bank’s proposals but stressed that changes to an interoperability arrangement by a non-UK CCP that could lower risk management standards should be reviewed and approved by the Bank. A CCP is required to obtain a permission before making any material changes to an interoperability arrangement. CCP rules apply to UK CCPs, and systemic overseas CCPs (unless a comparable compliance permission has been granted). With the exception of the Overseas CCPs Part, rules do not apply to non-systemic overseas CCPs. A non-UK CCP with an interoperability arrangement is a relevant factor considered through the Bank’s tiering framework for non-UK CCPs, which assess the risks that the CCP may pose to UK financial stability. Non-systemic overseas CCPs remain primarily supervised by their home authorities, where sufficient cooperation arrangements are in place between those authorities and the Bank. Where a non-UK CCP holds an interoperability arrangement with a UK CCP, the Bank requires additional levels of cooperation and information sharing under its arrangement with the home authorities in order to recognise the non-UK CCP as non-systemic.
Bank’s objectives, ‘have regards’ and cost benefit analysis
9.9 The Bank has considered the consultation feedback received on this proposal. The Bank is implementing the near-final policy as consulted with only minor clarificatory amendments that do not alter the substance of the policy. The Bank therefore considers that the objectives analysis, ‘have regards’ and cost benefit analysis set out in the CP remains applicable to the near-final policy.
10: Supporting responsible innovation in UK clearing
10.1 Chapters 3–9 of the PS provide an overview of stakeholder feedback regarding the seven policy areas where the Bank proposed material changes, and the Bank’s response to that feedback. The Bank is also making some further amendments as part of a broader programme to support innovation within the evolving clearing landscape. This chapter explains how CCP rules, powers and the Bank’s related policy publications support responsible innovation at both new and established CCPs, bringing together the Bank’s policies on CCP mobilisation, rule permissions, and modified supervisory processes. Some of these policies relate to post-consultation changes to the CCP rulebook and accompanying policy documents in response to feedback, while others are set out in separate publications.
10.2 This chapter sets out two new policies resulting from feedback to the CP that aim to facilitate innovation at established CCPs. These are:
- a New Collateral Pathway which provides a proportionate route through which established CCPs may introduce new collateral on a limited basis before seeking permission for its use at greater scale; and
- amendment of internal supervisory processes to support an expedited review of innovative new products where the CCP demonstrates the associated risks are limited and appropriately mitigated.
10.3 The Bank’s framework provides different routes for innovators. These routes may also be used in conjunction where applicable.
- Mobilisation enables a new CCP to complete its operational buildout and undertake limited live testing.footnote [8]
- The permissions framework provides flexibility in the application of rules for new and established CCPs, and increases the transparency of Bank decision-making.footnote [9]
- The revised supervisory processes set out at Chapter 8 of this PS make the treatment of model changes, new products and collateral types faster, clearer and more proportionate, including through providing a New Collateral Pathway. Established CCPs can benefit from the new policies set out in this chapter which provide clear routes to test new collateral arrangements, permitting responsible experimentation, and enabling new products to reach the market faster.
The Bank’s approach to innovation for CCPs
10.4 The Bank’s primary objective is to protect and enhance the UK’s financial stability, while its secondary objective is to facilitate innovation in FMI services where reasonably possible. Financial stability is an important foundation for innovation as it depends on firms and markets remaining resilient. Responsible innovation can also enhance resilience. New technologies, products, collateral arrangements and market structures can create opportunities to improve services and support more effective risk management.
10.5 The Bank’s approach to compliance with CCP rules is generally technology neutral, applying the same regulatory outcomes whether a service uses established arrangements or new technology, provided the rule is met. This provides a regulatory environment in which firms can explore new approaches with appropriate risk management, delivering the resilience outcomes expected in different ways.
10.6 The Bank encourages conversations at formative stages. CCPs considering innovative products, services or collateral arrangements should engage their usual supervisory contacts, and early engagement helps establish the appropriate route. This may also provide the Bank with opportunities to learn from market experience, and supports the Bank when considering areas where rule or policy amendments may be beneficial – where evidence demonstrates that this is appropriate.
Supporting new CCPs through mobilisation
10.7 The Bank is introducing a mobilisation stage, designed to support new CCPs when launching their business and developing market readiness. New CCPs may choose to undertake limited live activity to demonstrate the operation of their systems and complete the building out of their capabilities before moving into a scaling phase, or business-as-usual operations.
10.8 Mobilisationfootnote [10] provides an optional route for a new CCP after recognition, while its activity is limited to de minimis levels and accordingly the CCP poses limited financial stability risk. This supports prospective market entrants by providing a proportionate bridge between development and full operation, rather than requiring every element of the firm to operate immediately at business-as-usual scale. It can also be beneficial in obtaining investor support.
10.9 Mobilisation combines limits on the activities undertaken by the new CCP with, where appropriate, temporary modifications or waivers of specified rules. The firm must have a credible plan to complete its build-out and meet its unmodified requirements by the end of mobilisation. Mobilisation therefore supports market entry and live testing with a proportionate supervisory approach, whilst maintaining the standards ultimately expected of CCPs when operating without restrictions. The detailed policy, safeguards and assessment approach are set out in the separate Statement of Policy: The Bank of England’s approach to using its requirements and permissions to facilitate mobilisation of new CCPs
A more flexible framework through rule permissions
10.10 The CCP rulebook will provide a more dynamic framework, allowing the Bank to adapt requirements in relation to the evolving clearing environment at greater pace compared to the existing framework under UK EMIR. The permissions power under section 138BA of FSMA is a key mechanism for this flexibility.
10.11 The permissions framework allows the Bank to consider whether an applicable rule should be modified or waived for a particular firm or firms, while preserving the outcome the regulatory framework is intended to achieve. This supports both new and established CCPs by building adaptability into the rulebook and providing a transparent route through which firms can identify rules that may unnecessarily impede a particular innovation where this will not compromise financial stability.
10.12 Following consultation feedback, the Bank has made explicit that, in respect of rules where no subject-specific Statement of Policy applies, it will consider whether compliance with an unmodified rule would prevent improvements in the quality, efficiency or economy of FMI services as part of its assessment of whether compliance would be unduly burdensome. This is intended to be consistent with the Bank’s secondary objective to facilitate innovation, and is subject to the Bank being satisfied that giving a permission would not adversely affect the advancement of its financial stability objective. Further detail is set out in the Statement of Policy: The Bank of England’s approach to rule permissions and waivers and accompanying Policy Statement.
Supervisory review that focuses only on the material changes
10.13 In developing the new CCP framework, the Bank has made a number of changes intended to streamline its supervisory processes and focus the Bank’s supervisory resources on the model changes that are most material to financial stability. This ensures an approach that is more proportionate and risk-based, while supporting speed-to-market.
10.14 The revised supervisory process framework provides greater clarity about the scope of notification requirements for model changes, including ‘business-as-usual’ changes, such as routine parameter updates and certain adjustments within pre-defined ranges, that the Bank does not need to be notified of. It also introduces more proportionate materiality thresholds, an expedited route for non-material changes and clearer review periods for material changes. This will support CCPs in maintaining and developing their models, introducing products, and responding to changing markets, while allowing the Bank and CCPs to focus resources on areas of material risk. Further detail is set out in Chapter 8 of this PS and the supervisory processes SoP.
Introduction of a New Collateral Pathway
10.15 The Bank is introducing a New Collateral Pathwaythat will enable CCPs to experiment with new types of collateral within safe limits – a total of 2% (by post-haircut value) per clearing member for collateral types eligible under the CCP rules, and 1% for non-eligible types (per clearing member) within that overall limit.
10.16 For these purposes, eligible collateral is collateral that meets all applicable requirements in the Collateral Part of the CCP rulebook. In particular, rule 2.1 requires collateral to be highly liquid, with minimal credit and market risk, and limits the permitted categories to cash, financial instruments, commercial bank guarantees,footnote [11] central bank guarantees and gold, subject to the more detailed conditions set out under the Collateral Part of the CCP rulebook. Ineligible collateral is collateral that does not meet one or more of those applicable requirements. Eligibility depends on the characteristics of the asset. The form of delivery, tokenisation or traditional forms, does not, by itself, determine whether collateral is eligible.
10.17 The Bank considers that requiring a full review before any live use may be disproportionate where the CCP intends initially to use the collateral only within low and strictly controlled limits. As such, the Bank has set out an updated policy to provide a route through which collateral exploration can happen. The Bank judges this will provide more opportunities for firms to respond to market developments, whilst retaining a robust and responsible approach to collateral management.
10.18 A limited volume of new collateral can enable the CCP to build and test operational arrangements in a live environment, gauge member demand and usage patterns, and refine the risk controls and governance that could support any later application for use at greater scale. It could also provide the Bank with relevant evidence about the operation of the arrangement in practice.
10.19 Small-scale usage may provide useful information such as the practical operation of haircuts and other controls, clearing member demand, concentration amongst particular participants and the operational arrangements needed to accept and manage the collateral.
10.20 The introduction of new collateral can, however, also create risks. In business-as-usual conditions, a deterioration in collateral value can lead to additional margin calls. In the event of a clearing member default, collateral underperformance can increase the quantum of losses that are mutualised across the non-defaulting members. The Bank has taken these considerations into account in calibrating this policy and safeguards to mitigate these risks.
10.21 CCPs may seek to accept a new type of collateral to respond to clearing-member demand, improve collateral efficiency or explore new technologies and market practices. Under the approach originally proposed in the CP, the acceptance of a new collateral type with novel risk factors, that is already permitted under the Collateral Part of the CCP rulebook, would be treated as a material model change. A CCP would therefore need to obtain the Bank’s permission following a full model review before accepting any amount of that collateral.
10.22 To support responsible innovation in collateral practices, the Bank’s updated policy following consultation includes limits under which CCPs will be able to experiment with new collateral in a live environment without requiring a material model change permission. These changes will allow CCPs to benefit further from the Bank’s new streamlined process for model changes.
10.23 Under the new framework set out under the supervisory processes SoP, CCPs will be able to accept a total of up to 2%, by post-haircut value and per clearing member of new forms of collateral without needing to apply for a material model change permission. The 2% limit may be comprised entirely of forms of collateral which are eligible under the Bank’s CCP rulebook; alternatively, to facilitate broader collateral exploration, CCPs may allocate a maximum of 1% by post-haircut value within the overall limit to forms of collateral that are, ineligible under the Bank’s CCP rulebook.
10.24 As set out in Figure 1, the process for accepting new collateral under the New Collateral Pathway is determined by whether the collateral is eligible or ineligible under the Bank’s CCP rulebook:
1 Collateral that is eligible under the Bank’s CCP rulebook. This is deemed to be a non-material model change up to a limit of 2% by post-haircut value and per clearing member. A CCP notifies the Bank of the intended change and will be able to implement it within 10 business days following notification provided the Bank confirms the change as non-material. To go above the 2% limit, the CCP pre-notifies the Bank and applies for a material model change permission.
2 Collateral that is ineligible under the Bank’s CCP rulebook. This is deemed a non-material model change up to a limit of 1% by post-haircut value within the overall 2% limit. However, in addition to pre-notification, a CCP will need to apply for a waiver or modification of the relevant collateral rule(s), the process and criteria for which are outlined in the SoP on the Bank’s approach to rule permissions and waivers.footnote [12] To provide further clarity, the Bank intends to consult in H1 2027 on a subject-specific SoP for bespoke collateral permissions, taking into account any experience of the general permissions power being used for collateral.
10.25 Figure 1 summarises the overall framework.
Figure 1: New Collateral Pathway flow chart
Supporting speed to market for innovative new products
10.26 Where a CCP proposes an innovative new product and demonstrates the associated risks are limited and properly mitigated, the Bank will reflect this in the conduct of its review. In these instances the Bank generally expects its review to be shorter than the applicable maximum period set out in accompanying Statements of Policy, subject to the nature, complexity and completeness of the proposal by the CCP.
10.27 A CCP wishing to benefit from an expedited review should engage with their usual supervisory contacts at an early stage so that the firm and the Bank can identify the applicable process and the information required. The policy is intended to improve efficiency and prioritisation of the Bank’s review process and does not alter the Bank’s assessment criteria or risk appetite.
Tokenisation
10.28 Tokenisation may enable market participants to mobilise collateral more quickly and efficiently, including by improving settlement processes and the movement of assets between participants and infrastructures. The Bank’s technology-neutral approach to compliance with CCP rules means that tokenisation does not by itself determine whether an asset is eligible for use as collateral.
10.29 The Bank has published a separate consultation paper and draft Supervisory Statement explaining how existing requirements apply where CCPs seek to accept tokenised collateral.footnote [13] This should support CCPs, clearing members and other market participants by providing greater clarity, including on liquidity, interoperability, legal, settlement, credit, operational resilience and custody considerations.
10.30 Where an asset is already eligible under the CCP rulebook, using it in tokenised form does not automatically make it ineligible (or eligible). Instead, CCPs should consider how the tokenised collateral meets the requirements in the CCP rules, given it will need to achieve the same regulatory outcomes as conventional collateral, even if delivered by a new technology. A CCP seeking to accept a collateral type that is currently ineligible under the CCP rulebook may consider applying for a waiver in relation to the relevant rules under the Collateral Part, in line with the permissions SoP.
11: Consultation feedback on additional areas of the Bank’s proposals
11.1 This chapter addresses feedback from consultation respondents on parts of the rulebook where the Bank did not propose policy changes, and instead proposed to restate UK EMIR requirements with no or minor changes, including changes intended to ensure clarity and consistency in terminology. It explains where the Bank has made updates to rules or accompanying policy materials following consultation, and its rationale where it is not making changes.
Glossary
11.2 In Chapter 4 of the CP, the Bank proposed to restate definitions set out in UK EMIR and associated technical standards, with several amendments and new definitions set out in the consultation.
11.3 The Bank agrees with respondents that reiterated definitions should, where appropriate, be aligned to international standards for CCPs. Two respondents noted that the Bank had introduced a definition of margin procyclicality which is not a defined term in EU requirements, and one respondent raised concerns that the definition was too narrow and risks treating appropriate margin responsiveness as procyclical behaviour. Having considered this feedback, the Bank has revised the definition, using the UK EMIR definition as its basis and adapting it to the terminology of the FMI rulebook. The Bank considers that this approach is more closely aligned with the international framework for CCPs.
11.4 The Bank has amended its definition of capital to clarify that it included retained earnings and reserves. This is intended to remove ambiguity and ensure that the definition was applied consistently throughout the rulebook.
11.5 Respondents commented on the definition of regulatory initial margin, including whether margin add-ons should be included within its scope. The Bank confirms that margin add-ons are intended to be captured by the definition. The Bank has also made minor drafting changes to the margin definitions including add-ons, confidence interval, initial margin, margin, margin model override, margin cost, non-margin model override, override and regulatory initial margin, to improve clarity and align them more closely with the requirements in Chapter 3 of the Margin Requirements Part of the rule instrument.
11.6 The Bank has amended its definition of authorised UK credit institution and authorised overseas credit institution, and added definitions for overseas credit institution UK branch, and UK credit institution overseas branch, as part of clarifying the treatment of UK branches of overseas banks under the Investment Policy and Collateral Parts (further detail is provided in paragraph 11.49 of this chapter).
11.7 In addition, the Bank has made a number of consequential amendments to the definitions of ‘covered bond’, ‘FCA investment firm’, ‘financial institution’, ‘group’ and ‘institution’. These amendments replace references to the CRR, which is being revoked, and instead refer to the corresponding provisions and definitions in the PRA rulebook.
Interpretation and General Provisions
11.8 In Chapter 5 of the CP, the Bank proposed to introduce a set of interpretive and general requirements for CCPs, designed to facilitate clear interpretation and understanding of the rules applying to a CCP in the rulebook. The provisions outline a set of circumstances in which a CCP may be exempt from complying with Bank rules during an emergency.
11.9 Several respondents requested further detail from the Bank on which scenarios would be considered an emergency, including requests for specific examples. The rationale behind this request from stakeholders was to ensure that there is adequate protection for clearing members and their clients in an emergency.
11.10 The Bank notes that providing specific examples of what constitutes an emergency may be interpreted as limiting the scope of any emergency in a way that is not intended. The Bank therefore considers it more effective to focus on principles. The Bank has been clear that an emergency is a scenario in which it is impracticable for a CCP to comply with a rule, the scenario could not be avoided, and the circumstances are outside the control of the CCP. In such a situation, a CCP must notify the Bank of the emergency and the steps they are taking to deal with the consequences of the emergency. During this period a CCP will not be considered to be in contravention of the relevant rule(s) for as long as the consequences of the emergency continue and for so long as the CCP can demonstrate that it is taking all practicable steps to deal with those consequences, to comply with the rule, and to mitigate losses and potential losses.
11.11 These criteria are a targeted set of circumstances in which the Bank would be minded to apply the emergency provisions and each of the above criteria would need to be clearly evidenced to the Bank by any firm that considered itself to be facing an emergency. These rules are in line with similar provisions in place in other UK financial regulator rulebooks and aim to support effective and proportionate application of Bank rules to CCPs to support financial stability.
11.12 The Bank has added a provision under rule 2.5 of the Interpretation and General Provisions Part which sets out that references in the rulebook to legislation relate to that legislation as amended, unless otherwise specified. This amendment is intended to clarify that references to legislation in a rule should be read as referring to the version of the legislation currently in force (as amended over time), unless it is otherwise indicated in the rules that the reference relates to a version of that legislation as at a fixed point in time.
11.13 The Bank notes that in the near-final version of the CCP rules, rule 5.1 of the Interpretation and General Provisions Part has been retained as a savings provision for permissions held under a provision of UK EMIR immediately before its revocation. This states that a Financial Market Institution is not required to obtain a new permission where it held an approval under EMIR, immediately prior to EMIR being revoked. This provision may be amended or removed in the final rules to reflect the effect of HMT’s SIs, but the Bank intends to ensure a similar outcome.
Capital
11.14 In Chapter 6 of the CP, the Bank proposed to restate the existing UK EMIR capital requirements for CCPs in the Capital Part of the CCP rules, with minor clarificatory amendments. The relevant assimilated law provisions are set out in Article 16 of UK EMIR and Articles 1 to 5 of CDR 152/2013, together with Articles 274, 315 and 316 of the Capital Requirements Regulations (CRR).
11.15 Several respondents questioned the Bank’s proposal to maintain the existing approach to CCP capital requirements until a later review. They noted the continued use of CRR methodologies designed for banks and investment firms may not be well-suited to CCPs, and could result in disproportionate capital requirements for some risks. The Bank has considered this feedback but is not amending the substance of capital requirement rules at this time. The Bank continues to consider that conducting a broader review of the CCP capital regime separately, and in the round, is the most appropriate way to assess potential changes to CCP capital requirements. This will allow the Bank to consider the interaction between different elements of the capital framework, relevant international work including general business riskfootnote [14] and any implications for financial stability and proportionality.
11.16 The Bank has updated references to revoked provisions of the CRR so that they instead refer to the corresponding provisions in the PRA Rulebook, where appropriate. The Bank has also fixed certain references as at 31 December 2026, in order to preserve the existing approach to CCP capital requirements, and maintain a Bank governance framework for future changes to CCP capital requirements. This will ensure that changes under PRA proposals to implement the Basel 3.1 standards for operational risk, which have been delayed until 1 January 2027, will not be automatically carried over for CCPs. This additional clarification is in response to comments querying the appropriate version of CRR that is referred to in capital requirement rules.
11.17 The Bank has also clarified its description of the move from approval requirements to notification requirements in the Capital Part. In 6.13 of the capital requirements chapter of the CP, the Bank described the introduction of an objective standard in connection with replacing certain Bank approvals with notifications. For clarity, the Bank’s intention is that CCPs should calculate the relevant capital requirements in accordance with the objective requirements set out in the rules, rather than submit certain estimates for prior approval by the Bank. The Bank considers this to be a more proportionate approach. The change will also ensure we can target our supervisory resources effectively while retaining the Bank’s ability to supervise those calculations or to require information from CCPs where necessary.
Management and Governance
11.18 In Chapter 7 of the CP, the Bank proposed to restate requirements relating to management and governance which were previously set out in Articles 26, 27, 28, 31 and 33 of UK EMIR, and Articles 3 to 8, 10 and 11 of CDR 153/2013. The Bank proposed to make minor amendments to these requirements in order to improve the clarity of the applications of these rules. The Bank made explicit changes to the following elements: the definition of ‘board’, a restructuring of specific elements of Article 4 of CDR 153/2013 relating to liquidity, the explicit inclusion of recitals 66 and 67 of UK EMIR in the Risk Management and Internal Control Mechanisms Chapter, the introduction of a permission for CCPs to waive a disclosure under rule 9.1 of the Management and Governance Part.
11.19 The Bank has removed its inclusion of recitals 66 and 67 as rules 4.1 (2), 4.1(3) and 4.3 in the Management and Governance Part. This was in response to feedback received by the Bank which noted that these specific provisions appear to be more principles based. The Bank has considered this feedback and concludes that the expectations set out within these recitals set more general expectations on firms, rather than the specific requirements that are generally applied through the Bank’s rulebook. The Bank will consider how best to set out these expectations in a proportionate manner in the future.
11.20 Respondents noted that provisions in the Management and Governance Part were welcomed, but requested that the Bank provide greater clarity as to how client representation could influence CCP governance in practice. The Bank does not believe it is necessary to make further changes at this time but will continue to monitor the effectiveness of CCP Governance arrangements in relation to client engagement.
11.21 Respondents noted that governance transparency could be improved at CCPs. One respondent noted that CCPs could consider a balanced approach to allow for controlled internal consultation with representatives of their participants. This included a request that CCPs permit participants to share relevant materials strictly within their firm’s second line of defence or control functions to ensure robust and informed challenge without creating information asymmetries among clearing members.
11.22 The Bank notes that it believes transparency, particularly in respect of risk management to be an important principle for CCPs. The Bank has previously outlined in its Fundamental Rules for FMIs that it expects that FMIs should provide an appropriate level of transparency to support their participants understanding of the risks they incur through participation. The Bank supports appropriate transparency between CCPs and their clearing members to ensure risk management and support financial stability. Where CCPs can improve their governance structures to facilitate improved information transparency this should be considered as part of compliance with the Bank's Fundamental Rules for FMIs, however at this time the Bank does not believe it necessary to make any changes to its proposed rules in the Management and Governance Part.
11.23 The Bank has removed rule 9.2(2) in the Management and Governance Part. This change has been made to ensure consistency with the Bank’s powers and obligations under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Disapplication or Modification of Financial Regulator Rules in Individual Cases) Regulations 2024. The pre-consultation drafting of rule 9.2(2) required a firm to publish the fact that it has received a section138BA permission. However, the requirement on the Bank to publish the permission under Regulation 6 of the enabling regulations mentioned above outlines circumstances where the Bank may deem it inappropriate or unnecessary to publish the granting of a permission under section 138BA. The Bank is therefore removing rule 9.2(2) from its proposed rulebook. The Bank considers the requirement in the enabling regulations for the Bank to publish the granting of a permission (unless the Bank deems it inappropriate or unnecessary) should be sufficient for bringing a published permission to the attention of the public. This therefore achieves a satisfactory policy outcome without specifically requiring the CCP to disclose this information in the rules.
Record Keeping
11.24 In Chapter 9 of the CP, the Bank proposed to make minor changes to the Record Keeping Part which was developed from Assimilated Law provisions in Article 29 of UK EMIR and Articles 12 to 16 of CDR 153/2013 as well as Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 1249/2012 (CIR 1249/2012). This included changes to ensure accurate references, clarification on the ongoing nature of some requirements and to ensure consistency.
11.25 The Bank did not receive feedback on this chapter of its consultation and will proceed with restating UK EMIR requirements as described in the CP, with one minor change.
11.26 The Bank has specified in rule 2.10(2) of the Record Keeping Part that a CCP has a six-month period, following a request from the Bank, to provide the Bank with a direct data feed to specified records. This is an existing requirement under Article 1(4) of CIR 1249/2012 and therefore the Bank assesses it does not present an additional requirement for CCPs, compared to the existing framework under UK EMIR.
Business Continuity
11.27 In Chapter 10 of the CP, the Bank proposed to restate the UK EMIR business continuity requirements into Bank rules with minor amendments.
11.28 The amendments are intended to consolidate the requirements and achieve consistency in their wording. They include:
- changing references to ‘critical functions or services’ to instead refer to ‘critical business functions and related systems’; and
- not restating requirements where they have already been completed (such as the development of technical standards) or where they are no longer consistent with the Bank’s new role as a statutory rule-maker (eg Article 21(3) CDR 153/2013).
11.29 Respondents noted that while they agreed with the Bank’s proposals for the restatement of business continuity requirements into Bank rules, they wished for additional clarity on the types of systems that fall under the scope of the modified rule text that was restating Article 17(3) of CDR.
11.30 The Bank wishes to clarify that the types of systems being referred to in the modified rule text of ‘critical business functions and related systems’ are ‘information technology systems’ that support the delivery of critical functions in order to facilitate business continuity. In the CP, these systems are referenced under paragraph 11.4 (and outlined in Section 3 of the Operational Resilience Part of the draft FMI Rulebook: UK Central Counterparties Instrument 2025). Requirements for CCPs regarding information technology systems are currently provided under Article 9 of CDR 153/2013. The Bank has not made any changes to the business continuity requirements under its CP proposals.
Operational Resilience
11.31 In Chapter 11 of the CP, the Bank proposed restating UK EMIR provisions relating to operational resilience into Bank rules, with only minor modifications.
11.32 The modifications included replacing the existing process requiring CCPs to seek permission from the Bank to outsource major activities linked to risk management under Article 35 of UK EMIR with a requirement to seek permission under section 138BA of FSMA. This will achieve the same effect as the existing process.
11.33 Respondents noted that the restated text under rule 3.8(2) of the Operational Resilience Part (regarding information technology system requirements) has historically created interpretation issues for CCPs, specifically around the use of the term ‘guarantee’. Having considered this feedback, the Bank has amended the drafting of rule 3.8(2) of the Operational Resilience Part by replacing ‘guarantee’ with ‘maintain’.
11.34 Respondents noted that while they have no comment on the change to Article 35 UK EMIR, they encourage the Bank to further consolidate requirements that are currently specified in the Operational Resilience: Central Counterparties Supervisory Statement by stating them in the Bank’s FMI rulebook, in the interests of simplicity and completeness of the rules. The Bank is not making any changes at this stage but is intending to move these guidance and supervisory statements into Bank rules, as appropriate, in due course.
Conduct of Business
11.35 In Chapter 12 of the CP, the Bank proposed to recreate the rules as previously outlined in Articles 36, 37, 38 and 39 of UK EMIR. The Bank proposed a set of minor changes to these rules including relocating a portion of Article 38(1) of UK EMIR into rule 3.9 of the Conduct of Business Part. Proposals also included the introduction of the guidance on disclosing information by CCPs that is currently outlined in the ESMA Q&As on EMIR implementation in rule 4.1 of the Conduct of Business Part, and restating the obligation under UK EMIR Article 38(5) as an instance where the Bank may use its requirements power under FSMA.
11.36 The Bank has made some minor amendments in relation to this Part of the rulebook. This includes addressing two minor drafting errors in rules 3.2(2) and 3.2(3) which were raised by a respondent.
11.37 A respondent also noted that rule 3.9 of the Conduct of Business Part states that a CCP must allow its clearing members and, where relevant, their clients separate access to the specific services provided. The respondent noted that, while this wording was taken from Article 38(1) of UK EMIR, if read literally this provision places an obligation on a CCP with relevance to a clearing member’s clients. The respondent noted that in practice a CCP will usually have no contractual or other relationships with clients, who may access the CCP's services only via their clearing members. We recognise that reading this rule as proposed within the Bank’s consultation without the context of the EMIR recitals could raise issues in light of the way participant relationship models are structured. The Bank has therefore made changes to the drafting of this rule to ensure that there is no implied direct relationship and obligation between the CCP and client in this instance.
11.38 The Bank has clarified the application of rules 5.7 and 5.8 of the Conduct of Business Part related to a CCP’s right of use over margin and default fund contributions. The near-final rules clarify that these rights of use provided under a security financial collateral arrangement, or an arrangement under another jurisdiction with a similar or equivalent effect, must be reflected in a CCP’s operating rules and the clearing member must have accepted those rules in writing.
Exposure Management
11.39 In Chapter 13 of the CP, the Bank proposed to restate UK EMIR requirements related to exposure management into CCP rules, without modifications.
11.40 One respondent queried whether the Bank should integrate the Exposure Management Part as an annex elsewhere in the rulebook given its brevity. The Bank is keeping the Exposure Management Part as its own part for ease of accessibility.
Collateral
11.41 In Chapter 19 of the CP, the Bank proposed to restate UK EMIR requirements related to collateral into CCP rules, with minor changes only.
11.42 The Bank has clarified that rule 2.1(1) of the Collateral Part, which concerns collateral covering exposures to clearing members, also applies where relevant to interoperable CCPs. This is intended to be a clarification only and does not represent a change to existing policy.
11.43 The Bank has replaced the term ‘margin’ with ‘exposures’ in rule 2.4 of the Collateral Part. This is a clarificatory change only.
11.44 The Bank has made consequential amendments to rule 7.1 of the Collateral Part to reflect broader clarifications relating to credit institutions and their branches. This clarifies the requirements that apply where gold is deposited with each type of institution or branch. It clarifies the intended application of the existing requirements and does not represent a change in policy intention.
11.45 The Bank has changed a reference in rule 10.5(2) of the Collateral Part from ‘initial margin’ to ‘margins (including, where appropriate, variation margin)’. The proposed rule under consultation stated that a CCP must not apply the limits set out in the concentration limits section to collateral held by the CCP in excess of the minimum requirements for initial margin, default fund or other financial resources. Where the proposed rule referred to initial margin, UK EMIR had referred to margins. Two respondents noted that for some CCPs, their relevant calculations are wider in scope than initial margin only. Therefore, to provide additional clarity, the near-final rule 10.5(2) refers to ‘margins (including, where appropriate, variation margin)’.
11.46 The Bank wishes to clarify that a CCP still has the option not to mark-to-market collateral on a near real-time basis if they are able to manage the risks. This is permitted under UK EMIR and a respondent queried if this remains permitted under Bank rules. As noted in the CP, the Bank has removed from rules the UK EMIR requirement that a CCP must be able to demonstrate to the Bank that it is able to manage such risks. It is still the case that the CCP must be able to manage the associated risks, and the Bank will be able to request information to check compliance with its rules and require CCPs to make changes to their approach. The Bank is not making any rule changes in response.
11.47 The Bank also sought views on the risks and benefits of expanding the scope of eligible collateral. This is addressed below under ‘Discussion Chapter – Eligible Collateral’.
Investment Policy
11.48 In Chapter 20 of the CP, the Bank proposed to restate UK EMIR requirements related to investment policy into CCP rules, with minor changes only.
11.49 The Bank has included clarifications in the Glossary and Investment Policy Part regarding PRA-authorised UK branches of overseas banks. Two respondents sought clarity on the scope of the previous definition of the term ‘authorised UK credit institution’, as these institutions are required to meet less stringent requirements in order for CCPs to deposit margin, default fund contributions and contributions to other financial resources with them. The Bank had intended for the term to include UK branches of overseas banks, which does not represent a policy change from UK EMIR. The Bank has therefore amended the glossary definitions of authorised overseas credit institution and authorised UK credit institution, and created additional glossary definitions for overseas credit institution UK branch, and UK credit institution overseas branch. These additional definitions have been integrated into rules 4.1 and 4.2, and 5.1 and 5.2 of the Investment Policy Part. Consequential amendments have also been made to reflect these definitional clarifications in 7.1 of the Collateral Part.
11.50 The Bank has clarified that rule references to right of use and re-use are applicable to security interests and not title transfer. Two respondents queried whether investment policy provisions in rule 4.4 – and consequentially rules 5.7 and 5.8 of the Conduct of Business Part - were applicable to margin, default fund contributions, or contributions to other financial resources provided by way of title transfer. Respondents cited historical interpretive challenges. The Bank has clarified in rules 5.7 and 5.8 of the Conduct of Business Part and rule 4.4 of the Investment Policy Part that the provisions apply to instruments received under a security financial collateral arrangement, or an arrangement under the law of another jurisdiction having a similar or equivalent effect.
11.51 The Bank has expanded on the scope of the permitted purposes of reuse in rule 4.4 of the Investment Policy Part. Two respondents sought clarity on the scope of this rule. The Bank has included clarificatory detail in the rule in line with existing purposive interpretation.
11.52 The Bank has amended rule 2.3 of the Investment Policy Part to clarify that this applies to collateral received by the CCP, rather than collateral provided by a CCP to a CSD. One respondent queried this provision and noted UK EMIR’s wording more clearly reflected that this reference was to collateral received by the CCP. The Bank confirms this is still the correct interpretation of the requirement and has made a clarificatory update to rule 2.3 of the Investment Policy Part to reflect this.
11.53 Several respondents queried the requirement in rule 5.3 of the Investment Policy Part that at least 95% of cash maintained overnight other than with a central bank must be held through arrangements secured by highly liquid financial instruments. Cash maintained overnight at a central bank is not subject to this collateralisation requirement and is excluded from the 95% calculation. The respondents noted this requirement was onerous to meet and that, by excluding central bank deposits, it could create an incentive for CCPs to reduce central bank deposits in favour of collateralised cash arrangements in order to meet the 95% ratio. Respondents requested that the Bank amend this provision so that cash held with central banks would also be counted towards the 95% requirement. The Bank considers that this amendment may undermine the current level of security provided by the requirement, as it could allow a greater amount of a CCP’s total cash to be placed in unsecured commercial bank deposits. In addition, the counting of large central bank deposits in the CCP’s principal currency could offset a lower secured proportion of commercial bank cash in other currencies in which the CCP operates, and requires liquidity in. The Bank will therefore not make this amendment.
11.54 Two respondents requested that the Bank amends the requirement in paragraph 1(3) of the Annex to the Investment Policy Part, under which the average time-to-maturity of a CCP’s portfolio does not exceed two years. Respondents argued this is overly restrictive, operationally intensive, and can force CCPs into fast alternative investments if a short-term position expires. Respondents sought a higher time-to-maturity or the ability to include non-invested funds in the calculation. The Bank considers that allowing a greater proportion of a CCP’s investments to have longer maturities could decrease liquidity and increase credit and market risk. Incorporating non-invested funds would have a similar effect by enabling CCPs to hold a greater proportion of longer-dated instruments. The Bank will therefore not make this amendment.
11.55 Some respondents requested that the Bank consider expanding the range of instruments that a CCP is permitted to invest in to include Money Market Funds (MMFs). A respondent also advocated MMFs to be permitted as eligible investments. While the Bank is not amending the Investment Policy Part at this time, it will continue to monitor market developments and consider whether further policy consideration may be appropriate. The Bank is already progressing work following responses to the eligible collateral discussion chapter in the CP, as set out below at paragraphs 11.74–11.76.
11.56 Respondents also requested that the Bank expands the range of instruments that a CCP is permitted to invest in to include high-quality corporate bonds. Two respondents advocated for high-quality corporate bonds, noting this would greatly increase the range of instruments a CCP can invest in. The Bank considers that the market for these instruments is generally less liquid and carries higher market risk than the public debt instruments currently permitted under investment policy provisions, and risks introducing market and credit risk through a CCP’s investments. The Bank will therefore not be pursuing this change at this time.
11.57 A respondent also requested that the Bank expands the range of instruments that a CCP is permitted to invest in to include EU bonds, covered bonds, and interest rate derivatives to hedge against interest rate risk only. The Bank acknowledges there may be basis to explore these instruments in future for investment policy purposes and would look to consider this as part of possible future work on investment policy detailed later in this section.
11.58 Multiple respondents requested amendments to the requirement in rule 2.3 of the Investment Policy Part, under which a CCP must hold financial instruments posted as margins, default fund contributions, or contributions to other financial resources, with an operator of a securities settlement system, where one is available. This requirement was carried into rules from EMIR Article 47(3), with CDR 153/2013 Article 44 outlining alternative arrangements for depositing these instruments if no Central Securities Depository (CSD) is considered available, including custodian banks meeting certain standards. Respondents requested the Bank give CCPs optionality between depositing instruments at a CSD or the alternative arrangements outlined in technical standards, even when a CSD is available. Respondents variously argued that, given the UK’s market structure, the current provision forces participants to manage collateral across multiple locations, and this fragments liquidity pools and reduces collateral mobility. A respondent also pointed to concentration risk at a UK CSD.
11.59 The Bank considers CSDs as a highly reliable option for the deposit of financial instruments: CSDs minimise custody chains and reliance on intermediaries, provide a high level of legal certainty and asset protection, and reduce credit, operational and legal risks in comparison to other institutional types. Responses indicated that the Investment Policy Part of the rulebook could interact with a range of developing operational approaches, including developing work on tokenised collateral.
11.60 The amendment proposed by stakeholders as detailed in the above paragraph 11.58 has the potential to significantly alter the settlement landscape, and the financial stability benefits of this amendment require further consideration before implementing any changes. However, the Bank anticipates returning to the Investment Policy Part and assessing possible changes as emerging technologies and approaches develop.
Settlement
11.61 In Chapter 22 of the CP, the Bank proposed to recreate the rules previously outlined in Article 50 of UK EMIR, the proposed rules were made with minor changes to improve the clarity and transparency of the rules.
11.62 The Bank did not receive feedback on this chapter of its consultation and will proceed with restating UK EMIR requirements in its near-final rules with the minor changes described in the CP.
Capital Calculations and Reporting
11.63 In Chapter 23 of the CP, the Bank proposed to restate the rules previously outlined in Articles 50a to 50d of UK EMIR, and Articles 1–4 of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 484/2014 (CIR 484/2014), with minor changes only.
11.64 The Bank has updated rule 5.4 of the Capital Calculations and Reporting Part to require weekly rather than daily reporting frequency during specified scenarios. Three respondents noted that the requirement for daily reporting would be onerous while a CCP is managing the default of a clearing member. The Bank accepts this assessment and has updated rule 5.4 of the Capital Calculations and Reporting Part to require weekly reporting of its capital calculations under the specified scenarios. The Bank considers this to be a proportionate approach.
11.65 The Bank has corrected an error by removing references to ‘total amount of initial margin’ in the Capital Calculations & Reporting Part of the rules relating to capital calculations of hypothetical capital.
Recognition of non-UK CCPs
11.66 In Chapter 25 of the CP, the Bank proposed to restate the CCP-facing requirements for recognised non-UK CCPs (hereon referred to as ‘overseas CCPs’) into Bank rules. The Bank also proposed minor consequential amendments in relation to the existing Statements of Policy regarding the tiering of non-UK CCPs, and approach to comparable compliance for systemic overseas CCPs. No material policy changes were proposed in this area.
11.67 After consultation, the Bank has made minor consequential amendments to the Overseas Part of the CCP rulebook. In particular, the Bank has updated rule 4.2 of the overseas part to provide further clarity regarding the requirement for an systemic overseas CCP to provide the Bank with written confirmation regarding its continued ability to meet the conditions for recognition. The Bank has not made any post-consultation changes to the Statement of Policy – The Bank of England’s approach to tiering non-UK CCPs (Tiering SoP), or the Statement of Policy – The Bank of England’s approach to comparable compliance permissions (Comparable Compliance SoP).
11.68 Respondents were broadly supportive of the Bank’s approach to restating the recognition framework for non-UK CCPs without changing existing policy outcomes. Respondents emphasised the importance of timely and predictable recognition, international regulatory cooperation, and embracing of mutual regulatory deference where an overseas CCP is already subject to robust home authority oversight. This is in line with the Bank’s approach to non-UK CCPs, where the Bank places reliance on the supervision and regulation of the CCP’s home authority where it is appropriate to do so and sufficient cooperation arrangements are in place.
11.69 One respondent commented on the CP’s statement that costs for systemic overseas CCPs would align with the cost estimates for UK CCPs but could be lower in individual cases where a comparable compliance permission is granted. The respondent considered that, given the range is large and depends on an individual comparable compliance assessment, it was not possible to assess in advance which costs would apply to a particular systemic overseas CCP.
11.70 The Bank notes that its approach to comparable compliance is intended to support deference where comparable supervisory outcomes are achieved through a CCP’s home regulatory regime. In addition, where an overseas CCP is determined to be systemic, the framework will provide for an appropriate run-in period before the requirements applicable to systemic overseas CCPs apply (subject to the final legislation coming into force).footnote [15] This will provide sufficient time and transparency for the CCP and relevant home authorities to understand the requirements and the associated cost implications. The Bank is not making changes to its proposed rules or Comparable Compliance SoP in response to this comment.
11.71 One respondent made comments relating to UK Markets in Financial Instruments Regulation (‘UK MiFIR’) Article 38. The respondent noted that UK MiFIR Article 38 requires an HMT equivalence decision as a pre-condition for access between UK trading venues and non-UK CCPs. The respondent suggested that this may create an unintended barrier to competition, and suggested that UK authorities consider whether the UK MiFIR Article 38 equivalence mechanism remains necessary in light of the new Overseas Recognition Regime (ORR).
11.72 The Bank notes that UK MiFIR Article 38 is outside the scope of this consultation. Under the current UK transitional provisions, non-UK CCPs may provide services to UK clearing members and trading venues where they are operating under the temporary recognition regime (‘TRR’) or run-off regime. In addition, non-UK CCPs that have been recognised by the Bank under UK EMIR are able to provide services to UK clearing members and trading venues.
11.73 One respondent asked the Bank to confirm that Tier 1 (non-systemic) overseas CCPs would not be brought into the model-change permission regime and would remain subject to notification requirements relating to the conditions of recognition. The Bank confirms that non-systemic overseas CCPs are only subject to the Overseas Part of the CCP rulebook, which includes a limited set of notification requirements. Where a non-systemic overseas CCP seeks to vary the scope of its UK recognition, the Bank intends to consult on a draft Statement of Policy on variation of recognition for overseas CCPs. The consultation is expected in the first half of 2027.
Discussion chapter – eligible collateral
11.74 The Bank sought views on the risks and benefits of expanding the scope of eligible collateral, including letters of credit (LOCs) and tokenised assets. The feedback was valuable in gauging initial interest from industry. Based on this, the Bank has undertaken analysis and is now consulting on proposals to allow LOCs to be accepted as collateral, subject to robust safeguards.footnote [16] The Bank has also published a consultation paper setting out its supervisory expectations for CCPs seeking to accept tokenised collateral, with a view to supporting firms who are interested in the use of these assets by providing greater clarity on the Bank’s supervisory expectations.footnote [17] The Bank will consider feedback received through these consultations before deciding whether any further clarity or rule changes are needed.
11.75 Some stakeholders suggested that Money Market Funds (MMFs) should be considered as eligible collateral – this was mentioned in the context of tokenised MMFs and Public Debt Constant Net Asset Value MMFs. The Bank considers it important that all assets accepted as collateral meet the eligibility requirements set out in rules. These requirements aim to ensure that collateral can be realised in a timely manner, including in stressed market conditions. In assessing whether MMFs meet the eligibility requirements, CCPs should consider factors such as barriers to redemption and the extent to which redemption timelines, operating arrangements and liquidity characteristics of these instruments could affect their ability to access collateral in a timely manner. Within the consultation on the Bank’s proposed approach to CCPs accepting tokenised collateral, the Bank invites feedback on potential future types of tokenised collateral including, but not limited to, tokenised MMFs, stablecoins and tokenised gold. The Bank will continue to monitor industry interest and implications for risk management and, reflect on responses to its consultation regarding tokenised collateral.
11.76 Given the interest in new collateral types, the Bank also notes the importance and value of CCPs having options to innovate and test market interest. As set out at Chapter 10, in response to feedback requesting more avenues to facilitate innovation at established CCPs, the Bank is introducing a New Collateral Pathway that will allow CCPs to accept a limited amount of new collateral, including new collateral that is non-eligible under the rules, without a 60-business-day model review. This will enable CCPs to develop and test risk management and controls, as well as demand, supporting experimentation within responsible limits. It can also provide the Bank with evidence that can inform future considerations around collateral eligibility and relevant rules where needed.
Bank’s objectives, ‘have regards’ and Cost benefit analysis
11.77 The Bank has considered the consultation feedback received on its proposals in areas where no material policy change was put forward under the CP. The Bank is implementing the near-final policy as consulted, and with minor clarificatory amendments that do not alter the substance of the policy. The Bank therefore considers that the objectives, ‘have regards’ and cost benefit analysis set out in the CP remains applicable to the near-final policy for areas where no material changes were proposed.
12: Consultation on the draft instrument revoking rule 4 of the Recognised Clearing House Rules Instrument for CCPs 2018
12.1 In March 2026, the Bank consulted on its intention to revoke Rule 4 of the Recognised Clearing House Rules Instrument 2018 (RCH 4), which requires CCPs to report operational incidents. RCH 4 duplicates the operational incident and outsourcing and third-party reporting (IOREP) rules for FMIs, which come into force on 18 March 2027.
12.2 The Bank considers that its proposed approach is aligned with the Bank’s primary financial stability objective as the Bank will, through the new IOREP reporting requirements, still receive appropriate information on operational incidents. The Bank also considers that this approach would advance the secondary innovation objective by offering clarity on applicable requirements and aligns with the FSMA ‘have regard’ principles on transparency and efficient use of resources, thereby reducing duplicate reporting and streamlining resourcing. The Bank considers the approach is consistent with the recommendation in the remit letter from the Chancellor of the Exchequer to the Bank on 1 July 2025 that the Financial Market Infrastructure Committee (FMIC) have regard to the role of proportionate regulation in facilitating growth.
12.3 The Bank has not carried out a cost benefit analysis as it considers that the revocation of the existing rule for CCPs is exempted from the requirement to carry out such analysis as it will lead to no increase in costs.
12.4 Following the earlier March 2026 consultation, the Bank is now seeking views on the draft instrument to revoke RCH 4 when the IOREP incident reporting requirements come into force. The draft revocation instrument is included in Annex 9.
12.5 The consultation will close on 30 November 2026 and responses should be sent to FMI-IOREP-CP@bankofengland.co.uk. The Bank will take into account any responses already received to the March 2026 consultation. Subject to the comments received, the Bank proposes to publish the final instrument and proceed with revoking RCH 4 on 18 March 2027, at the point that the incident reporting rules under the Bank’s operational incident and outsourcing and third-party reporting policy (IOREP) policy for FMIs take effect.
13: Next steps
13.1 The CCP rulebook instruments included at annex 1 and accompanying policy materials at annexes 2 – 5 are near-final and subject to HMT making the legislation regarding the revocation of UK EMIR Title III-V and restatement of the new CCP framework. As set out at paragraph 1.24 of this PS, the Bank currently expects HMT to lay its main SI in Q4 2026, with a commencement SI following in Q1 2027. Subject to the legislation being made by Parliament, the Bank will make the final CCP rules and finalise the accompanying policy materials. This is likely to include updated references to amended and restated legislation where current references in the near-final rules still relate to HMT draft statutory instruments, published in July 2025 and final savings provisions.footnote [18]
13.2 HMT’s legislation is expected to include provisions regarding regulator Binding Technical Standards (BTS), that will ensure existing references to UK EMIR are updated in line with the new CCP framework under FSMA and Bank rules.
13.3 In addition, the Bank will seek to revise references to UK EMIR in existing Statements of Policy and Supervisory Statements to ensure alignment with the new CCP framework expected to come into force next year.
13.4 HMT's legislation is also expected to include: provisions related to the variation of recognition for overseas CCPs (where a recognised non-UK CCP intends to extend or withdraw a service, or where the Bank withdraws recognition in respect of a clearing service), and provisions that introduce a permanent Qualifying CCP regime which includes a route for non-UK CCPs to apply to the Bank for QCCP status. The Bank intends to consult on a proposed Statement of Policy regarding variation of recognition for overseas CCPs in the first half of 2027. In addition, the Bank will also seek to publish guidance next year for non-UK CCPs intending to apply for QCCP status. The Bank anticipates that the guidance will only be relevant to a small number of non-UK CCP, as the majority of non-UK CCPs would automatically hold the status under the new QCCP regime where HMT has made an equivalence determination (or overseas recognition determination) regarding the CCP’s home jurisdiction.
13.5 Following the repeal and replacement of UK EMIR Titles III-V into legislation and Bank rules, the majority of CCP-facing requirements will be in one place – the Bank’s rulebook. Some CCP-facing requirements are included in legislation that falls outside of the scope of UK EMIR Titles III-V. Subject to further discussion with HMT, the Bank expects to address these requirements as part of further reviews with the intent of transferring all remaining CCP requirements into the Bank’s rulebook in due course.
13.6 The Bank recognises that a range of on-shored ESMA Level 3 materials, including Q&As, guidelines and opinions, continue to support interpretation of the UK framework. The Bank intends to review this material as part of the next phase of work to complete the transfer of existing on-shored EU framework into Bank rules and policy materials.
14: Annexes
- Bank of England FMI Rulebook: UK Central Counterparties Instrument 2027
- Bank of England FMI Rulebook: UK Central Counterparties: Interpretation and General Provisions Instrument 2027
- Bank of England FMI Rulebook: Overseas Central Counterparties Instrument 2027
- Bank of England FMI Rulebook: Glossary Instrument 2027
The following marked-up version of the Collateral Part of the CCP rulebook is for illustrative purposes only. It is intended to show the changes that would be made to the Collateral Part on the basis of the Bank's proposals under its consultation paper Review of CCP collateral rules - letters of credit:
The following respondents to the consultation Ensuring the Resilience of CCPs were content for their names to be published:
Aviva
The Association for Financial Markets in Europe (AFME)
The Bank of New York Mellon (BNY)
ClearToken
Energy Traders Europe
European Association of CCP Clearing Houses (EACH)
The Financial Markets Law Committee (FMLC)
Futures Industry Association (FIA)
GFO-X Ltd.
The Global Association of Central Counterparties (CCP Global)
ICE Clear Europe
International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA)
LME Clear
London Stock Exchange Group (LSEG)
RWE Supply & Trading GmbH
Six Clearing
UK Finance
The World Federation of Exchanges (WFE)
Review of CCP collateral rules - letters of credit; Consultation on supervisory expectations for central counterparties seeking to accept tokenised collateral.
Review of CCP collateral rules - letters of credit; Consultation on supervisory expectations for central counterparties seeking to accept tokenised collateral.
Section149 Equality Act 2010.
Section 409B of FSMA 2000 (as inserted by FSMA 2023) and as applied by paragraph 31A of Schedule 17A to FSMA.
HMT previously published two draft Statutory Instruments for technical comment, alongside an accompanying policy note: Updating the UK’s regulatory framework for central counterparties - GOV.UK.
Fundamental Rules for Financial Market Infrastructures: supervisory statement.
www.bankofengland.co.uk/paper/2026/sop/the-boes-approach-to-rule-permissions-and-waivers.The permissions power under section 138BA FSMA 2000 allows the Bank to give permission to a central counterparty, central securities depository or critical third party for an applicable Bank rule to be modified or waived.
As set out in the Bank of England’s supervisory approach to onboarding new financial market infrastructure firms. www.bankofengland.co.uk/paper/2026/sop/the-boes-approach-to-using-its-requirements-and-permissions-to-facilitate-mobilisation-of-new-ccps
www.bankofengland.co.uk/paper/2026/sop/the-boes-approach-to-rule-permissions-and-waivers.
As set out under 300EH (2)(b)(iii) of The Central Counterparties (Amendment) Regulations 2025.
The Central Counterparties (Amendment) Regulations 2025 and The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Criteria for Determining Systemic Importance of Overseas Central Counterparties) Regulations 2025.