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Central bank independence and accountability: theory and evidence
Quarterly Bulletin 1996 Q1
Published on
01 March 1996
Clive Briault, Andrew Haldane and Mervyn King discuss the importance of central bank accountability: how it relates to central bank independence; why central banks should be accountable for their actions; and how accountability and transparency can help to reduce the inflation bias which might otherwise result from discretionary policy-making.